


095018

JPRS-USA-84-001

31 JANUARY 1984



USSR Report

USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY

No. 11, NOVEMBER 1983

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 2

19980727 091

FBIS

FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE



6
96
A05

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service (NTIS), Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in Government Reports Announcements issued semimonthly by the NTIS, and are listed in the Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

Soviet books and journal articles displaying a copyright notice are reproduced and sold by NTIS with permission of the copyright agency of the Soviet Union. Permission for further reproduction must be obtained from copyright owner.

NOTICE

Effective with this issue, JPRS is implementing a new numbering system for its reports in which the dual numbering system currently in use will be replaced with a single 15-character alphanumeric code. Within this code, each JPRS report will have a unique trigraph code. For example, the alphanumeric code for the first JPRS JAPAN REPORT issued in 1984 will be:

JPRS-JAR-84-001

Explanation of Elements of Alphanumeric Code

JPRS: Indicates that the report was published by the Joint Publications Research Service

JAR: Trigraph code for the JAPAN REPORT

84: Indicates the year in which the report was published

001: First report in the series. Each report series will have a separate numbering system that will begin with 001 on 1 January every year and will end on 31 December every year with whatever 3-digit number has been reached.

The alphanumeric code described above will appear in the upper left-hand corner of each report. The date the report was prepared for publication will appear on the line below the code.

31 January 1984

USSR REPORT

USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY
No. 11, November 1983

Except where indicated otherwise in the table of contents the following is a complete translation of the Russian-language monthly journal SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA published in Moscow by the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies, USSR Academy of Sciences.

CONTENTS

Arbatov Examines History of U.S.-USSR Relations (pp 3-15) (G. A. Arbatov).....	1
Fifty Years of Diplomatic Relations Between USSR and United States (pp 16-27) (V. V. Sokolov).....	17
Objective Necessity (American Press Reports of 1933 on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations Between USSR and United States) (pp 28-34) (T. N. Yudina) (not translated)	
U.S. Debates on Space ABM System (pp 35-46) (A. A. Kokoshin).....	32
American Urban Petty Bourgeoisie: Some Economic and Sociopolitical Aspects (pp 47-59) (A. N. Mel'nikov) (not translated)	
Washington's 'Big Stick' Policy Threatening Central America (pp 60-63) (Yu. V. Romantsov).....	45
Washington's Intervention in the Conflict in Chad (pp 63-70) (V. Yu. Vasil'kov).....	50
Congressional Democrats' Foreign-Policy Proposals Critiqued (pp 70-75) (N. N. Sokov).....	58
American Films at Moscow International Film Festival (pp 75-81) (I. Ye. Kokarev) (not translated)	

Operations of U.S. Oil Monopolies Under New Conditions (pp 82-91)
(A. N. Loginov, Yu. S. Stepanov) 63

'Canada Already Has a Unique Culture' (pp 92-93)
(Claude Fournier) (not translated)

American Journey. Traveling with Tocqueville in Search of Democracy
in America (pp 94-100)
(Richard Reeves) (not translated)

U.S. Railway Transport and Technical Progress (pp 101-111)
(A. A. Zmeyev) (not translated)

Book Reviews

Book About Current Political, Social Tensions Reviewed
(pp 112-115)
(A. Yu. Mel'vil') 76

Review of 'Texas Rich. The Hunt Dynasty from the Early Oil
Days Through the Silver Crash' by Harry Hurt (pp 115-117)
(Yu. A. Shvedkov) (not translated)

Book About U.S.-French Relations Reviewed (pp 117-121)
(G. A. Trofimenko) 81

Russian-Language Edition of U.S. Scientific Journal Reviewed
(pp 121-124)
(I. Ye. Malashenko) 86

Review of 'Echo of the Shots in Dallas' by S. A. Losev and
V. V. Petrusenko (pp 125-127)
(A. A. Arzumanov) (not translated)

PUBLICATION DATA

English title : USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY
No 11, November 1983

Russian title : SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA

Author (s) :

Editor (s) : N. D. Turkatenko

Publishing House : Izdatel'stvo Nauka

Place of Publication : Moscow

Date of Publication : November 1983

Signed to press : 21 October 1983

Copies : 30,283

COPYRIGHT : Izdatel'stvo "Nauka", "SShA--ekonomika,
politika, ideologiya", 1983

ARBATOV EXAMINES HISTORY OF U.S.-USSR RELATIONS

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 83 (signed to press 21 Oct 83) pp 3-15

[Article by G. A. Arbatov: "Thoughts on the Jubilee (Commemorating the 50th Anniversary of the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations Between the USSR and United States)"]

[Text] The achievements of physical science have for the first time opened up the possibility of total self-destruction by mankind, of the annihilation of human civilization and even of the biological species. The chances of avoiding such an end and of putting self-preservation mechanisms in action are associated not with technology or physics, but with intelligent policy and with the institutions and spheres of knowledge which serve that policy. It seems to me that history plays a considerable role among them. It is readily available to society, to mankind's collective memory, and that memory helps us to understand the past and to learn lessons from it so that we can cope more successfully with problems in the future.

It is from this standpoint that I should like to approach the anniversary which is being marked on 17 November 1983--the 50th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the USSR and the United States.

Nonrecognition as a Way of Thinking and a Way of Acting

The establishment of diplomatic relations was preceded, as can be easily calculated, by 16 years of the absence of such relations, 16 years during which America did not recognize the Soviet Union as a sociopolitical reality.

Nonrecognition is not a rare foreign policy tactic, particularly in U.S. foreign policy. I once heard a psychiatrist's views on this policy. He drew a parallel between it and the pathological reaction of certain individuals who respond to extremely unpleasant and distressing events by simply "not noticing" them, ignoring them and not allowing information about these events to enter even the most remote corners of their minds.

This kind of behavior in an individual is correctly regarded as pathological, and people try to cure him. But what if we are dealing with a state and a state policy?

This is probably also pathological behavior, but it is politically pathological. I do not know the cure. It is probable that only history itself can cure this disease, and if the "patient" is stubborn the matter will end in major or minor political problems. But political nonrecognition cannot be viewed only as an attempt to ignore an unpleasant reality. Frankly, if that were all that America's nonrecognition of the Soviet Union entailed, we might even heave a sigh of relief. It is better to be ignored or forgotten than to be the target of hostile acts. But the crux of the matter is precisely that hostile intentions and hostile actions often lie behind political nonrecognition. Here it all acquires a certain logic. By not recognizing a particular country, you decline to treat it in ways which do not run counter to international law and you reserve the right to treat the country in the worst way possible--in any way you see fit.

This, however, is not a disease, but a specific policy.

The young Nation of Soviets learned what lay behind that policy as early as 1918. It is true that the United States was not alone in this behavior and it was not even its main instigator. But it meticulously did its share to follow W. Churchill's orders to smother the "infant in the cradle," trying to put an end to the "Soviet challenge" by means of direct armed intervention. The United States was directly involved in that intervention and it also gave generous financial assistance to counterrevolutionaries, spending many billions of dollars on attempts to overthrow the Soviet regime.

Our people are not noted for bearing grudges, but they do not suffer from lapses of memory either. Therefore, they remember the beginning of our relationship with the United States. And is this surprising? As Senator Claiborne Pell once admitted, the Americans "would have reacted even more harshly if Russian troops had landed, for instance, simultaneously in Florida, Washington State and Rhode Island."¹

As we know, the intervention failed. After that, we repeatedly proposed to the United States that relations be normalized. In spite of this, American ruling circles persisted for much longer than the other Western countries in refusing the USSR diplomatic recognition.

Perhaps one of the reasons was that an absolutely bestial hatred of socialism, which--and this was no joke--was trying (as Secretary of State R. Lansing wrote to W. Wilson) "to turn the ignorant and incompetent masses into the masters of the earth," was particularly strong in the politically provincial America of those years. Political provincialism can also explain a certain stagnation in the political thinking of the majority of U.S. ruling circles; eventually, the capitalist (and highly anti-Soviet in inclination) Britain and France established relations with the USSR much earlier. And another thing: For a number of domestic reasons the movement of leftwing circles for the normalization of relations with Soviet Russia did not have as much impact on U.S. policy as on the policy of many European countries.

But it would seem that there was also another group of factors at work here which reflected the uniquely American historical features and had a considerable

influence on the basic ideological and political tenets of the American bourgeoisie.

American foreign policy's break with the country's bourgeois democratic past and with its democratic traditions can be traced back to the time when U.S. capitalism entered its imperialist stage of development. These were the traditions of a country which was the first to proclaim, in the Declaration of Independence, the people's right to revolt and to bring about revolutionary changes in government. These were the traditions of a country whose policy had adhered for a century and a half to the principle of diplomatic recognition of "de facto governments"--that is, governments which actually controlled the territory and population of a specific country, even if they had been created as a result of revolution.

Another factor may have been that the age-old spirit of messianism, which dates back to the Pilgrims (and which was transformed in the 19th century into the political belief in America's "manifest destiny" as the "promised land" of the "chosen people"), began at the start of the imperialist era to convince dominant segments of the American bourgeoisie of their "historic mission" as the main savior of capitalist civilization from the "forces of evil." This would have been the reason for the rejection of socialism as an anomaly, as the "illegitimate child" of history and as an error which should be "rectified" at all costs.

Of course, the loftiest motives, primarily motives of defense, were used to justify this policy toward the USSR. In a message to the President in 1920, then U.S. Secretary of State B. Colby (who is regarded by many people to this day as a founder of the philosophy of "nonrecognition") wrote that the Soviet State's very existence "depends and will continue to depend on the victory of the revolution in all other civilized countries, including the United States." In view of this, the U.S. Government "does not and cannot have anything in common with a state whose approach to international relations is so profoundly alien to its own."² The natural conclusion was that normal relations with the USSR and its admission to the community of "civilized nations" would be possible only on the condition of radical domestic changes, and that U.S. policy would have to do everything within its power to "promote" this.

It is hardly necessary to expose the bankruptcy of the "defensive" phraseology on which these anti-Soviet ideas were (and, it must be said, still are) based. In the very first days after the revolution, the party, after inflicting ideological defeat on the "leftists" and Trotskyists, rejected the "export of revolution" and "revolutionary war" as political methods not compatible with working class ideals. And we consistently, persistently offered the capitalist countries, including the United States, peace, peaceful coexistence and mutually advantageous cooperation. We offered them this despite their hostility.

I will not quote the widely known excerpts from the documents of the young Soviet State which have been cited repeatedly in this connection. I will confine myself to citing the reply of then People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs

G. V. Chicherin to the abovementioned statement by Secretary of State Colby. "Mr. Colby," Chicherin stressed, "is profoundly mistaken in his assumption that normal relations between Russia and North America are possible only on the condition that the capitalist system prevail in Russia. We feel, on the contrary, that it is in the interest of both Russia and North America that relations be established between them without delay, despite their opposing social and political systems, and that these should be thoroughly correct, fair, peaceful and friendly relations, the kind of relations that are necessary for the development of trade between them and for the satisfaction of both sides' economic needs."³

But some people could not understand this, and others did not want to. Non-recognition remained part of the arsenal of American diplomatic policy for a long time, and it became part of the American reactionary political frame of mind. For 16 years the United States did not recognize the Soviet Union. For more than 20 years it did not recognize socialist China (and it may have held out even longer had it not wanted to make use of the "China card" for anti-Soviet purposes). For more than two decades it has not recognized the new Cuba....

Incidentally, even the formal act of diplomatic recognition does not always signify actual recognition on Washington's part. We have often encountered this problem in Soviet-American relations, and this is particularly true today. But this will be discussed at greater length below.

Two Tendencies in U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet Union

Obviously, nonrecognition did not mean that there were no relations between the two countries for 16 years.

These relations existed, and literally from the first days of the revolution. And these were extremely diverse relations--from direct armed conflict to highly intensive economic cooperation. Even then, long before the diplomatic recognition of the USSR, two tendencies in U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union became apparent: unrestrained, implacable hostility and a realistic policy, in which actions are determined not by a blind hatred of socialist Russia but by the desire to base relations with it on a sober understanding of the United States' own political and economic interests and, of course, its own actual potential.

I do not even have to remind the reader that there were more than a few people in the United States who sympathized with revolutionary Russia.

We will never forget the names of John Reed, Albert Rhys Williams, Raymond Robins and others who tried to tell Americans the truth about the new Russia; nor will we forget the solidarity of the many thousands of American workers who perceived, with unerring instinct, the meaning of the impressive changes accomplished by their brothers in distant Russia and saw there, in Lincoln Steffens' words, "a future which works."

And they did not only sympathize with Russia. Despite the position taken by the authorities, even at the height of the Palmer raids and at the time of the

"great Red peril," thousands of ordinary Americans voluntarily gave financial assistance to ravaged, starving Russia and went there themselves to work side by side with the Soviet people to build mines and plants and to form agricultural communes, equipping with tractors and motor vehicles they had brought with them.

Nevertheless, these people were too few in number. From the vantage point of later history, it is indicative that the solidarity of the most intelligent Americans and the common sense of many members of the business and political community, who understood the potential advantages of cooperation with the USSR and the futility of stubborn political hostility and economic blockade, cut through the official policy of "nonrecognition." The blockade demonstrated, as V. I. Lenin remarked, "that it is unclear whether it is a greater burden for those who are blockaded or those who are doing the blockading."⁴

Our trade and economic contacts with American businessmen, established for the first time at the very beginning of the 1920's, received a powerful boost during the first five-year plan. The Soviet Union became one of the main purchasers of the most important U.S. export products; suffice it to say that in 1931, for instance, the USSR accounted for no more and no less than 40 percent of American exports of machines and industrial equipment, including 66 percent of its metal-cutting machine tools, 75 percent of its forging equipment and 96 percent of its locomotives.⁵ This provided hundreds of thousands of Americans with jobs in the years of the "great depression." By 1930 more than 40 major U.S. firms, including Ford Motors, General Electric and du Pont de Nemours, had agreements with the Soviet Union on technical cooperation and participated directly in building the DneproGES, the Stalingrad and Kharkov tractor plants and the Magnitogorsk and Kuznetsk metallurgical plants. Thousands of American workers and specialists worked here. Among those who took part in erecting the country's first large truck plant in Nizhniy Novgorod were the Reuther brothers, Walter and Victor, who were later prominent figures in the American labor movement. High USSR Government awards were conferred on some of these Americans.

Many people wanted to come to the USSR to work: In 1931 more than 100,000 responded to an Amtorg ad for 4,000 jobs. During those years there was a dramatic increase in the U.S. interest in the impressive "Soviet experiment" in economics and planning. This was a truly impressive, unique chapter in the history of our relations.

Although the good periods continued to alternate with bad ones, a sober understanding of the "Soviet problem" gradually gained ground. The more realistic American politicians gradually became aware that it would be absurd to continue to ignore the existence of one of the world's largest states.

"No serious disarmament will be possible until Russia is included in the international community," Senator W. Borah, one of the men who actively supported the recognition of the USSR, said in 1931. "There will be no economic improvement or stability in Europe or in the world in general as long as that huge country, with its incalculable natural and human resources, is waging a painful struggle for economic security; and this struggle will go on as long

as it is treated as an outcast and is denied the usual opportunities for credit and trade.... Any efforts to secure peace and mutual understanding among peoples will be doomed to failure as long as one-sixth of the world, inhabited by the world's third largest population, remains alienated and on its guard."⁷

It ultimately became impossible to ignore the absurdity of the existing state of affairs. Franklin Roosevelt, who came to the White House at the beginning of 1933, told Secretary of State C. Hull at the very start of his term in office: "Two nations as great as America and Russia must talk with one another. The renewal of diplomatic relations will benefit both."⁸

It would be hard to exaggerate the significance of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the USSR and the United States. On Roosevelt's part, this was an act of political farsightedness and some boldness: The advocates of "nonrecognition" were still strong and it would have been easier and safer to continue the old policy, which had already become an institution in government, had acquired a solid political base among ruling circles and was ideologically reinforced by the then current version of the "Soviet threat"-- "ideological infiltration," "subversive" activity, etc.⁹

But Roosevelt was able to overcome this institutional inertia by disregarding the advice of State Department "experts" and by placing vital U.S. national interests above petty questions regarding old debts and ideological differences. He realized that the United States and the world in general faced tasks whose accomplishment would be impossible without the participation of the USSR, primarily the opposition of the growing threat posed by Nazi Germany and militarist Japan. What is more, Roosevelt perceived the futility of the policy of "nonrecognition," which had led neither to a change in the existing system in the USSR nor to the renunciation of Soviet foreign policy principles. Therefore, his proposal, put forth in a message to M. I. Kalinin, chairman of the USSR Central Executive Committee, that talks begin with a view to "putting an end to the present abnormal relations between the 125 million people in the United States and the 165 million in Russia."¹⁰

The Soviet side responded willingly because it was well aware of the international significance of this step. It is not only our two countries which suffer from the lack of relations, Kalinin replied to Roosevelt; this also affects "the overall international situation by increasing elements of unease and complicating the process of consolidating world peace." An exchange of messages between Roosevelt and Litvinov not only laid the legal foundations of relations, but also enshrined the main principles of peaceful coexistence: complete sovereignty, nonintervention in internal affairs in any form and the renunciation of actions "aimed at violating the territorial integrity or forcibly changing the political and social order of the other country."¹¹

These principles, which, incidentally, no one has revoked, are worth recalling now that the U.S. Government is officially subsidizing the subversive activity of organizations like "Radio Liberty" and is giving refuge to emigre governments and organizations encroaching on the USSR's territorial integrity, while the Congress makes resolutions and laws which constitute overt interference in the USSR's internal affairs.

Of course, the two abovementioned tendencies in U.S. policy toward the USSR persisted even after the establishment of diplomatic contacts. Many difficulties and problems persisted in these relations, and their development in the prewar years was quite uneven. Nevertheless, the potential for their successful development was established and was subsequently implemented with success during World War II.

The war itself was a truly remarkable period in the relations between our countries. The shoulder-to-shoulder struggle to the death against a common enemy for the sake of civilization linked our peoples firmly in a single alliance. We remember these moving, memorable years well, perhaps better than the Americans do. And this is only natural: We paid a much higher price for the victory, the price of unprecedented destruction and losses. These were years of close collaboration between our politicians and military leaders, years of a tremendous upsurge in friendly feelings between our peoples. It would be difficult to find clearer confirmation of the possibility of coexistence and even of fruitful cooperation.

This does not mean that we have no other memories of the war. The delay of many years in the opening of the second front, in spite of numerous promises, is one example. We now know that this took place only when the U.S. military and political leaders had serious fears that further delays could make the USSR "too strong" in Europe. The delay cost us much blood and suffering which could have been avoided. There were also secret talks between the United States and Hitler's Germany. Looking back, it is also hard to ignore the fact that the United States was not behaving as a loyal ally should when it kept the development of the atomic bomb a secret from us.

The overall balance of our relations, however, was certainly positive in the war years.

The shift toward cooperation was made possible by the Roosevelt Administration's sober assessment of the situation. For example, the recommendations of the U.S. supreme military command on the eve of the 1943 Quebec conference stated that "since Russia is the decisive factor in the war, it should be given every possible form of support and no effort should be spared to win its friendship. By the same token, since Russia will undoubtedly dominate Europe after the defeat of the Axis countries, it is extremely important to develop and maintain the most friendly relations with it."¹²

But apart from coldblooded calculations regarding the "balance of power," there seems to have been another motive for Roosevelt and his supporters: a new view, reinforced by allied contacts with the Soviet Union, of the USSR as a highly important, equal partner, and the belief that a strong system of international security would necessitate cooperation with the USSR.

Roosevelt wanted to secure a stable postwar order and believed that Moscow would have to be given a fitting place in that order. He did not agree with the current anticommunist dogmas. "They are friendly people. They have no crazy aggressive ideas or anything of that kind; and now that they have become more closely acquainted with us, they are much more inclined to accept us," he remarked in 1944.¹³

The words of Roosevelt's close colleague Harry Hopkins can perhaps be regarded as the fullest expression of this approach. He dictated them not long before his death as a kind of political testament of the Roosevelt Administration on Soviet-American relations: "We know that we and Russia are the two mightiest nations in the world in terms of human and raw material resources. We also know that we were able to fight side by side with the Russians in the greatest war in history. We know or assume that Russia's interests, to the extent that we can predict them, indicate no serious differences between us in foreign affairs. We know that we are interdependent economically. We know that it is easy to deal with the Russians.... I am certain that they have no desire to fight a war with us, they are fully determined to take their place in world affairs and in international organizations and, above all, they want to maintain friendly relations with us....

"The Soviet Union consists of 180 million industrious, proud people.... These are strong-willed, resolute people who think and act like you and me. Our policy toward Russia cannot be dictated by people who have already made up their minds that there is no chance of cooperating with the Russians and that our interests conflict and must ultimately lead to war. I consider that position to be unfounded, and it can lead only to catastrophe."¹⁴

The end of the war and the defeat of the common enemy, Fascism, naturally presented our countries with new and extremely difficult problems; another basis had to be found for the maintenance and development of relations. As American Congressman C. Pepper recalled, I. V. Stalin told him in October 1945: "Our alliance was created to combat Hitler, but those bonds no longer exist and we will have to find a new basis for close relations in the future, and this will not be easy. But Christ said: 'Seek, and ye shall find.'"¹⁵

As we know, events took a different turn. In the United States the supporters of a tough anti-Soviet policy, who did not care for the political results of the war or the prospect of future cooperation with the USSR, gradually gained strength in their fight against Roosevelt's approach. This reflected a general shift in the feelings of U.S. ruling circles at the end of the war toward the renunciation of the quest for a new and more democratic structure of international relations, a structure based on constructive collaboration by countries with different social systems and respect for the legitimate rights and interests of all participants. The hegemonist philosophy of the "American Age," which nurtured dangerous illusions about U.S. military-economic omnipotence and was aimed at consolidating dominant U.S. positions in the world, became increasingly outspoken. When Roosevelt died, this tendency gained the upper hand. This is not the place for a thorough examination of the history of the cold war. It has already been discussed in thousands of books and it is still being debated by experts. I will simply say that even the harshest U.S. critics of postwar U.S. policy--the "revisionist" historians who said that America was chiefly to blame for the cold war--subsequently became highly indulgent toward Washington. Eloquent testimony can be found in the recently declassified documents on U.S. military and foreign policy strategy in 1945-1950. They reveal the actual plans and even the line of reasoning of the cold war's supporters.

According to this line of reasoning, the USSR once again became the supreme and absolute enemy of the United States, a nation capable of understanding

only the language of force and seeking world supremacy. Since the socialist order is "aggressive" by its very nature, the resolution of the conflict requires "a change in the nature of the Soviet system."

It is not difficult to find the familiar logic of "nonrecognition" in these constructs, a logic which, as U.S. researcher Professor F. Neal wrote, was again based on the premise that "the Soviet Union and, accordingly, communism as a world political force had not been permanent factors of the international situation to which it has been necessary to adapt, but a transitory phenomenon doomed to disintegration as a result of defeat in a war or internal upheavals."¹⁶ And the declared aim of U.S. policy was to promote this kind of result, to "accelerate the degradation of the Soviet system" by means of military, economic and political pressure on the USSR, subversion and "psychological warfare." The decisive role was allotted to military superiority, which meant an unbridled arms race.

In this way, U.S. policy toward the USSR was again dominated for a long time by the notion of implacable enmity, on which the policy of "nonrecognition" had been based.

It was necessary to go through several dangerous political crises and decades of a ruinous arms race, disappointments and increasing threats before the realistic tendency became apparent once again in the United States. Both our populations and the entire world sighed with relief when the relaxation of international tension and the first steps toward arms limitation and the development of mutually advantageous cooperation revived the hope that the world could be saved.

The Policy of the Current U.S. Administration and the Lessons of History

The hope of something better, the hope that lasting guarantees of peace could be established, that the arms race could be halted and that USSR-U.S. relations and international relations in general could be rebuilt in the spirit of cooperation, was short-lived. At the end of the 1970's implacable hostility toward the USSR, militarism and power politics began to gain strength once again--for the third time--in the United States. This tendency has blossomed under the Reagan Administration.

In terms of its view of the world, of history, of relations with the USSR and of U.S. policy, this administration might easily have existed 60 or 30 years ago. Its statements, documents and declarations are like copies of those which served as the basis of U.S. policy at the height of the cold war. Its views of the USSR, socialism and communism have not moved forward an inch from the aforementioned views of Lansing, Colby and, later, McCarthy and other dinosaurs of anticomunism. Nor has American policy progressed since those days.

I do not know why Americans have such a short political memory. After all, everything they are doing now has happened before. Not so long ago, just in the 1950's, even General D. MacArthur, who was famous for his bellicosity, complained: "Our government has kept us in a state of constant fear, a constant frenzy of patriotic fervor, to the accompaniment of shouts about the

great dangers threatening the nation.... But in retrospect one realizes that these disasters never occurred and were never even real at all."¹⁷ It was about that time that a man with an equally firm anticommunist reputation, Allen Dulles, revealed why the Americans were being intimidated. "When we are pushing our programs through Congress," he admitted, "we have to make the threat of international communism as obvious as possible. Otherwise these programs...would survive only in fragmentary form."¹⁸

But is this not exactly what is happening now? Frankly, this article contains an uncommon multitude of quotations precisely because we are going through an amazing period in which we are seeing a repetition of all the worst things that have occurred in U.S. policy--things which have already proved futile and dangerous but which are nonetheless being revived.

How it could have happened in America, which went through such trials and tribulations in the 1960's and 1970's, in America, which is proud of the fact that it is capable of attracting the "most able and most intelligent" into politics and boasts about the "competitive nature" of its political process, allegedly ensuring the selection of the creme de la creme, is a separate subject. For the time being, I will simply say that we are again living through a period in which Soviet-American relations have displayed marked deterioration. The reason for this is Washington's policy. "In a nutshell," Yu. V. Andropov, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, stressed in this connection in his recent statement, "it is a militarist course which poses a grave threat to peace. It basically disregards the interests of other states and peoples in an effort to secure dominant world positions for the United States."¹⁹ In pursuing this policy, the United States is fueling tension all over the world. The recent paroxysm, for which the South Korean airliner incident served as an excuse, provided new evidence of this.

Washington quickly compiled a propaganda story about the "responsibility" of the Soviet Union for the incident and, to all appearances, it managed to deceive many people. Only time will tell how long they will remain deceived. It will also tell how long it will be before the public in the United States, Western Europe and Japan realizes the full extent to which the incident was exploited by President Reagan and his administration. There is no question that this was a tragic incident. It is always tragic when innocent people die. Always--whether it is in the night sky above Sakhalin or in blood-drenched Lebanon, El Salvador, Ulster, Chile or South Africa.

But the more tragic the event, the more odious it is to exploit it for selfish purposes. But that is exactly what happened: The President himself and his entourage latched onto the incident with undisguised glee, precisely in the hope of solving some of their own problems and accomplishing their own dirty deeds. They hoped to shut the opposition's mouth, for example, weaken the antinuclear movement, pressure Congress and force it to rubber-stamp the most expensive and dangerous military programs, derail the arms limitation talks once and for all and simultaneously keep their own hands clean (their reasoning was simple: Who, in this atmosphere of hysteria, would be able to examine such a serious incident in detail?). And last but by no means least, they

hoped to create a psychological (or, more precisely, psychotic) atmosphere favoring Reagan and his congressional supporters in next year's elections.

But this was not the full extent of their cynicism. The most important aspect is that Washington is trying to use the tragic airliner incident to take yet another (and perhaps more than one) step toward another, more horrifying tragedy--nuclear war. The facts must be faced. Whether the present U.S. administration knows what it is doing or not, the war hysteria it has whipped up, the exacerbation of relations with the USSR, the continuous acceleration of the arms race, the efforts to undermine the real possibility of reaching an arms limitation agreement and the destruction of the little that remains of the machinery of dialogue, which took so much effort to create, are all indisputably intensifying the threat of war.

I believe that even many of those who were misled regarding the causes of the incident were deeply alarmed by Washington's reaction to the event, especially as the end of this year and the beginning of next year hold nothing good in store: The likelihood of the disruption of talks and the deployment of U.S. missiles in Europe has increased, as has the likelihood of a serious new deterioration of the situation in such a potentially dangerous part of the world. It is indicative that one of the shrewdest U.S. foreign policy experts, Professor Stanley Hoffman, chose "Another 1914?" as the heading for his article in the 18 September issue of the NEW YORK TIMES.

The professor also mentioned another aspect pertinent to this discussion of long-term generalizations. After all, we are concerned with the lessons of the 50-year history of Soviet-American relations, and he questioned the connection between this incident and the entire present-day world situation. Indeed, if the event is examined in the broader context, rather than from the standpoint of mere questions about how the order to launch the missile came to be issued and who issued it, the inference is that the South Korean airliner incident was no accident. I would even go so far as to say that the entire world political situation made this incident or a similar one virtually inevitable--sooner or later.

In the end you have to pay for everything in life, for any kind of policy. If tension and suspicion have been fueled deliberately over many years, people will be tense and suspicious. If Washington spews out slander, abuse and lies against the USSR over many years and asserts that the Soviet Union rejects moral and humanitarian values, that it is deceitful and does not keep its promises, that it is using chemical and bacteriological weapons, that it advocates international terrorism (including the attempt on the pope's life) and that it is Moscow which is to blame for all of the difficulties and conflicts in the world--whether in Latin America, Africa or the Middle East--then what are we supposed to think? After all, we know that this is not true and we also know that Washington must not and cannot believe this. This means that we are dealing here with deliberate lies and slander, lies and slander as U.S. state policy, and this further confirms Washington's worst intentions. Therefore, we must be on our guard at all times.

And what about U.S. policy with regard to the state borders of the Soviet Union? What about the innumerable spy planes and the constant "brinkmanship"

which violate or nearly violate Soviet airspace? What about the utterly incredible (and absurd, in my opinion) emphasis on total espionage, which led to the failure of efforts to improve relations in 1960 (the U-2 incident) and is now the pretext for, if not the cause of, their exacerbation? No matter what they say in the United States, who could ignore the fact that during just this couple of hours the special Ferret-D reconnaissance satellite appeared above the South Korean aircraft three times, an RC-135 reconnaissance plane was flying over from the direction of Kamchatka, another was on standing patrol off the Kuril Islands, an Orion aircraft was flying over the Sea of Okhotsk and another was over the Sea of Japan, not to mention reconnaissance ships? Was this not a dense concentration? Was this not an excessive number?

Some reports published at this time in the United States say that the Russians have a nervous trigger-finger.

I do not agree with this description. I would say that we controlled our nerves and emotions much better than the Americans did, although it was all happening far closer to us than to them. On the other hand, all of U.S. policy is obviously geared to a situation in which they (and, consequently, we as well) have a finger on the launch trigger and in which this trigger is so delicately adjusted that it is set off by the slightest touch. This is the purpose of everything the Reagan Administration is doing: the fueling of tension, the hysterically hostile rhetoric and the development of the many new weapon systems (including the Pershing II missiles which will take 6-8 minutes to fly from Western Europe to their targets in our country). This naturally makes all manner of tragic incidents possible and increases the likelihood of the greatest tragedy of all--nuclear war--and it is time for everyone, including the United States' allies and even neutral states (because a nuclear war is scarcely likely to leave them untouched), to realize this.

I would like to return to Stanley Hoffman's article. He writes that some part was played in the incident by the "Soviet conviction that the Reagan Administration has brought with it a ruthless all-embracing strategy geared to acquiring nuclear superiority, waging an ideological, political and economic war and changing the world balance of power--all at Moscow's expense--and to removing all of the elements of cooperation, which, however limited they might seem, previous presidents, at least since Dwight Eisenhower, have sought to preserve and expand, from Soviet-American rivalry."

I would tell Hoffman that he is absolutely right in this case. It is exactly this image, or even a more negative one, of U.S. policy that the Reagan Administration has created in the Soviet Union with its words and actions. And this should be a matter of concern to Americans as well.

In short, in the fall of 1983, when this article is being written, storm clouds are gathering and, as far as the immediate future is concerned, there is scarcely any cause for a cheerful forecast. Nevertheless, a wide range of facts must be taken into account when the future is being contemplated. Of course, the current U.S. administration is the most anti-Soviet and most militarist of governments. But the Soviet Union is now more powerful and its defenses are stronger than ever before. Our people have established a strategic

military balance, it is quite strong, and we will not let the United States acquire superiority. Never before have people been so alert to the nuclear threat. And the reference to people here is not just for show: Millions of people in all countries and on all continents, people of different political beliefs, different religions and different ideological views, are concerned about the future of the world and are on the move. Judging by all indications, quantitative changes are becoming qualitative changes in this respect. History has been teaching people lessons for a long time. Now they want to understand these lessons thoroughly, and perhaps they are beginning to do so.

History provides striking examples of the "nonrecognition" of realities by U.S. leaders both before and after the establishment of diplomatic relations with the USSR. The American businesslike manner is almost proverbial here. Apparently, however, it is not typical of all Americans. Many times I have thought that if U.S. businessmen approached the facts and realities of life in the same way as U.S. politicians, the United States would have been bankrupt long ago.

But a lack of realism is costly in politics too--at the very least it means missed opportunities and sometimes quite serious losses.

As I have already said, times have changed during the 50 years of diplomatic relations between the USSR and the United States. Periods of normal relations have alternated with periods of deterioration and friendly relations have alternated with hostility. We have been allies, but we have also teetered on the brink of nuclear war. We have had years of hope and years of disillusionment. Much has been written about this and much will be written about it in the future. But I would like to make one general comment. Things today are not like yesterday, and whereas bad relations sooner or later gave way to normal ones in the past, we can no longer rely on the automatic recurrence of this "cycle." After all, we are living in a nuclear age and the safety margin--at the moment, at any rate--is not very wide. Unless the situation changes and unless international relations in general and Soviet-American relations in particular become smoother and more stable, the time may come when there will be no escape from the spin of further deterioration. Soviet policy displays a deep awareness of this and a sense of high responsibility, but when will this be true of U.S. policy?

The 50th anniversary also prompts the thought that the difficult history of Soviet-American relations should have made the United States appreciate, as we do, the only possible standards of international intercommunication in the modern world.

This applies in particular to the standard that one side should not try to remake the other side in its own image and likeness--this is a futile and dangerous exercise.

Besides this, efforts to establish good relations with another side certainly do not stipulate the need to like that side. Politics is not a novel in which people are motivated by inclinations and emotions, but a serious and complex enterprise in which it is important to have a sober understanding of one's own

interests and, if one wants to achieve success, to give the other side's interests reasonable consideration.²⁰

Finally, whether we like each other or not, the two countries are condemned to live with one another in this world. They must live or die together, and this would seem to be the necessary point of departure for any policy.

It appears that these and many other historical lessons have evaded or escaped the attention of the present administration. In fact, it has a fairly odd view of history and its lessons. William Buckley, an ideologist of modern U.S. conservatism, sees the function of this political current as being able "to straddle the path of history and shout: 'Halt!'" A not undramatic undertaking perhaps, but a futile one, unlikely to succeed. By and large, there is no doubt that a policy based on illusions, straight from cloud-cuckoo-land, cannot expect to live long, although it may cause a lot of damage in a short time.

The matter could be left at that, but it is hard to resist the temptation to speak, however briefly, about another event which is also being commemorated this fall, in November 1983. This is the 20th anniversary of the assassination of President John Kennedy. I believe that his presidency took place in an important, breakthrough period in the history of Soviet-American relations, when it became clear that they could no longer be organized in the old way, but there were no clear ideas about new ways. That is why Kennedy's presidency also taught important historical lessons.

One of these lessons is that even a single error or false step in our difficult times can easily become a chain of dangerous events, a vicious circle which then becomes very difficult to escape.

In foreign policy, President Kennedy started out with the notorious intervention against Cuba in the Bay of Pigs. But from there a thread can be traced leading to the Caribbean crisis that brought the world to the brink of nuclear catastrophe. That intervention hung like a black cloud over U.S. policy and, for more than 2 of the 3 years which fate allotted to President Kennedy, it influenced the very process of that policy's formation by giving him a feeling of political humiliation and a desire to take "revenge" somewhere at all costs. And perhaps it is even connected in some way with the new errors being made by the United States in Central America today....

Another example is the "great leap forward" in the nuclear arms race which was undertaken under Kennedy. It began on that same pretext of the "Soviet military threat" which is being used today to kindle military rivalry. That pretext faded away very soon: The Americans themselves admitted that the notorious "missile gap" did not exist (at least, not in the form of a U.S. lag). But the deed was done. A chain reaction had started and it has essentially been impossible to stop to this day.

Now for the second lesson of Kennedy's presidency. Of course, it is better not to make mistakes in politics, but if they are made they must be rectified as soon as possible. In this sense, I think Kennedy set certain examples which should be followed.

Under him, the situation deteriorated to the maximum and the world essentially peered into the crater of the nuclear volcano. But Kennedy quickly realized that it was necessary to draw back immediately from the brink of an irremediable catastrophe--and to draw back far enough. His speech at the American University was the signal for this. And perhaps, had it not been for the villainous assassination, this would have marked the start of a long-term turn toward detente in U.S. policy.

Under Kennedy, as I said, an unprecedented new round of the arms race began. This too was a highly dangerous step and, in essence, a serious mistake. But Kennedy was the first U.S. President to understand and publicly acknowledge the futility of the arms race and the need to seek the path to security through arms limitation and talks. It was under Kennedy that the first treaty was concluded to limit nuclear arms--the partial nuclear test ban treaty.

The current U.S. administration has surely surpassed the Kennedy Administration in terms of its capacity for mistakes, rash statements and reckless moves. But it has not shown the same capacity to learn from its mistakes and to rectify them.

These are the main reasons why the 50th anniversary of USSR-U.S. diplomatic relations is being marked in a highly complex, even dangerous atmosphere. It is an atmosphere which could be called far from festive.

FOOTNOTES

1. "The SALT II Treaty," Hearings..., pt II, p 403.
2. "Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States," vol III, 1920, pp 467, 468.
3. "Dokumenty vneshney politiki SSSR" [USSR Foreign Policy Documents], vol III, Moscow, 1959, pp 176-177.
4. V. I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 44, p 301.
5. "Vneshnyaya torgovlya SSSR" [U.S. Foreign Trade], Moscow, 1965, p 289.
6. G. Tsvetkov, "16 let nepriznaniya" [Sixteen Years of Nonrecognition], Kiev, 1971, p 110.
7. "The American Image of Russia: 1917-1977," edited by B. Grayson, N.Y., 1978, pp 83-84.
8. "The Memoirs of Cordell Hull," N.Y., 1948, p [number not given].
9. Responding to allegations that the USSR was trying to establish "Bolshevik hegemony" in Latin America, People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs M. M. Litvinov wrote in 1927: "I would not be surprised if enlightened statesmen of the great powers started to blame earthquakes in Japan and floods

in America on 'Bolshevik intrigues.' A serious denial of these ridiculous 'explanations' would be an insult to public opinion." -- "Dokumenty vneshey politiki SSSR," vol X, Moscow, 1965, p 18.

10. "Dokumenty vneshey politiki SSSR," vol XVI, Moscow, 1970, p 564.
11. *Ibid.*, p 642.
12. R. Sherwood, "Roosevelt and Hopkins," N.Y., 1948.
13. J. Gaddis, "Strategies of Containment. A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security," N.Y., 1982, p 9.
14. R. Sherwood, *Op. cit.*, vol 2, Moscow, 1958, pp 661-663.
15. D. Yergin, "Shattered Peace," N.Y., 1977, p 18.
16. "The Cold War: Origins and Development. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Europe of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives," Wash., 1971, p 163.
17. W. Williams, "The Tragedy of American Diplomacy," N.Y., 1962, p 274.
18. A. Berding, "Dulles on Diplomacy," Princeton, 1965, p 63.
19. PRAVDA, 29 September 1983.
20. I do not agree often with the U.S. diplomat A. Hartman, now ambassador in Moscow, but in 1976, when he was assistant secretary of state for European affairs, he described very well, in my opinion, the principles of relations between "equal or nearly equal rivals": "We cannot get anything we want from the Soviet Union without taking its interests into account in one way or another. This means that our policy toward the USSR should be based to a far greater extent than before on a balance of interests, which will necessitate mutual adaptation and compromises. This new imperative may seem obvious, but many of the people participating in debates on Soviet-American relations are ignoring it. On the one hand, they admit that the USSR is now a superpower, but on the other they reckon that we can negotiate with the Russians as if they had just lost a war and were supposed to surrender" ("The American Image of Russia: 1917-1977," p 355).

COPYRIGHT: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka", "SShA--ekonomika, politika, ideologiya", 1983

CSO: 1803/3

FIFTY YEARS OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN USSR AND UNITED STATES

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 83 (signed to press 21 Oct 83) pp 16-27

[Article by V. V. Sokolov]

[Text] "Long live the peaceful Leninist foreign policy of the Soviet Union! Let us implement the Soviet Program of Peace!"--from the CPSU Central Committee slogans for the 66th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution.

In the history of intergovernmental relations there are dates which can be called fundamental because they are particularly significant. They serve as a basis for a retrospective look at events and for the summation of results over a specific period of time. The 50th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and the United States of America, which took place on 16 November 1933, is precisely this kind of date.

The current period is distinguished, as General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Yu. V. Andropov said at the June (1983) CPSU Central Committee Plenum, by the increasing aggressiveness of "ultra-reactionary forces, with U.S. imperialism in the lead."¹ The current American administration is conducting a policy in pursuit of "military superiority to the Soviet Union," Yu. V. Andropov said when he spoke with the renowned American political and public figures A. Harriman and his wife P. Harriman. This policy is "canceling out earlier positive achievements in relations between the USSR and United States and is undermining the bases of their mutual trust. The result is a situation which cannot be described as anything other than alarming.

"We are taking an extremely serious approach to relations with the United States because we realize their importance in the preservation of peace on earth and the elimination of the threat of nuclear war. Efforts aimed at peaceful coexistence and the development of equal, mutually beneficial and, what would be even better, good-neighbor relations with the United States--this is our general policy line."²

This statement has been graphically confirmed by history. From the time of its birth, the Nation of Soviets constantly and consistently made an effort to normalize relations with all countries, including the United States, based on

the Leninist principles of peaceful coexistence by states with differing sociopolitical systems.

Back in May 1918 the head of the Soviet Government, V. I. Lenin, sent the U.S. Government a message through Colonel R. Robins, the head of the American Red Cross mission in Russia--a plan for the extensive development of economic relations with the United States.³ The U.S. Government never responded to this peaceful Soviet proposal.

In June 1918 G. V. Chicherin, RSFSR people's commissar of foreign affairs, met with American Ambassador to Russia D. Francis in Vologda and informed him of the Soviet Government's intention to send M. M. Litvinov to Washington as an official Soviet representative to the United States. On 21 June 1918 V. I. Lenin signed M. M. Litvinov's Council of People's Commissars credentials, making him the plenipotentiary of Soviet Russia in the United States.⁴ The American authorities refused to grant him a visa, however. What is more, they sanctioned armed intervention in Soviet Russia and sent their own troops to Murmansk and the Far East, sowing death and destruction.

Two years later the United States had to recall its interventionist troops, but the American policy of boycotting and not recognizing Soviet Russia continued.

The Soviet Government continued to defend its own foreign policy principles and waged an energetic struggle for peaceful coexistence with the United States. V. I. Lenin renewed the peaceful Soviet proposals repeatedly. "The entire world knows that we are willing to conclude a peace on terms which could not be called unfair even by capitalists with the strongest imperialist feelings," he told a correspondent from the American WORLD newspaper.⁵ "The American capitalists should not bother us. We will not bother them. We are even willing to pay them in gold for machines, tools and other items to be used in transportation and production. And not only in gold, but also in raw materials,"⁶ V. I. Lenin said in February 1920 in answer to the questions of Carl Wiegand, a correspondent from the American UNIVERSAL SERVICE news agency. Earlier he had made the quite definite statement: "We are resolutely in favor of an economic agreement with America--with all countries, but especially with America."⁷

The Soviet Government viewed the development of trade and economic relations with capitalist countries as an economic basis for peaceful coexistence by states with differing social orders. V. I. Lenin remarked that the policy of refusing to develop trade with Soviet Russia, which was being conducted by the administration of President W. Wilson, was nearsighted and would hurt the United States itself. "Whether it (the United States--V. S.) likes it or not," he said in October 1920, "Soviet Russia is a great power. After 3 years of blockades, counterrevolution, armed intervention and war in Poland, Soviet Russia is stronger than ever before. America will gain nothing from Wilson's devout refusal to have anything to do with us on the grounds that our government does not suit him."⁸

Despite the Washington administration's anti-Soviet position, the development of trade with Soviet Russia and the recognition of this country began to be

debated in great earnest at the end of 1920 and the beginning of 1921 in the United States, and the debates even spread to the Congress. Senators W. Borah, J. France, R. La Follette, G. Norris and others advocated the normalization of Soviet-American trade relations. These feelings were reflected in the proposal, put forth by American industrialist and banker V. Vanderlip on behalf of a syndicate uniting 12 West Coast capitalists, that a concession agreement be signed with the Soviet Government on the exploitation of the natural resources of the Soviet maritime zone and Kamchatka peninsula.⁹ V. I. Lenin remarked in reference to this that "voices advocating an agreement with Russia are growing louder in America."¹⁰ By 1921 the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade had signed several contracts with American firms,¹¹ including one for the delivery of a million poods of American wheat to Soviet Russia.¹²

In spite of the U.S. Government's official refusal to recognize the USSR, which was reaffirmed repeatedly by Secretary of State C. Hughes and then by President C. Coolidge throughout the year of 1923, American firms continued to develop business contacts with Soviet economic organizations. This was promoted, on the one hand, by the creation of the Amtorg joint stock society in May 1924, uniting the earlier Arcos-America and Prodexco societies, and on the other hand by Soviet concession policy, which was designed to attract foreign technology to the USSR. The Soviet Government awarded concessions to many well-known American firms in the 1920's, including one for the exploitation of Georgian manganese ore in Chiatura to a company headed by the now famous politician A. Harriman, one for the production of pencils in Moscow to a joint medical and chemical company whose representative was A. Hammer, a gold mining concession and others. As the Americans themselves repeatedly remarked, the Soviet Government guaranteed American concessionaires a 10-20 percent profit margin because it was interested in the quickest possible industrialization of the USSR. Actual profits were much higher, however, and reached 100 or even 140 percent.¹³

Even in the absence of diplomatic relations between the two countries, the unofficial Soviet representative in the United States, B. Ye. Skvirskiy, remarked in a speech in the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences on 12 May 1928, the volume of Soviet-American trade grew. For example, whereas commodity turnover between tsarist Russia and the United States was equivalent to 48 million dollars during the entire year of 1913, the figure was 80 million dollars during the 6 months between October 1927 and March 1928. Although by today's standards this is a relatively low figure, it marked a positive trend toward the growth of Soviet-American trade. Numerous artificial barriers and obstacles were created by U.S. government agencies, however, to block the development of trade relations. They either made up lies about "forced labor" in the USSR, refused to accept the Soviet gold sent to the United States to cover the negative balance of trade or revived all of the absurd rumors about the alleged Soviet practice of "dumping."

Looking back at the history of Soviet-American relations, we see how frequently the irresponsible actions and personal feelings of politicians impeded their development and how many superficial and even unpredictable elements U.S. policy always contained.

These relations were primarily affected by the battles between various sociopolitical and economic circles and clans in this country. Some American business groups and the politicians who agreed with them tried to develop trade, economic and political contacts with the Soviet Union, acting primarily in the national interest. But their efforts were not enough to constitute the prevailing tendency in American foreign policy. Another contributing factor was the relatively small Soviet share of U.S. foreign trade.

The United States also has monopolistic groups and narrow-minded politicians who are guided mainly by their pathological hatred for communism and the Soviet Union. They are willing to sacrifice the U.S. national interest and the public's desire for peace and prosperity for the sake of a "crusade" against forces for democracy and socialism. Whereas they once simply did not want to trade with the Soviet Union or to extend it any credit, now they are camouflaging their tactics with false appeals for a struggle against the "Soviet military threat."

Squabbles between politicians in the American corridors of power have always influenced the nature of U.S. relations with the USSR.

The normalization of Soviet-American relations was not a simple process. For 16 years the United States did not want to recognize the Soviet Union and did not want to accept the triumphant October Revolution and its results as a fact. The stubbornness of American ruling circles was not due to major governmental disputes with the Soviet Union, the people's commissar of foreign affairs remarked at the Fourth Session of the Sixth USSR Central Executive Committee on 29 December 1933, nor did they protest because they were suffering excessively from the revolutionary legislation. In essence, they were continuing "the struggle declared after the October Revolution by the entire capitalist world against the new Soviet system of government, which planned to create a socialist society. This was a struggle against the peaceful coexistence of two systems."¹⁴

As other large and small countries agreed to normalize their relations with the Soviet Union, however, the more farsighted American politicians began to realize the need for diplomatic relations with the USSR.

The USSR and the United States approached the normalization of bilateral relations from different vantage points. For the Soviet Union this was a natural political development, stemming from the theoretical premises worked out by V. I. Lenin and the Communist Party with regard to the need for peaceful coexistence by the two opposing social systems. For the anti-Soviet U.S. ruling circles, however, this was a move with dangerous implications. But then a world economic crisis broke out, hitting the United States hardest of all, and hot spots appeared in Europe and the Far East, posing a threat to American foreign economic and political positions. A new domestic political and international situation took shape. Under these conditions, U.S. ruling circles agreed to establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union but did not give up their anti-Soviet aims.

Several factors were at work here. First of all, the authority of the USSR grew immeasurably. Sensible people had to acknowledge that the Soviet Union,

whose economy had never undergone a crisis, had successfully fulfilled its first five-year plan and had taken self-reliant steps toward unprecedented industrial development. In spite of difficulties, socialism was making advances across the board in urban and rural areas. Unemployment in the country had been completely eradicated. The impassioned enthusiasm of the Soviet people who were building socialism amazed the American skilled labor and specialists who came to the USSR to work.

The Soviet Union's successes are in sharp contrast to the decline of production in the United States. In 1932 there were around 17 million unemployed--almost half of the working class of that time. When industrial production in general decreased by 41.2 percent in 1932,¹⁵ and foreign trade decreased to 2.9 billion dollars (whereas the volume exceeded 9.6 billion in 1929),¹⁶ American businessmen had to appreciate the value of Soviet-American trade. Commodity turnover over 10 years (1923-1932) was equivalent to 621 million dollars, with 482 million representing American exports to the USSR.¹⁷ The net trade balance was 343 million dollars in the United States' favor. Besides this, dozens of American firms--and extremely solid ones, such as Ford, du Pont de Nemours, General Electric and others--had concession agreements or special contracts for the offer of technical and technological assistance to the USSR, and this certainly profited them, even though these profits were not always reflected in the specific figures of the Soviet-U.S. trade volume. Virtually no accounts were kept of trade conducted through third countries. And these contacts could have been much more voluminous if various American trade barriers had not inhibited the consistent growth of trade between the two countries then, just as they do now.

Under these conditions, the rabid anticommunism of American reactionary extremists (Congressman H. Fish, Catholic Bishop E. Walsh, AF of L leaders W. Green and M. Woll and others) no longer won the same support from the American public.

A movement for the recognition of the USSR was simultaneously growing in the United States, and this naturally had to be taken into account by a politician as farsighted as President F. D. Roosevelt. "Friends of the Soviet Union," a society founded back in 1924, grew more active. In the first half of 1933 it collected more than a million signatures for a petition demanding the recognition of the USSR.¹⁸ In summer 1933 a committee on Russo-American relations was set up in the United States for the collection and publication of information about the recognition of the USSR. In addition to performing other functions, the committee conducted a press survey. Of the 1,139 editors of daily newspapers who responded to the survey, 718, or 63 percent, favored the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.¹⁹ Back in the beginning of 1933, 78 of 152 surveyed large American corporations were already in favor of the normalization of relations with the USSR.²⁰ On 21 March 1933 the American-Russian Chamber of Commerce requested C. Hull, the new U.S. secretary of state, to revise policy toward the USSR and create broader opportunities for the crediting of Soviet purchases in the United States.²¹

The American business community's demands for the normalization of relations with the USSR became much more insistent after the head of the Soviet delegation at a plenary session of the World Economic Conference in London announced

on 14 June 1933 that the Soviet Government "could soon place orders totaling around 1,000 million dollars abroad" if credit could be extended and normal conditions could be secured for Soviet exports.²² In connection with this, the board of the American-Russian Chamber of Commerce stated in its resolution of 12 July that the London conference had reaffirmed the disadvantages of the policy of not recognizing the USSR.²³

All of these facts provide graphic proof of the changes in U.S. public opinion. The American political barometer was definitely shifting in favor of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.

This was sensed by President F. Roosevelt, who had an accurate grasp of all nuances of the political situation. But the heads of the State Department, some officials from among Roosevelt's closest advisers and representatives of conservative groups did everything within their power to prevent him from carrying out his plans to normalize Soviet-American relations.

When Secretary of State C. Hull met with People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs M. M. Litvinov at the World Economic Conference in London (June-July 1933), he did not take the opportunity to discuss the establishment of relations between the two countries. When Assistant Secretaries of State W. Bullitt and R. Moley spoke with the people's commissar, they merely tried to gain concessions from the USSR in "payment" for recognition. The only positive result of the people's commissar's meeting with R. Moley was an agreement on the terms by which the American Reconstruction Finance Corporation would extend credit for the Soviet purchase of 4 million dollars' worth of American cotton.²⁴

Roosevelt had to take not only domestic political and economic factors into account, but also the international situation, which was growing increasingly tense. American ruling circles had to see that Nazi Germany and militarist Japan, which had openly announced their aggressive intentions, were posing a threat to the United States as well. The most obvious threat to American interests was Japan's aggressive behavior in the Far East. After it had seized Manchuria in 1931, it gradually moved into other parts of China, driving American capital out. The American "Open Door" doctrine in China was endangered by Japanese military actions. All of this motivated the U.S. Government to seek contacts in matters pertaining to Far Eastern policy with the USSR, a strong international power which was also being threatened directly by militarist Japan.

In this way the foreign policy factor became the main reason for the American administration's realization of the need to reconsider its position and establish diplomatic relations with the USSR as a first step toward possible cooperation in the future.

When Secretary of State C. Hull later explained the reasons for the change in policy toward the Soviet Union in his memoirs, he wrote: "The world entered a dangerous period in its development in Europe and in Asia. In time Russia could be of great help in stabilizing the situation, when the danger of war became more and more of a threat."²⁵

Even in Far Eastern policy, however, U.S. leaders and diplomats were pursuing their own goals. On the one hand, as State Department archives testify, they were not upset by the fact that Japan was coming close to fighting a war with the Soviet Union by invading the Soviet maritime region. On the other hand, they were certain that the USSR would be more likely to make certain concessions to the United States during the negotiation of diplomatic relations if it were to have a tangible Japanese military threat at its borders.²⁶ American Ambassador to Japan J. Grew informed the State Department on 9 March 1933 that "the Soviets are willing to offer economic advantages or concessions in exchange for the cancellation of old debts in order to obtain American recognition."²⁷ Considering the anti-Soviet feelings of many American politicians, renowned Japanese diplomat Y. Matsuoka declared, referring to a report from the American Embassy in Paris, that "if Japan should start a serious war within the next 5 years, this will be a war against the Soviet Union" and that if this should occur he would not be surprised "to see the United States on Japan's side."²⁸

The reactionaries from the State Department who had refused to recognize the USSR for many years pressured the President's closest advisers and tried to stop the normalization of relations between the two countries, against the wishes of broad segments of the American public. Roosevelt did not want to start a fight with the opposition and decided to commence the development of Soviet-American trade contacts without officially recognizing the USSR. In his opinion, several goals could be attained in this way: Without irritating reactionary groups to excess, he could establish some kind of contact with Soviet officials, pacify the liberal segments of the American intelligentsia and serve the interests of the particular American businessmen who had expressed an interest in the expansion of trade relations.

The existence of these intentions was confirmed by a telegram from the unofficial representative of the USSR in the United States, B. Ye. Skvirskiy, to the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs on 2 August 1933, in which he informed the commissariat that there had been increasingly frequent mention in the American press that "the President is discussing the question of sending a trade representative or commission to the USSR in the hope that the establishment of relations through trade representatives will then lead to recognition." The possibilities for this were then investigated by the head of the recently founded farmers' credit union, H. Morgenthau, in a conversation with B. Ye. Skvirskiy in the presence of Amtorg officials. After expressing his own "personal opinion," Morgenthau, a man close to the President, asked the Soviet representative whether the American Government should not "send a trade representative to Moscow in the interest of developing trade." Skvirskiy vehemently denied this possibility, declaring that "sound relations between the two countries can be based only on a firm judicial foundation, which can be laid only by establishing the full range of diplomatic relations."²⁹

Skvirskiy reaffirmed in a wire to the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs on 4 August 1933: "Our opponents are making an earnest effort to convince Roosevelt that the USSR will agree to the development of trade relations without recognition and that our statements to the contrary are only a bluff. The

question Morgenthau asked me and later reports indicate that the President is giving this matter serious consideration so as not to rile the opposition."³⁰ After receiving a clear and unequivocal answer from the Soviet side, however, the President made a more farsighted decision, which was urged on him by actual events. In his message of 10 October 1933 to Chairman M. I. Kalinin of the USSR Central Executive Committee, F. D. Roosevelt announced his willingness to begin negotiating the normalization of relations between the two countries.³¹

In reference to the President's move, the USSR people's commissar of foreign affairs said that "President Roosevelt must be given credit for being perceptive enough" to "realize the futility of continuing to fight against us in the name of capitalism and the advantages of dealing with us in the name of the American national interest and the interests of international peace."³²

In his reply of 17 October 1933, the chairman of the Central Executive Committee informed the American President that the abnormal state of USSR-U.S. relations was having a negative effect on the interests of the two states and on international affairs in general by complicating the consolidation of world peace and encouraging forces attempting to disrupt the peace.³³

On 7 November 1933 USSR People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs M. M. Litvinov arrived in the U.S. capital. The next day he spoke with Secretary of State C. Hull. Hull raised a number of questions which he believed should be settled in connection with the normalization of relations: questions about freedom of religion, about propaganda, about the legal status of Americans in the USSR and so forth. To the amazement of the people's commissar, not one major international political issue was on the list.

A study of documents which have now been made public indicates that the United States was already trying to impose preliminary conditions on the Soviet delegation and conduct a policy of "linking" absolutely unrelated issues--just as it frequently does today when it uses negotiations to interfere in the internal affairs of the Soviet Union. All of the questions raised by Hull, with the exception of financial claims, concerned Soviet domestic legislation. When the people's commissar reported to Moscow on this conversation, he wrote that he informed the secretary of state: "Legislation on religion is the internal affair of each state. The reports of religious persecution in the Union are the result of onesided propaganda, misinformation and slander.... I cannot, however, even mention this purely domestic issue in any kind of official document or statement, and I certainly cannot make it a matter of international commitment. After a lengthy argument, Hull changed his position and declared that he expected at least a guarantee of religious freedom for Americans" in the USSR.³⁴

In response to this question and ones pertaining to the legal status of Americans, the people's commissar replied quite firmly that "we will not give foreigners any kind of privileges."³⁵

The discussion of mutual material and financial claims grew heated. Summing up the results of this discussion, the people's commissar reported: "America wants us to give up at least part of our counterclaims, in exchange for which it might be willing to give up some of its claims."³⁶

When the people's commissar met with F. D. Roosevelt on 8 November, the latter admitted that he himself "had always had doubts about America's moral right to collect tsarist debts and that the intervention in Arkhangelsk was absolutely unwarranted." He agreed with M. M. Litvinov that it would be necessary to avoid any demands defined by the people's commissar as interference in the internal affairs of the USSR.³⁷

After the first day of talks, the people's commissar informed the Soviet Government that "there is no question that Roosevelt wants to restore the best possible relationship, but he has truly been intimidated by the opponents of recognition.... For this reason, there has been little progress in the talks."³⁸

Documents pertaining to the history of the talks testify that American diplomacy tried to exert pressure on the USSR with the aid of methods which are essentially still being used today. The people's commissar had to inform the President: "It is our contention that controversial issues should not be discussed with governments other than on the basis of equality and without any kind of pressure." He went on to stress that "any commitment we assume will have to be bilateral." Roosevelt remarked in this connection that "any bilateral agreement would require the approval of the Senate, which he would like to avoid, but that he would consent to a note stipulating that America would assume the same commitments as we."³⁹

As a result of the week-long talks, which sometimes grew quite heated, the two sides agreed to exchange notes and letters on several of the matters discussed.

In a note of 16 November 1933 President Roosevelt informed the head of the Soviet delegation that the U.S. Government had "decided to establish normal diplomatic relations with the Government of the USSR and to exchange ambassadors.

"I trust," the President wrote, "that the relations now being established between our nations will always remain normal and friendly and that our nations will henceforth be able to cooperate to their mutual benefit and in defense of world peace."⁴⁰

A similarly worded note was sent to the American President by People's Commissar M. M. Litvinov.⁴¹ The two sides also exchanged notes and letters on specific issues, particularly propaganda; in essence, they pledged to avoid interfering in one another's internal affairs. The American note, for example, stressed: "The observance of these commitments will be the firmly established policy of the U.S. executive branch, within the limits of the powers granted to it by the Constitution and laws of the United States."⁴² These commitments included: to respect the other side's irrefutable right "to build its life according to its own discretion and to refrain from interfering in any way in internal affairs"; "to restrain all individuals in the government's service and all government organizations or organizations directly or indirectly controlled by the government, including organizations receiving some kind of financial support from the government, from all types of overt or covert actions that might endanger the peace, prosperity, order or security" of the other side.⁴³

Within a relatively short period of time American ruling circles "forgot" about this commitment and flagrantly violated its basic premises. A good example of this was the notorious act on mutual security with the Kersten amendment (October 1951), in accordance with which 100 million dollars would be allocated annually for intervention in Soviet internal affairs and subversive activity against the USSR. The amendment said that these sums would be designated either for the maintenance of "individuals living in the Soviet Union" and other socialist countries, as well as "refugees from these countries or regions," or "for the formation of armed subunits consisting of these refugees and supporting the North Atlantic Treaty Organization."⁴⁴ Since that time the U.S. subversive activity against the people of the Soviet Union has been constantly augmented--from provocative launchings of hot-air balloons carrying anti-Soviet leaflets and the distribution of hostile literature to the creation of the subversive CIA-maintained "Radio Liberty" and "Radio Free Europe" stations.

Now that the Republican right wing, headed by Ronald Reagan, has taken charge in the United States, anti-Soviet propaganda has acquired the dimensions of "psychological warfare" and the new administration has spared no funds in conducting it. The Reagan Administration demanded 832 million dollars from the Congress in fiscal year 1984 for the notorious "democracy and public diplomacy program" and other propaganda undertakings for more intensive ideological subversion. Branding the USSR the "center of evil," the American President called for a new "crusade for freedom." Whereas lies and slander against the USSR were once spread primarily by the so-called "free press," American political officials and members of the administration are now involved more than ever before in this subversive activity, and this is indisputably and woefully contrary to the commitments the United States voluntarily assumed when it established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.

In contrast to the United States, the Soviet Union and other socialist countries (this is clearly recorded in the Prague Declaration of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee of 5 January 1983) strictly separate ideological issues from problems in intergovernmental relations in their policy and base their relations with capitalist states on the principles of peaceful coexistence.

In an exchange of letters about religious matters, the people's commissar informed President Roosevelt of the Soviet laws and regulations which guaranteed foreign citizens in the USSR freedom to practice their religion.⁴⁵ The President responded by expressing his hope that American citizens residing temporarily in the USSR could enjoy religious freedom.⁴⁶

Then the people's commissar and President exchanged letters in which the legal rights of citizens were recorded. The Soviet side stated that the rights granted to U.S. citizens would not be inferior to the rights enjoyed by Soviet citizens in the USSR.⁴⁷

In the hope of quickly settling matters connected with the normalization of Soviet-American relations, which was exceptionally important from the standpoint of the preservation of world peace, the Soviet Government unilaterally

gave up all of its claims against the United States for the U.S. armed intervention in Siberia in 1918-1920. This was recorded in a note.⁴⁸

On the same day, on 16 November 1933, the two sides exchanged letters on judicial matters, in accordance with which the USSR gave up all of its rights to bring suit or file claims against American citizens, including corporations, companies, societies and associations. All of the sums that might have been awarded to the Soviet Union by American courts in connection with these claims were ceded to the U.S. Government by the Government of the USSR.⁴⁹

Besides this, on 15 November, just before the people's commissar exchanged notes with the American President, a so-called "gentleman's agreement" was reached on mutual financial claims. On the condition that the United States would extend a long-term loan to the Soviet Union, the people's commissar expressed the Soviet Government's consent to cover the difference of 75 million dollars between the American and Soviet claims by means of supplementary interest payments over and above the standard loan interest rate. It was stipulated that all mutual claims would then be considered null and void.⁵⁰ Since the American side demanded a sum twice as high, the two sides agreed to continue the negotiations after the establishment of diplomatic relations. In contrast to the USSR, which magnanimously gave up most of its claims against the United States, the American Government inhibited the development of Soviet-American relations for several years by making spurious claims.

Even American journalists of that time admitted that the U.S. Government's demands regarding old debts were absurd and invalid. For example, L. Fischer wrote: "The Bolsheviks never took anything from the U.S. Treasury. The materiel purchased with American money went to Kolchak and other enemies of the Soviet regime. Some of the money was spent by Kerenskiy's ambassador, Boris Bakhmet'yev, to support anti-Bolshevik actions in the United States and in Europe. Now this sum is regarded as a debt owed by the Bolsheviks to the United States." To illustrate the absurdity of the American demands, the author asked the reader to consider a parallel example from American history: "Imagine that a foreign power gave money and food to the Confederacy during the Civil War in America. Using these resources, the Confederacy was able to fight against the North and kill northern army soldiers. When the war ended, the foreign power would demand that the North pay the South's debts."⁵¹

During the talks in Washington, the people's commissar of foreign affairs repeatedly stressed the importance of major international issues which completely overshadowed the questions raised by the United States. In particular, the Soviet Union expressed great interest in cooperation with the United States against Japanese aggression in the Far East. With this aim in mind, the USSR proposed a regional Pacific non-aggression pact and a Soviet-American agreement "on joint action in response to peace-endangering events." The Washington administration did not respond to either of these proposals, although later events proved that the United States had the greatest interest in them, and merely requested Assistant Secretary of State W. Bullitt, who was then appointed American ambassador to Moscow, to investigate the matter. It soon became obvious, however, that Washington's "investigation" of the possibility of creating a system of collective security in Asia had negative implications.

The U.S. Government did not express any interest in safeguarding security in other parts of the world either. Although Roosevelt admitted in his talk with the people's commissar that he "regarded Germany's eastward move as a probability" and that Japan was winning the arms race and was already ahead of the United States in terms of its number of naval ships, he did not express any willingness to take specific steps to curb the aggression. He simply said that "Japan will not withstand financial pressure"⁵² and, as history demonstrated, he was wrong.

The establishment of diplomatic relations with the United States was a great achievement for Soviet foreign policy. From that time on, the Soviet Union had diplomatic relations with all of the great powers. It was no coincidence that a new wave of recognition began the very next year; the USSR established diplomatic relations with Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and Czechoslovakia. In 1934 the USSR joined the League of Nations. The most active period of the Soviet Union's struggle for collective security in Europe and Asia began. These peaceful efforts were not supported at that time by U.S. ruling circles.

Nevertheless, the USSR and the United States were on the same side in World War II. And although the anti-Hitler coalition made up of the Soviet Union, the United States, England and France had its friction and differences of opinion, as USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs A. A. Gromyko, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, remarked, "it lives in history and in public memory as an example of cooperation by states belonging to different social systems in a struggle against a common enemy."⁵³ There is no question that the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries lay at the basis of the anti-Hitler coalition, which played such an important role in crushing fascism.

Fifty years have gone by. During these years Soviet-American relations have had their ups and downs. There was an alliance in the war against the barbarous fascist "Axis." There were agreements and treaties on cooperation in various fields--from the cessation of nuclear tests in the three spheres and the agreement on the peaceful use of outer space to the ABM treaty. But there were also American planes which violated Soviet borders and were shot down.

The foreign policy of the current U.S. administration, which is aimed at an unrestrained race for nuclear arms for the purpose of military superiority to the USSR, the severe deterioration of Soviet-American relations and the escalation of international tension, is a melancholy backdrop for the 50th anniversary of U.S.-Soviet diplomatic relations. But it is a good sign that the American people and the more farsighted American politicians are beginning to resist the anti-Soviet propaganda hypnosis and take increasingly vigorous action to stop the arms race, to impose a nuclear freeze and to seek mutual understanding with the Soviet Union and ways of strengthening world peace. In this struggle for a peaceful future, they have always been supported by the Soviet Union.

"People of the world! Let us resolutely repulse the aggressive plans of imperialism, militarism and revanchism! Let

us curb the arms race, eliminate the danger of war and defend and reinforce detente!"--from the CPSU Central Committee slogans for the 66th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution.

FOOTNOTES

1. PRAVDA, 16 June 1983.
2. Ibid., 3 June 1983.
3. "Istoriya vnesheyny politiki SSSR" [The History of USSR Foreign Policy], vol I, 1917-1945, Moscow, 1976, p 76.
4. "Leninskiy sbornik XXXIV" [34th Lenin Anthology], Moscow, 1942, p 29.
5. V. I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 40, p 152.
6. Ibid., p 145.
7. Ibid., vol 39, p 209.
8. "Leninskiy sbornik XXXVII," Moscow, 1970, p 254.
9. "Dokumenty vnesheyny politiki SSSR" [USSR Foreign Policy Documents] (hereafter called "DVP SSSR"), vol III, Moscow, 1959, pp 664-665.
10. V. I. Lenin, Op. cit., vol 42, p 67.
11. "DVP SSSR," vol IV, pp 465-471, 610-613.
12. Ibid., pp 442-444.
13. S. Margold, "Let's Do Business with Russia," N.Y., 1948, pp 107-108.
14. "DVP SSSR," vol XVI, p 786.
15. A. A. Gromyko, "Vneshnyaya ekspansiya kapitala. Istoriya i sovremennost'" [Foreign Expansion by Capital. Past and Present], Moscow, 1982, p 123.
16. I. I. Genkin, "Soyedinennyye Shtaty Ameriki i SSSR" [The United States of America and the USSR], Moscow-Leningrad, 1934, p 11.
17. Ibid., p 12.
18. V. Ya. Sipols, "Vneshnyaya politika Sovetskogo Soyuza. 1933-1935 gg." [Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union. 1933-1935], Moscow, 1980, p 117.
19. Ibid., p 118.

20. V. A. Val'kov, "SSSR i SShA (ikh politicheskiye i ekonomicheskiye otnosheniya)" [USSR and United States (Their Political and Economic Relations)], Moscow, 1965, p 201.
21. V. K. Furayev, "Sovetsko-amerikanskiye otnosheniya. 1917-1939" [Soviet-American Relations. 1917-1939], Moscow, 1964, p 212.
22. "DVP SSSR," vol XVI, p 345.
23. V. K. Furayev, Op. cit., p 212.
24. Ibid., pp 234-235.
25. "The Memoirs of Cordell Hull," vol 1, N.Y., 1948, p 297.
26. D. Bishop, "The Roosevelt-Litvinov Agreements. The American View," N.Y., 1965, p 7.
27. Ibid., p 6.
28. Ibid., pp 6-7.
29. "DVP SSSR," vol XVI, p 852.
30. Ibid., p 481.
31. Ibid., pp 564-565.
32. Ibid., p 787.
33. Ibid., p 565.
34. Ibid., p 608.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid., p 609.
37. Ibid., p 610.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid., pp 621-622.
40. Ibid., p 641.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid., p 644.
43. Ibid., p 643.

44. "Istoriya diplomatii" [History of Diplomacy], vol V, bk 1, Moscow, 1974, p 698.
45. "DVP SSSR," vol XVI, pp 646-649.
46. Ibid., pp 644-646.
47. Ibid., pp 649-650.
48. Ibid., p 654.
49. Ibid., pp 651-654.
50. Ibid., p 640.
51. L. Fischer, "The Soviets in World Affairs," vol II, N.Y., 1930, p 561.
52. "DVP SSSR," vol XVI, p 658.
53. KOMMUNIST, 1983, No 6, p 30.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka", "SShA--ekonomika, politika, ideologiya", 1983

8588
CSO: 1803/3

U.S. DEBATES ON SPACE ABM SYSTEM

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 83 (signed to press 21 Oct 83) pp 35-46

[Article by A. A. Kokoshin]

[Text] The planning of various alternative antiballistic missile defense systems has been intensified perceptibly in U.S. political and military circles, and theories to substantiate these systems are being eagerly proposed. Furthermore, whereas discussions in 1980 and 1981 were concerned primarily with the restoration of alternative land-based systems to protect American ICBM launching pads,¹ in recent years the main considerations have been the development of a broad-scale space ABM system and the emplacement of its various components in outer space.²

The increasingly active promotion of the space ABM program by the Reagan Administration, interested monopolies and military officials has been accompanied by increasing criticism of these plans by various political spokesmen, government officials, scientists and public organizations. To a considerable extent, the debates of the early 1980's regarding the possibility of creating a space-based ABM system were a continuation of the heated debates in U.S. ruling circles at the end of the 1960's and the beginning of the 1970's on the plans to deploy the Sentinel and Safeguard ABM systems.³ They became particularly intense after Ronald Reagan's statement of 23 March 1983. In the demagogic style characteristic of this administration, the President appealed for the concentration of national efforts on the design and development of a "defensive weapon," which could allegedly guarantee U.S. security in the future, by the beginning of the next century. The administration's entire propaganda machine began operating at top speed to lend more cogency to the plan. The appropriate explanations and additional comments were made, particularly by Vice-President G. Bush, Secretary of Defense C. Weinberger, presidential science adviser G. Keyworth, Assistant Secretary of Defense F. Ikle and several other members of the administration.

An assessment of Ronald Reagan's statement calls for a preliminary analysis of the international political atmosphere in which it was made. This occurred at a time of friction in Soviet-American relations in general, including the important area of military policy: Top administration officials have made various statements, with differing degrees of frankness, to substantiate the

U.S. need to become "strategically superior" to the Soviet Union. These statements correspond to many elements of Reagan's program of armed forces organization and to his administration's ideas on military policy, strategy and tactics.

In connection with this, several indicative statements were made by members of the current administration, primarily at the very start of this administration, about the possibility of "winning" a nuclear war and the need to be prepared for "limited nuclear war." It is true that the Reagan Administration was motivated by the pronounced negative reaction of the most diverse social and political forces in the United States, Western Europe and other countries to make an attempt to disorient the emerging world antinuclear movement by conveying the impression, approximately from the middle of 1982 on, that it was not even contemplating a "victory" in a nuclear war. But this is totally inconsistent with its foreign and military policy.

The administration's decision to step up the work on the space ABM program is consistent with the obvious augmentation of the power-based military element of U.S. foreign policy and the pronounced militarization of the thinking of government and political leaders. At the same time, the American side effectively blocked START and the talks on the limitation of nuclear arms in Europe, where Washington has made proposals which have been obviously unacceptable to the Soviet side because they are aimed at disrupting the military-strategic balance and at making Soviet nuclear forces much weaker than U.S. forces.

There has been a simultaneous active buildup of American strategic offensive arms. "No matter which component of U.S. strategic offensive forces we consider, each is to be rearmed with new weapon systems within the near future," remarked Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov, USSR minister of defense and member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo.⁴

In addition to this, Ronald Reagan's statement of 23 March was made at a time of growing opposition in the United States to the administration's efforts to increase military spending and escalate international tension, a time when the plans to pump more and more billions of dollars out of the American taxpayer faced a real threat. The administration is striving to preserve the main elements of its chosen policy in this field to satisfy the demands of the most chauvinistic and militaristic segment of the monopolistic bourgeoisie, which began to dominate U.S. politics at the end of the 1970's and put its protege, Ronald Reagan, in the White House in 1980. The narrow group interests of the military-industrial complex, with its nucleus consisting of monopolies in California, Texas and the deep South, are the primary concern of the current American administration. According to some estimates, the work on its military programs will require the largest "transfer" of taxes through the federal budget in all U.S. history, a transfer of funds from the Midwest and Northeast to the South, Texas and California: The military-industrial monopolies concentrated in this region will receive an additional 268 billion dollars in 1982-1986 alone.⁵

After President Reagan made his statement (on 23 March 1983), the Pentagon announced a significant increase in military space R & D allocations. In

particular, Assistant Secretary of Defense R. DeLauer said that "the administration plans to spend much more in the next 3 years on the development of the modern ABM system proposed by Reagan than the figure reported earlier by officials." Specifically, in fiscal year 1983 it will spend around 2 billion dollars, and not the previously announced 1 billion. The administration has requested 2.6 billion dollars for 1984 and will request 3.1 billion for 1985.⁶

Judging by data published in the United States, the final choice of a space ABM system has not been made as yet and several alternatives are being considered. This is why Ronald Reagan's statement was so general in nature. The Pentagon officials in charge of these matters did not want the statement to contain any specific commitments or details because many military experts feel that problems of a technological and strategic nature have not been investigated sufficiently and they have even questioned the administration's entire plan by stating a preference for the development of American strategic arms in more traditional ways.

For example, the report of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces, headed by Lt Gen (Ret) B. Scowcroft, former national security adviser to President G. Ford, (other members were independent experts with Republican and Democratic party affiliations), a report which was published in April, within 2 weeks after Ronald Reagan's statement, contained a relatively restrained assessment of the need for a broad-scale ABM system and of the possibility of developing such a system. In the section pertaining to this matter, the authors avoided any kind of assessment of administration plans, but did remark that there were no economic, scientific, technical or practical grounds for accelerated advancement in this direction. The report says, and this is more in line with statements made in the first half of the 1970's than with Reagan Administration policy, that R & D projects connected with space ABM systems should be continued only for the sake of preventing any kind of Soviet "technical surprise" in this field.⁷

According to the data of the Heritage Foundation, an influential rightwing organization reflecting the views of much of the Reagan political coalition, there is amazing opposition to the plans for a broad-scale ABM system in space even in the military establishment. In particular, the opposition includes individuals directly connected with the MX and B-1B programs, who are afraid that these programs might be slighted if the work on a space system is stepped up.⁸

The Heritage Foundation's concern about the opposition to the plans for the new space weapon system stems from the fact that the widely publicized "High Frontier" ABM project was designed under the auspices of this organization and under the supervision of Lt Gen (Ret) D. Graham, former head of the Defense Intelligence Agency. Many of its premises, judging by reports leaked to the press, are in accord with what has actually been contracted by the Pentagon in this sphere. The project envisages the creation of a "multi-leveled" system. The first "level," according to the planners of this project, should consist of missiles deployed on orbital stations and capable of destroying Soviet missiles during the initial stage of their flight; the second should consist of a broader space system with laser weapons for the

destruction of ICBM's in the middle of their trajectory and to destroy missiles aimed at American space stations; the third should be a land-based system for the defense of American ICBM launching pads; the fourth should consist of so-called passive defense, the civil defense system. The total cost of the High Frontier project has been set at 40 billion dollars.

"From the purely military standpoint," its authors assert, "America will move from the world of a 'balance of terror' to a world of 'assured survival.' A balance between strategic attack and strategic defense will offer more alternatives for strategic retaliatory forces, and this is even more important for military efforts in general. In this way, it would seem that High Frontier would restore traditional American military ethics. This new strategy is consistent with the average American citizen's ideas about military problems and it will facilitate their resolution in all spheres of U.S. security safeguarding efforts."⁹ The authors also try to prove the project's economic advantages by underscoring the possible long-term contracts it would mean for the American aerospace industry and the potential transfer of resulting technical innovations to the civilian sector of industry.

Two types of lasers are to be used as a basis for the second "level"--the laser space ABM system. One is being developed on a Department of Energy contract in the Livermore Laboratory with the active assistance of E. Teller, the "father of the hydrogen bomb" and a well-known "hawk." In the more distant future a neutral particle-powered cluster weapon is to be developed. The work on this weapon has been going on in the United States for several years.¹⁰

The laser weapon system (chemical laser) developed under the supervision of the Pentagon's Advanced Projects Research Agency has three main elements. The first is the Alpha program, aimed at the creation of a 5-megawatt infra-red chemical combat laser. It should be ready for ground tests in the middle of the 1980's. The chief designer is the TRW Corporation. The second is the LODE program (Lockheed and Hughes Aircraft), aimed at the development of a mirror 4 meters in diameter to focus the laser beam and the means of its guidance and control; its testing has been planned for approximately the same period. The third is the Talon Gold program, designed to determine the possibility of intercepting a target, tracking it and effecting the precision guidance of the laser beam; Lockheed is the main contractor.¹¹

According to G. Keyworth, a high-power laser located on earth in a super-hardened shelter, with its beam focused on the target by large mirrors installed on satellites, seems the most realistic alternative today from the standpoint of the U.S. administration's emerging technical potential.

The space shuttle, with at least a third of its flights earmarked for military purposes, will play an important role in the creation of the entire laser system. The construction of a special military spaceport on Vandenburg Air Force Base (in Indiana) is progressing rapidly and should be completed at the end of 1984.¹²

The most active critics of Ronald Reagan's plans include Democratic Senators G. Hart, A. Cranston, C. Levin and C. Pell, Speaker of the House T. O'Neill

and others. Some prominent Republicans have also expressed extremely skeptical views, including Chairman C. Percy of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and Senator L. Pressler.

When Ronald Reagan's critics discuss the international political aspects of the plan for a broad-scale space ABM system, they justifiably stress the fact that this plan would undermine the Soviet-American ABM treaty, which is one of the two ratified and operating Soviet-U.S. agreements on strategic arms limitation; for this reason it is of particular value. The plans to develop space "superweapons" would be in direct violation of this treaty, Article 5 of which bans not only the deployment but also the development of space-based ABM systems.

Critics have correctly noted that the assurances made by the President and members of his administration to the effect that the action taken on the plans for a space ABM system will supposedly be "compatible" with ABM treaty commitments are meant to deliberately deceive the public and pave the way for the disruption of existing agreements. "A global antiballistic missile system is now illegal. Its testing or deployment would mean the destruction of the ABM treaty, perhaps our most valuable arms limitation agreement today," a statement by the Washington Center for Defense Information says.¹³

Critics have also said that the creation of a satellite-aided ABM system (along with the development of antisatellite weapons, which is being stepped up in the United States) would preclude any kind of Soviet-U.S. cooperation in the peaceful use of outer space for decades.

According to Director R. Bauman of the Defense Science Institute, "one important argument against the militarization of space is the need to preserve the possibility of East-West cooperation in the use of space." In a discussion of a variety of alternative joint Soviet-American space programs, he stresses that "what is even more important than the financial benefits of these programs is the very fact that we would work on them together; this would obviously have a positive effect on our relations with one another. Joint space missions on behalf of mankind would give us a real opportunity to break the cycle of fear and would deliver us from the threat of annihilation. It would be a shame to give up this chance for the sake of the illusory immediate advantages of an ill-founded program for the militarization of space."¹⁴

Democratic Senator S. Matsunaga has proved to be one of the most active supporters of extensive Soviet-American cooperation in outer space as an alternative to the Reagan Administration's plans to militarize space. Objecting to the plans to develop a space ABM system and antisatellite systems, he stresses that the need for peaceful cooperation by the USSR and the United States in space is quite substantial from the economic and political vantage points; he further states that an objective scientific and technical basis for this kind of cooperation exists, as the USSR and U.S. space programs are intersupplementary in terms of many parameters. The possibility of this kind of cooperation, Matsunaga says, was cogently demonstrated in 1975 by the success of the "Soyuz-Apollo" program.¹⁵

Many American experts and politicians who have assessed the implications of a broad-scale ABM system in space have conclusively proved that this would be an exceptionally dangerous move from the standpoint of strategic and politico-military stability and the maintenance of the balance of power, and that it would increase, and not decrease, the danger of nuclear confrontation. In particular, they have noted that the creation of this system would complicate the already unwieldy and fragile mechanism of the Soviet-U.S. strategic balance and would considerably increase the danger of tragically faulty decisionmaking in a crisis situation.

Well-known military analyst S. Talbot says that many American experts view the administration's plans as "the nightmare of a new and exceptionally destabilizing arms race." Talbot warns that the deployment of ABM weapons in space could start a chain reaction with the most negative effects: "The other side would have every reason to assume that the United States' primary intention in the creation of a broad-scale space ABM system is to secure the possibility of preventing an annihilating retaliatory strike after the United States itself has delivered the first strike." Expressing the views of many American experts, Talbot says that there is no doubt that the Soviet Union is completely capable of responding to the U.S. challenge by creating similar systems and simultaneously improving its offensive strategic weapons for the penetration of even the most sophisticated ABM system.¹⁶

When Senator C. Pell addressed the Senate Subcommittee on Arms Control, Oceans, International Operations and Environment, he compared the potential destabilizing effect of a broad-scale ABM system in space to the conversion of strategic offensive arms to MIRV'ed warheads.

The opponents of the space ABM system believe that its destabilizing effect could already be apparent in the earliest stages of deployment. According to R. Bauman, for example, a few orbiting platforms with first-generation ABM weapons could not be viewed as any kind of serious protection against hundreds of the other side's ballistic missiles. But they certainly could serve as a purely offensive weapon for a first strike against communication satellites and for the guidance and control of the attacking side's strategic forces.¹⁸ Incidentally, the use of a space ABM system as an antisatellite weapon was considered during the work on the abovementioned Alpha and LODE systems, with a transition to a 10-megawatt laser and a 10-meter mirror.¹⁹

When the implications of a space ABM system are being debated, its opponents also stress that it could, under certain conditions, be regarded not only as a weapon against ballistic missiles in flight and not only as an antisatellite weapon, but also as a weapon for attacks on objects on land, and precisely for the first strike. The reason is that the space ABM system, as a system accurate and powerful enough to destroy missiles immediately after launching, theoretically could also destroy other targets on land and sea, including command posts, communication and control systems, administrative centers and so forth. Part of the other side's strategic weapons could also be a target for this system, its critics point out.²⁰

In this respect, according to the opponents of the space ABM system, it certainly appears to be the most destabilizing weapon possible, even more

dangerous in some ways than the MX and the highly accurate MIRV'ed ballistic missiles on D-5 submarines (Trident II).

Not one serious U.S. expert doubts that the creation of a broad-scale space ABM system would cost much more than the 40 billion dollars cited by D. Graham, the main author of the High Frontier project. The cost of creating chemical fuel alone (for the type of system which presupposes the emplacement of lasers on orbiting stations) is estimated at 100 billion dollars in thorough studies by American specialists--for example, MIT Professor K. Tsipis.²¹

According to the Center for Defense Information, this system would cost hundreds of billions of dollars. When the High Frontier program was analyzed by specialists from the staff of Assistant Secretary of Defense R. Cooper, he concluded that the creation of the system alone would cost at least 200-300 billion dollars and its deployment would cost at least this much.²²

Detailed technical and economic calculations by renowned Boston economist W. Demisch, aerospace expert, resulted in a similar estimate: He concluded that the support system of the space ABM weapons alone (communications equipment and reconnaissance satellites) would cost around 100 billion dollars; the entire system would give the U.S. aerospace industry around 500 billion dollars in the next 15-20 years.²³ Besides this, there would be the colossal expenditures on the training of special personnel to maintain the system, billions of dollars to pay for its operation, etc.

All of this would mean the transfer of even more funds from civilian industries to the military sphere, would increase the already huge budget deficit and would undermine the United States' ability to restore (or at least stabilize) its competitive position in relation to Japan and Western Europe.

Several U.S. studies of the late 1970's and early 1980's prove conclusively that the lower growth rates of the American economy in comparison to the majority of West European countries and Japan and the slower growth (and even its cessation in some fields) of labor productivity in U.S. industry are closely connected with the higher percentage of military expenditures in the U.S. gross national product for many years. This has a particularly negative effect on the investment process: the investment of capital in new technology, machines and equipment. For example, a study by the banking firm of Brown Bros, Harriman and Co. noted that the long-term trend of higher military spending in the United States in comparison to the majority of West European countries and Japan was reducing economic growth and contributing to the quicker development of the inflationary process.²⁴

In spite of the totally unfounded allegations of the Heritage Foundation staffers and people who share their opinions, the R & D projects connected with a space ABM system will be of almost no benefit to civilian science and technology because the paths of military and civilian science and technology have diverged more and more in the past 10-12 years. A study by the New York Council on Economic Priorities states, for example, that Japan is crowding American corporations out of the market for non-military computers. This is a direct result of the Japanese emphasis on the creation of elements which are

more reliable and simpler to operate in combination with the constant reduction of overhead costs, while the development of American computers has been influenced primarily by the requirements of weapon systems, with an emphasis on speed of operation and with relatively little concern for overhead costs. A similar situation is taking shape in the aerospace industry, where even such giants as Lockheed and McDonnell Douglas were on the verge of stopping the profitable production of civilian airplanes at the beginning of the 1980's because they were more interested in military contracts. The results of R & D projects pertaining to fighter and bomber aviation are virtually inapplicable to civilian aviation.²⁵

During these debates the overwhelming majority of American specialists have questioned the very possibility of creating a reliable space-based ABM system from the scientific and technical standpoint.

The active opponents of Reagan's plan and the critics of its lack of scientific and technical validity include prominent American scientists--Nobel prizewinners C. Townes, I. Rabi and H. Bethe, Professors R. Garvin, P. Doty, W. Panofsky and J. Van Allen, President Carter's former science adviser F. Press, former Director of the U.S. National Security Agency N. Gayler and many others. A group of 17 scientists (including most of those listed above) sent an official petition to President Reagan to ask him to cancel the plans for the creation and deployment of a broad-scale space ABM system.

The report by the information center, headed by Adm (Ret) G. LaRocque, contains the quite definite statement that "the technology for global antiballistic missile defense does not exist. Even the possibility of accomplishing the more modest task of protecting ICBM positions with ABM systems, despite U.S. efforts over several decades, is still quite dubious, particularly with a view to the relatively cheap and simple countermeasures the Soviet side could take."²⁶

The Carter Administration's secretary of defense, H. Brown, a renowned physicist who headed the Livermore Physics Laboratory of the California Institute of Technology before his move to the Pentagon, is quite skeptical about the possibility of creating an effective ABM system in space. In his book "Thinking About National Security" he stressed that, in the presence of huge numbers of nuclear warheads (even in combination with broad-scale civil defense undertakings and the "counterforce potential" of strategic offensive arms), the attacking side with an ABM system is not guaranteed not to suffer huge population losses as a result of a retaliatory strike by the other side. The very attempt to create any such system, including one using powerful lasers in orbit, could create, Brown stresses, an extremely dangerous illusion which could lead to nuclear catastrophe.²⁷ A similar conclusion was drawn by J. Wiesner, former science adviser to President Kennedy: "It would be a miracle if we were able to create the kind of ABM system which would destroy 90-95 percent of all missiles, but even the remaining 5-10 percent would be enough to wipe civilization off the face of the earth."²⁸

An analysis of the debates in the American scientific community indicates that the scientific and technical validity of this system is being defended only by

a small group of experts who have built their careers exclusively around military R & D and are primarily the followers of E. Teller and G. Keyworth (incidentally, before Keyworth became the President's assistant, he worked in the Los Alamos weapon systems engineering laboratory and was recommended by E. Teller for the White House position. Keyworth's support for the maximization of expenditures on military R & D was obvious from his very first months in this position).

Many specialists who have criticized the administration's military R & D projects, including those connected with space-based ABM weapons, justifiably feel that it is naive for members of the Reagan Administration and Reagan political coalition to hope for a "technological breakthrough" which would put the nation far ahead of the Soviet Union and could be transformed into perceptible strategic and political advantages. These attempts have always failed--as in the case of the submarine-based ballistic missiles, the MIRV'ed warheads, the strategic cruise missile, etc.

The danger of the outbreak of nuclear war, which would annihilate virtually all life on earth, is having an oppressive effect on the mental state of millions of people, including politicians and military leaders.

By calling upon the country to mobilize all economic resources and scientific strength to create a broad-scale space ABM system, Ronald Reagan and his associates are trying to play on the American public's fear of nuclear catastrophe, a fear which is so obviously being compounded by the current administration's aggressive and irresponsible foreign and military policy. It is demagogically speculating on the lack of awareness of the "average American," who has been made ignorant by the unidimensional stereotypes of militarist propaganda and knows nothing about the realities of the strategic balance and the dialectical connection between defensive and offensive weapons and between the two levers of the "balance-wheel" or equilibrium of the two sides' military forces.

The need to put an end to this general "balance of terror" is self-evident, but it must be done in such a way as to avoid strategic and politico-psychological destabilization. This will be possible only under the conditions of considerable improvement in all relations between the USSR and the United States and between the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries and stronger mutual trust among peoples and their political leaders, in an atmosphere free of political demagogic and artificially cultivated illusions. These illusions are being cultivated by the same people who have plans for a broad-scale space ABM system, because their implementation will not remove the potential for "mutually assured destruction," will not stabilize the strategic balance and will not reduce the danger of a catastrophic nuclear war, but will have the opposite effect.

The debates evoked by the Reagan Administration's plans prove that more and more responsible Americans are becoming aware of their unacceptability, regarding them as adventuristic plans which will lead to the colossal waste of the most valuable resources, both natural and human, and will actually reduce U.S. security and destabilize the strategic balance.

Respected scientists in many other countries are of the same opinion. For example, a conference held in the Papal Academy of Sciences in Rome in September 1982, attended by representatives of 35 national academies of sciences, adopted a declaration on the prevention of nuclear war. It says: "Attempts to create effective means of defending cities are futile because even one nuclear explosion could mean massive destruction."²⁹

In an appeal to all people of goodwill, and especially to scientists, leading Soviet scientists made the responsible statement that there are no effective forms of defense in a nuclear war and their creation would be virtually impossible.

The creation of a so-called "defensive weapon" against the strategic nuclear forces of the other side, which was discussed by the U.S. President in his statement of 23 March 1983, would inevitably lead to the appearance of another element, which would actually heighten the American first-strike potential. But this "defensive weapon" would be of virtually no benefit even to the country which resorts to the first strike; it will be unable to protect the overwhelming majority of the population because it cannot prevent a retaliatory strike. Therefore, the "initiative" of the U.S. President, his promise to create a new antiballistic missile weapon, is obviously aimed at disrupting the existing strategic balance. "By making this statement the President created the most dangerous illusion, which could bring about an even more dangerous round of the arms race" and "demonstrated extreme irresponsibility with regard to the very existence of human civilization," the appeal stressed.

As we know, and this was reiterated by General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Yu. V. Andropov when he answered PRAVDA's questions about the U.S. administration's intention to launch a full-scale project for the development of a space-based ABM system, at the very beginning of the Soviet-U.S. talks on strategic arms limitation the two sides acknowledged that there is an indissoluble connection between strategic offensive and defensive weapons. On the strength of this, the Soviet Union and United States simultaneously concluded an ABM treaty and the first agreement on strategic offensive arms limitation in 1972: "In other words, the two sides acknowledged, and recorded in these documents, that only mutual restraint in the area of ballistic missile defense will permit progress in the limitation and reduction of offensive weapons--that is, will stop and reverse the entire race for strategic arms. Now, however, the United States has decided to break this connection. The result of this idea, if action should be taken on it, would be an unrestrained race for all types of strategic weapons, both offensive and defensive."³⁰

When Yu. V. Andropov received a group of American senators in the Kremlin on 18 August 1983, he again discussed a matter of extreme importance--the real and terrible danger that the arms race could spread to outer space: The Soviet Union, Yu. V. Andropov said, believes that an agreement must be concluded on a total ban on the testing and deployment of any space-based weapon for the destruction of targets on earth, in the air or in outer space.

Detailed proposals on this matter were put forth in a letter from USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs A. A. Gromyko, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of

Ministers, to UN Secretary-General J. Perez de Cuellar, to which a draft treaty on the prevention of the use of force in outer space or from space against the earth was appended.³¹

"People of the world! Fight a resolute struggle against imperialist aggression and violence and for the eradication of seats of tension and crisis situations in Asia, Africa and Latin America!"--from the CPSU Central Committee slogans for the 66th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Strategic Weapons Proposals. Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, pt I," Wash., 1981, pp 62-63; J. Kemp, "U.S. Strategic Force Modernization. A New Role for Missile Defense," STRATEGIC REVIEW, Summer 1980, pp 11-17; C. Gray, "A New Debate on Ballistic Missile Defense," SURVIVAL, March-April 1981, pp 60-71, etc.
2. A special space command with its headquarters in Colorado Springs was created on 1 September 1982 as part of the U.S. Air Force to "coordinate all U.S. military space programs and manage antisatellite systems." In just a single fiscal year, official budget allocations for military programs in space increased from 2.9 billion dollars in 1982 to 4 billion in 1983. Assistant Secretary of Defense R. DeLauer has admitted that the design of various antisatellite weapons with differing degrees of intensity has been going on since 1960; the work on the ASAT system, which is to be deployed by the end of the 1980's, has been going on since 1977 (the basis of this system is the F-15 fighter-bomber, which is supposed to destroy satellites with small guided missiles with non-nuclear warheads).

In June 1983 the NEW YORK TIMES reported that the Air Force command suggested the creation of a unified command of all branches of the armed forces to oversee U.S. military activity in space. "Arms control and the Militarization of Space. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Arms Control, Oceans, International Operations and Environment of the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate," Wash., 1982, pp 13, 29.

3. V. V. Larionov, "The Strategic Debates," SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1970, No 3--Editor's note.
4. PRAVDA, 31 July 1983.
5. J. Anderson, "The Pentagon Tax: Where It Comes From--Where It Goes," Employment Research Associates, Lansing (Mich.), 1981, p 3.
6. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 17 May 1983.
7. "Report of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces," Wash., April 1983, p 12.

8. "National Security Record," The Heritage Foundation, Wash., December 1982, p 5.
9. "Congressional Policy. A Guide to American Foreign Policy and National Defense," edited by P. Dietrich, Wash, 1982, pp 106-108.
10. AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 23 February 1981, pp 25-26.
11. Ibid., 27 September 1982, pp 14-15.
12. "World Armaments and Disarmament. SIPRI Yearbook 1983," London, 1983, p 433.
13. "The High Frontier Proposal. A CDI Critique," Center for Defense Information, Wash., 1983, p 3.
14. "The Case Against Space Weapons," Defense Science Institute, Potomac (Maryland), 1982, pp 12-13.
15. EAST-WEST OUTLOOK, September 1982, pp 5, 6; as one form of cooperation, S. Matsunaga proposed a long-term program for the creation and operation of Soviet-American "Shuttle-Soyuz" orbital stations.
16. S. Talbot, "The Risks of Taking Up Shields," TIME, 4 April 1983, p 20.
17. THE WASHINGTON POST, 17 April 1983.
18. "The Case Against Space Weapons," pp 11-12.
19. AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 27 September 1982, p 16.
20. TIME, 4 April 1983, p 20.
21. "The Case Against Space Weapons," p 10.
22. "The High Frontier Proposal. A CDI Critique," p 2.
23. INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 2 June 1983.
24. B. Jackson, "Military Expenditures, Growth and Inflation in the Seven Leading Industrial Countries," N.Y., 1981, p 1; also see R. Smith, "Military Expenditures and Capitalism," CAMBRIDGE JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, March 1977, p 71.
25. "The Costs and Consequences of Reagan's Military Buildup," The Council on Economic Priorities, N.Y., 1982, p 21.
26. "The High Frontier Proposal. A CDI Critique," p 1.
27. H. Brown, "Thinking About National Security. Defense and Foreign Policy in a Dangerous World," Boulder (Colo.), 1983, p 52.

28. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 27 March 1983.
29. BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, December 1982, p 4.
30. PRAVDA, 27 March 1983.
31. Ibid., 22 August 1983.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka", "SShA--ekonomika, politika, ideologiya", 1983

8588
CSO: 1803/3

WASHINGTON'S 'BIG STICK' POLICY THREATENING CENTRAL AMERICA

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 83 (signed to press 21 Oct 83) pp 60-63

[Article by Yu. V. Romantsov]

[Text] The PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER recently printed a cartoon depicting President Reagan walking toward a dense thicket, dragging an immense club labeled "militarism" on the ground behind him. The thicket was labeled "Central America." This graphic assessment of Washington's official policy in Central America was then reprinted by many other American press organs. It was a quite expressive and valid depiction of the current state of affairs, namely the administration's willingness to use the American "big stick" against a region which is still regarded by hardheaded Washington politicians as the United States' back yard.

The spearpoint of the Reagan Administration's provocative subversive activity is aimed against Nicaragua, where the Sandinist government has resolutely pursued an independent foreign and domestic policy ever since it took power in 1979 after the Nicaraguan people had overthrown the despised Somoza dictatorship. Washington has organized a genuine war against it: For many months, gangs of inveterate Somozists, armed at America's expense and trained by American instructors, have entered Nicaragua from neighboring countries, particularly Honduras, to brutalize the civilian population. Their character was clearly illustrated by an incident which took place in August near the village of San Jose de Bocay in Jinotega Department: Bandits seized and burned a public bus, killing 14 people. Here is what journalists were told by three passengers who miraculously escaped: "The bandits did not spare even the women and children. The leader of the counterrevolutionaries shot two unarmed peasants point-blank. He was spattered all over with the blood of his victims. These Somozist murderers cannot be called people."

The counterrevolutionaries do not conceal their aim of destabilizing and eventually overthrowing the Sandinist government. In turn, the American administration has openly sympathized with them and has even admitted that it is giving them financial support through CIA channels. Its top-level spokesmen have cynically described these butchers as "freedom fighters" and "genuine patriots" more than once.

Washington has taken overt steps to smother the Nicaraguan economy. At the end of 1981, for example, it instructed the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) to refuse Nicaragua's request for 30 million dollars in credit for the development of its fishing industry. In May 1983 the United States cut imports of Nicaraguan sugar virtually to zero. It vetoed the IADB decision to extend this country a loan for highway construction. In July the U.S. Department of the Treasury announced that the United States would use every means at its disposal to prevent the extension of loans to Nicaragua by the IBRD and IADB.

The unprecedented U.S. militarist preparations in Honduras, conducted both inside and outside the framework of the massive 6-month "Big Pine-2" combat maneuvers, have been aimed primarily against Nicaragua. In Honduras, military airfields are being built and enlarged, military bases and "training" camps are being established, and troops have been stationed dangerously close to Nicaragua's borders. The U.S. naval fleet of around 20 ships, including aircraft carriers, patrolling the shores of Central America is actually working out elements of a naval blockade of Nicaragua. This is attested to in particular by the provocative overtures made by American naval ships to the Soviet merchant ship "Aleksandr Ul'yanov," which was making an ordinary commercial run in the Pacific Ocean. After they had approached the Soviet ship, a helicopter took off from the deck of one of the destroyers, flew around the merchant ship and took pictures of it.

In a note delivered to the U.S. embassy in Moscow, the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs described these provocative actions, which are incompatible with the practice of international shipping, as patently illegal and dangerously arbitrary behavior.

In addition to tightening the ring around Nicaragua, the United States has been "putting things in order" in neighboring countries, where the governments are pro-American puppet regimes conducting a policy of brutal repression and the suppression of civil liberties.

Honduras, where the American military establishment acts as if it owns the country, was already mentioned above.

In El Salvador the revolutionary patriotic struggle has become quite intense and has been marked by major rebel victories. American military "advisers" in El Salvador train local punitive forces and, according to some reports, are directly in charge of combat operations. The ruling regime receives substantial economic and military support, and the White House has even demanded Congress' consent to a further increase in this assistance--an immediate increase of 30 percent. What is more, the administration has displayed incredible cynicism by alleging that the situation with regard to human rights has "improved" in El Salvador, in spite of the fact that the State Department report containing this allegation says in black and white that whereas 160 people a month were brutalized in El Salvador in the second half of 1982, the indicator was already 177 in the first half of 1983. According to the Catholic Church of El Salvador, the actual number of victims of government brutality during the first 6 months of this year was 2,527. The lie invented by

Washington propagandists about the "massive" shipments of weapons to this country has been used extensively by the administration as an "argument" to fuel the hostile campaign of slander against Nicaragua, as well as against the Soviet Union and Cuba, which were allegedly involved in these shipments. Naturally, Washington has not taken the trouble to produce any proof for these unsubstantiated statements. In this way, the responsibility for the civil war in El Salvador, which broke out in response to the brutal socioeconomic oppression and annihilation of the people by the pro-American oligarchic regime, has been shifted, so to speak, from the guilty to the innocent, and for purely selfish reasons.

In neighboring Guatemala the United States supports a regime which is just as unscrupulous and is conducting a policy of terror and repression. Washington has expressed unequivocal support for the current Guatemalan dictator, General Oscar Humberto Mejia, who declared that he would put an end to the "subversive activity" of leftist groups as soon as he had accomplished his coup d'etat. The American NBC television company had this to say about the matter: "The new dictator is an ardent anticommunist and is therefore expected to support U.S. policy." In other words, Washington hopes to use General Mejia's assumption of power to involve Guatemala in U.S. police actions in Central America along with Honduras.

The United States has also created a center of provocative anti-Nicaraguan intrigues in another Central American country, Costa Rica, and is striving to maintain this center by drawing this country into the orbit of its own aggressive preparations. According to a report in the NEW YORK TIMES, at the end of September Washington approved the plans for the construction of a diversified network of roads and bridges in this country by the Pentagon. This project will secure broad access to almost impassable forests along the border with Nicaragua and will also guarantee a permanent U.S. military presence in Costa Rica, which is something Washington has wanted for a long time.

Therefore, the focal point of the Reagan Administration's Central American policy, which has exacerbated regional relations so dramatically, is the hope of maintaining and consolidating U.S. positions in the region and eliminating all obstacles to this. The main "obstacle" is Nicaragua. "President Reagan," ABC television commented, "has actually declared that the purpose of his hard line in Central America is the liquidation of the Sandinist government in Nicaragua." On another occasion, when Ronald Reagan was asked whether it were true that he would never send American troops to Central America, he replied: "A president never says never."

This phrase sounds particularly sinister in light of the contents of a secret report prepared for the White House in July 1983 by an interdepartmental group of the National Security Council. The NEW YORK TIMES acquired a copy of it. The authors of the report recommend "threats of the direct use of American troops" in Central America and advise the "strategy of isolating Nicaragua," stressing that the American administration's main goal is to prevent a "communist takeover."

The administration's policy line, which is endangering peace in the region, has alarmed many people in the United States and has led to frequent mass

demonstrations and protest rallies. Many prominent politicians are also alarmed. For example, Senator C. Dodd had this to say about the U.S. combat maneuvers in Central America: "This is a threatening gesture, which cannot be called anything other than an attempt to conduct a policy of intimidation in the region." Senator E. Kennedy has called this a "policy of war." The House of Representatives has demanded the cessation of the covert assistance of Nicaraguan counterrevolutionaries.

Latin American feelings about Washington's power politics in the region were clearly expressed when Mexican President M. De la Madrid met with President Reagan in August. He said that international problems are complicated by shows of strength and must be solved with the aid of constructive political discussion. Mexico wants people to decide their own future. An unequivocal line in favor of a peaceful settlement in Central America is being conducted by the Contadora Group (Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia and Panama), which was created and took on this task in the beginning of 1983.

Objections to Washington's attempts to find a military solution to Central American problems have been voiced far beyond the bounds of Latin America, particularly in Western Europe. The chairman of the Spanish Government, F. Gonzalez, declared: "The assumption that military intervention and arms shipments can settle or alleviate conflicts in Central America is like using gasoline to put out a fire."

The search for a peaceful settlement has been firmly and precisely advocated by Nicaragua, which has repeatedly proposed talks with Honduras and with the United States.

Washington, however, is stubbornly pursuing an incendiary policy. The "peace-keeping" Central American trips made from time to time by R. Stone, the President's special envoy, actually consist in attempts to force the Salvadoran patriots to accept the conditions of the mercenary regime and efforts to impose the American model of "democracy" on Nicaragua. As for the special commission headed by the notorious H. Kissinger, created by the White House to "make long-term policy for Central America," observers have aptly described its function as a "cover." In other words, the administration's diplomatic "efforts" are a cover for its militarist plans.

Washington is using essentially the same methods in Central America as everywhere else in the world. It is pursuing a global hegemonic policy. Its elements are intervention on Israel's side in Middle East affairs, aimed at strengthening its own politico-military presence in this region by ignoring the interests and restricting the sovereignty of Arab states and peoples; intrigues in Africa, particularly the provocative actions against Libya and the intervention in the conflict in Chad; the pressuring of West European countries to accept the new nuclear missiles which will effectively turn these countries into nuclear hostages of the United States and so forth.

The same handwriting is on the wall everywhere: The United States is fueling seats of tension and rattling sabers. It has advanced its frontiers to the maximum by enmeshing the planet in a dense network of military bases; it has

located 43 percent of the American Armed Forces outside the United States' own borders.

The tactics being used by the current administration in Central America are reminiscent, as many sensible Americans have pointed out, of the process by which the United States became involved in the dirty venture in Vietnam. Everyone knows how this ended.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka", "SShA--ekonomika, politika, ideologiya", 1983

8588

CSO: 1803/3

WASHINGTON'S INTERVENTION IN THE CONFLICT IN CHAD

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 83 (signed to press 21 Oct 83) pp 63-70

[Article by V. Yu. Vasil'kov]

[Text] A kind of euphoria with global interventionism has become a distinctive feature of the Reagan Administration's foreign policy. Viewing the world only as an arena for confrontation with socialism, Washington is trying to create confrontation situations everywhere, is fueling old "hot spots" and is creating new ones--in the Middle East, in Central America, in Asia and in Africa. The idea of the "crescent of crisis" in the developing world is being resurrected, the developing countries are being included arbitrarily in the "sphere of U.S. vital interests" and the futile attempts to stop objective socioeconomic processes in the world by force have been resumed. Alleging that the global supremacy Washington seeks is the sum of U.S. "positions of strength" in all parts of the world, American strategists are augmenting U.S. military potential and are also striving for the "triumph" of their proteges in any location, at any price and by any means. They are completely ignoring the anti-people nature of these regimes and existing realities in the world and in specific regions. Many lessons of history are also being ignored, particularly the fact that this kind of foreign policy adventurism has led to more than one shameful failure in the past.

Something of interest in this connection is Washington's intervention in the internal conflict in the Republic of Chad, which has been in a state of almost continuous civil war for most of its independent history, for 17 years now.

The United States did not show much interest in Chad until the early 1980's. The main reason was that Chad's former mother country, France, was long able to control both the N'Djamena regime and the liberation struggle in this country, which has been headed since 1966 by the Chad National Liberation Front (FROLINAT), an organization fighting for the legitimate rights of all inhabitants of the country, regardless of their ethnic origins or religious preference.*

* The vast territory of Chad (1,284,000 square kilometers) is inhabited by only 4.6 million people, but they speak 300 languages and dialects. Since FROLINAT's split in 1973, the country has had 11 major politico-military groups, formed according to tribal affiliations. No less than six have

France not only took advantage of the conflicts between numerous opposing forces in the country but even resorted twice to military intervention in Chad (1968-1971 and 1978-1980). In May 1978 the State Department announced its total support of the French operations in Chad. As long as conditions permitted, however, Paris reacted negatively to the prospect of intervention by other Western countries in its carefully guarded "sphere of influence." At the beginning of the 1980's the French imperialist intervention intensified the smoldering conflict and caused it to take on continental dimensions: more than 10 African countries became involved in the conflict in one way or another, and in 1982 the conflict was used by reactionary forces as a pretext to disrupt a regular session of the OAU assembly.

The Organization of African Unity made a massive effort to settle tribal disputes and the domestic political conflict in Chad. In August 1979 at a conference of the 11 Chad groups, organized by the OAU with the participation of the members of the OAU Special Committee on Chad (Benin, Congo, Senegal and the six countries bordering on Chad--Nigeria, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Sudan, Libya and Niger), the so-called Lagos agreement on a provisional government of national union was drafted. The government was formed in November 1979 and included representatives of all 11 groups. G. Oueddei was the president, A. Kamougue was the vice president and H. Habre became state minister for defense. By January 1980, however, armed units controlled by Habre launched hostilities against other groups.

Habre's forces received assistance from Sudan and Egypt, which were backed up by the United States. Under these conditions, Oueddei asked Libya for help. On 15 June 1980 a Libyan-Chadian treaty on friendship, cooperation and mutual defense was signed in Tripoli. In accordance with this agreement, Libya sent a military contingent to Chad. With its assistance, the Habre forces were beaten in N'Djamene in December 1980 and were driven out of the country. The hostilities ceased. Chairman G. Oueddei of the provisional government of national union (PGNU) made an official visit to Tripoli on 4-7 January 1981. Libya promised to give Chad more economic assistance and temporarily took on the defense of the Chadian-Sudanese border, which was threatened by Habre's rebels. The merger of the two countries was also considered. France, Egypt, Sudan and several pro-Western African states immediately objected to this plan. Paris threatened Libya and increased the number of French troops in the Central African Republic to 1,500.

their own armed formations, often acting with complete autonomy in controlled regions. The composition of coalitions and the balance of power in Chad have changed repeatedly. The south is the most isolated region. It has a relatively high level of economic development and is the most densely populated part of the country, inhabited primarily by Christian and animist Sara tribes, in contrast to the Arab and Muslim north, where most of the inhabitants are from the nomadic Toubou tribes. The south even has its own administrative body--a "standing committee." When the south monopolized authority after the declaration of the independence of Chad in 1960, tribal, ethnic and religious conflicts evolved into a civil war, intensified by the power struggle of various groups.

U.S. Intervention: The First Stage--Overthrowing an Unacceptable Regime

At the precise time when France took a "hostile temporizing" stance, American diplomacy became more active. On 11 January 1981 the U.S. State Department expressed "worries" about the projected merger, declaring that the United States shared the concern of "many African states." Reiterating the U.S. support for the Lagos agreement, it called the plan for a merger "interference" by Libya in Chad's internal affairs. At that time, Habre met with Egyptian and Sudanese military spokesmen in Khartoum and with U.S. military attaches in both capitals. On 14 January England's FINANCIAL TIMES reported that the new Reagan Administration "might want to demonstrate its belligerence" in Chad. And it was right. A covert CIA operation, including weapon shipments to Habre's rebels and the training of his soldiers, was launched at a cost of 10 million dollars. At the same time, the U.S. administration started attacking Libya, which became the first and foremost target of the campaign against "international terrorism." Addressing Congress on 8 July 1981, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs C. Crocker made statements about "Qadhafi's expansionist plans to combine his Arab and Muslim neighbors in a state under Libya's heel," including Chad, Nigeria, Mali, Mauritania, Senegal and Algeria. Verbally admitting that this was "an African problem, which should be solved by Africans," he nevertheless assured the congressmen that the African countries could not get along without help from the West. The U.S. "help" consisted in such provocative anti-Libyan actions as the closure of the Libyan national bureau in Washington in May 1981, naval maneuvers near Libyan shores in August, an embargo on U.S. imports of Libyan oil in March 1982, etc. American military aid to Sudan was increased dramatically (from 30 million dollars in fiscal year 1981 to 100 million in 1982 and 1983). American instructors secretly trained and armed Habre's troops in Sudan in 1981.

A session of the OAU assembly in Nairobi in June 1981 did not condemn Libya for sending troops to Chad, but resolved to replace them with an inter-African peace-keeping force.

But as soon as the Libyan troops had been withdrawn from Chad (the promises of Western aid, the assurances of the rapid and effective introduction of the OAU force, economic difficulties and, finally, direct pressure from the West and pro-Western neighbors motivated G. Oueddei to agree to this and to request Libya to withdraw its troops "before the end of the year"; the withdrawal was completed without delay; the OAU chairman thanked Libya for its contribution to the peace-keeping efforts in Chad), literally on the day of the Libyan evacuation, Habre's troops invaded eastern Chad and took the large city of Abeche on 19 November after a fight with the fragmented units of the Chad groups making up the government. Besides this, there were delays in the creation of the inter-African force. Of the six countries which originally consented to supply their own contingents (Nigeria, Benin, Guinea, Senegal, Togo and Zaire), only three sent troops--Zaire, Senegal and Nigeria--and these troops numbered only 3,800. No organizational matters were settled in advance and the status of the force was defined too vaguely in the agreement. For example, the leaders of all the countries participating in the force made individual statements to stress that they were sending troops "not to engage in

battle" but because Oueddei was insisting on their active participation; otherwise he would have turned to Libya again for help.

This alarmed the Western countries. They stepped up the transfer of inter-African forces to Chad, offering the use of their own transport means: the Senegalese were transferred on Air Afrique planes chartered by France, and the contingent from Zaire and part of the Nigerian force were transferred on American military planes. The United States also resorted to outright misinformation to dull the vigilance of the Chad government. When State Department spokesman R. Salazar arrived in N'Djamene on 13 December, he said that the United States was cutting off all direct and indirect aid to the Habre group (in this way, the aid was officially acknowledged). American and Canadian experts arrived in Chad at the same time to analyze its need for economic assistance, but it did not come soon enough for the Oueddei government. On the contrary, that December the United States gave massive military assistance to the Zairian contingent, and this was later passed off as "the great U.S. contribution to keeping the peace in Chad" (the U.S. Congress allocated 12 million dollars for this purpose; besides this, U.S. military aid to Zaire in 1982 was increased from the projected figure of 10.5 million dollars to 15 million).

The London journal AFRICA NOW shed some light on this entire situation in June 1982. With references to President Mobutu, it reported that former U.S. Secretary of State A. Haig had a plan to achieve a "settlement" in Chad by dividing the country into two parts, one of which was to be "turned over" to Habre. According to Mobutu, the Americans had two aims: to eradicate the "Soviet-Cuban threat" and to simultaneously get rid of the French. According to the journal, Mobutu supposedly learned all of the details of the plan when he visited Washington in March 1982. The Zaire contingent of inter-African troops was to be the main striking force. It was instructed, firstly, not to take any steps that might aid in the stabilization of the provisional government of national union in Chad, headed by G. Oueddei, because it "had not won the trust" of the White House; secondly, to give tacit support to the Habre group, so that it could, with the aid of the Sudan, gain control over most of the country and thus be in a more advantageous position when the time came for talks with the PGNU; thirdly, to give active but covert support to any forces in Chad declaring their intention to overthrow Oueddei. In addition to divulging all of these details, the journal also noted that "White House officials are analyzing all possible ways of using the neutral inter-African force to undermine stability in a number of African countries considered to be pro-Soviet.... The list includes Libya, Ethiopia, Algeria and Angola and, in a broader context, Benin, Guinea-Bissau, Congo, Sao Tome and Principe, Zambia, Madagascar and the Seychelles."

While the subunits of the inter-African force were inactive, Habre's detachments, which had received U.S. military assistance through the Sudan, had established control over much of the country's territory by summer and entered N'Djamene without a battle on 7 June. The inter-African force was busy with the evacuation of foreign diplomats, and then with its own evacuation on the orders of OAU Chairman D. arap Moi, the president of Kenya. Only Zaire failed to follow this order because its president, who was then in Beijing, decided to keep his troops "temporarily" in the country "at Habre's request."

Habre headed the "provisional state council" made up of his supporters and convinced several other groups to take seats on the council, including the southern group. Since A. Kamougue, who had been the vice president, supported G. Oueddei, Habre's supporters instigated a rebellion in the south, as a result of which Kamougue was unseated and his opponents declared their intention to cooperate with Habre. At the end of October the state council was dissolved. Habre declared himself president and chairman of the council of ministers.

U.S. Intervention: The Second Stage--Struggle for the Puppet's Survival

When G. Oueddei, chairman of the PGNU and leader of FROLINAT, retreated to the mountains in the north of Chad, he located his government in Bardai. In May 1983 he began attacking rebel forces. France, which had previously made a show of support for the Oueddei government, immediately reacted by threatening him and putting the French troops in the Central African Republic in a state of combat readiness. Washington took the standard "Libyan line" by accusing Tripoli of aggression. In a statement of 2 June, the State Department declared that it had information about the deployment of Libyan troops on Libya's southern border, "possibly for their involvement in battle in Chad at an opportune time." These fabrications were followed by a threat that "the United States will regard this as a serious act of military intervention in Chad." Washington declared Chad a "front-line state" in relation to Libya. The "war of nerves" against Libya was resumed. Four AWACS planes began to patrol the Libyan-Sudanese border in February 1983 and the aircraft carrier "Nimitz" was sent to the Libyan coast. In summer it was replaced by the aircraft carrier "Eisenhower," heading a task force of around 30 U.S. naval ships. The planes based on this carrier regularly made provocative flights into Libyan airspace.

The leader of the Libyan revolution, M. Qadhafi, resolutely refuted the Western propaganda about "intervention by Libyan troops" in the Chad conflict and suggested that an OAU mission be sent to Chad to corroborate Libya's neutrality in the conflict. The presence of Libyan troops in Chad was also denied repeatedly by Oueddei and by Western correspondents who had visited the cities occupied by his troops.

By the end of June 1983, when Oueddei's troops controlled a third of the country after seizing the large city of Faya-Largeau, France announced its decision to give the Habre regime direct military assistance. French President F. Mitterrand cited the agreement on military and technical cooperation with Chad as the grounds for France's support of Habre. There was an unexplained disregard for the fact that Habre was precisely the rebel who had overthrown, with U.S. assistance, the legal government of Chad that had once been recognized by Paris. France became the current Chadian regime's main supporter among the Western countries and indisputably played this role by agreement with Washington. In July alone, French Air Force planes delivered over 400 tons of weapons from France and the Central African Republic to Chad, as well as around 150 military advisers disguised as "civilian experts" and "volunteers." They included, according to QUOTIDIEN DE PARIS, officials from the French intelligence service, servicemen and reserve personnel from

airborne units. The "legality" of this intervention was grounded only in Chad's status as a former French colony, which France was now striving to retain within its "sphere of influence." Military advisers from England also appeared in Chad.

At the same time, special services in the Western countries carried out a broad international program for the recruitment of mercenaries in France, Belgium and the United States, several hundred of whom had already been involved in the battles in July. They were transported to the country through the territory of neighboring states on American military transport planes.

The United States and France had no trouble involving the Mobutu regime in the intervention. This is how he "repaid" the United States, France, Belgium and Morocco for saving him in 1977 and 1978. At the request of the United States and France, Zaire sent more than 2,000 of its commandos, who had been trained since 1978 by French and Belgian instructors, to Chad in July and also sent around 10 combat and military transport planes there. All of these forces were put at Habre's disposal and took part in military actions, which in one way the year of 1983 differed from 1982. Several countries gave the rebels indirect aid by agreement with the United States and France. The Sudan continued to serve as a channel for American arms shipments and sent military instructors. Egypt also rendered military assistance, although it did not send advisers. Israel also became involved, taking advantage of the events in Chad to strengthen its position in Africa after restoring diplomatic relations with Zaire in 1982 and concluding a military agreement with it.

The decisive phase of the entire operation was the intervention by the United States itself. It began to escalate after the provocative anti-Libyan actions designed to serve as a pretext for subsequent U.S. intervention in Chad. The United States also supplied the troops of Habre and Zaire with intelligence gathered by spy satellites and AWACS planes. On 19 July President Reagan sanctioned the "emergency" transfer of large quantities of military equipment to Chad directly from the United States, at a cost of 10 million dollars, taken from a special emergency fund not controlled by the Congress.

The standard excuse of a "Libyan threat" to Chad, Sudan and so forth was used. A State Department announcement of 19 July 1983 contained the shameless allegation that the failure to take these measures could lead to the creation of a government "friendly to Libya" in N'Djamena.

It is indicative that the Western countries completely ignored the OAU efforts to restore the peace in Chad, although they had been so eager to use these efforts as a cover in 1982. The chairman of the OAU, Chairman Mengistu Haile-Mariam of the Provisional Military Administrative Council of Ethiopia, declared that the OAU did not want African countries to send their troops to Chad and did want to prevent intervention by France, the United States and other imperialist powers. The demand for nonintervention by foreign powers and the appeal for national accord were also made in a bureau meeting communique of the 19th session of the OAU assembly of heads of state and government, held on 15-16 July in Addis Ababa to discuss the events in Chad. Oueddei announced his willingness to negotiate the matter, but the Habre regime completely rejected

this proposal. The Western countries also ignored the OAU proposal and the appeal of UN Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar.

The position of the African countries was wholly supported by the Soviet Government. A TASS statement of 12 July 1983 said: "The purpose of foreign intervention is quite obvious. The people of Chad are being forced to accept a neocolonial order, and the territory of this sovereign state is to be turned into a new bridgehead for struggle against the freedom and independence of the African people. The purely internal conflict in Chad could, through the fault of the Western powers, turn into a serious seat of international tension. This would lead to the further exacerbation of the already dangerous world situation." The Soviet Union, the TASS statement said, "resolutely condemns the escalation of imperialist interference in the internal affairs of the Republic of Chad and wholly supports the efforts of the Organization of African Unity to negotiate a peace in this country."

The Western countries and Zaire, however, continued to escalate the conflict. At the end of July and the beginning of August, Mobutu visited Paris and Washington to discuss further joint action by the three countries. At the same time Habre appealed for direct intervention by France and the United States. The immediate result of Mobutu's talks was the growth of the Zairian contingent in Chad to 3,000 men, with the United States assuming the responsibility for their transfer and for much of the expense of their maintenance. Washington also increased military aid to Habre's forces by another 15 million dollars, sent a group of military advisers to Chad and intensified the activity of its aviation.

The United States simultaneously urged France to expand its intervention. When U.S. Secretary of State G. Shultz was interviewed on a CBS television program at the beginning of August 1983, he acted as though Washington knew more than Paris did about the interests and policy of France and expressed the hope that the French Government would "honor its commitments." State Department spokesman J. Hughes announced that there was "extremely close cooperation" between Paris and Washington and that "France should take the leading role" in the Chadian conflict. President Reagan demanded direct armed intervention by France at a press conference on 11 August, declaring that Chad was a primarily French sphere of influence. Besides this, he included Chad in the "zone of U.S. interests." He was echoed by Chairman J. Tower of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, who categorically described Chad as "a country of vital importance to the United States." On 7 August the United States sent an air task force to Khartoum, consisting of two AWACS planes, eight F-15 fighters, two KC-10 service planes, an RC-135 reconnaissance plane and 550 ground personnel. It was sent there at the end of August, after the beginning of the French intervention, which it was supposed to stimulate and did stimulate. A day later Washington bombarded Paris with demands for French intervention and threatened that Franco-American relations would suffer otherwise.

In August France launched operation "Manta," during which 3,500 French servicemen were sent to Chad with modern heavy equipment, including AMX-10 tanks, heavy artillery, helicopters and anti-air and anti-tank missiles. Six

Jaguar attack planes and four Mirage fighter-bombers also arrived in N'Djamene. The French troops were deployed south of the 15th parallel on the Moussoro-Salal border, north of N'Djamene, and Abeche-Biltine-Arada, east of N'Djamene, blocking the southern progress of PGNU troops. French officers commanded the troops of Zaire and Habre. In this way, imperialist intervention in Chad entered a new phase, which the African press rightfully compared to the initial stage of the dirty wars fought by the United States in Vietnam and by France in Algeria.

Regardless of the outcome of the current stage of the tragedy in Chad, it is obvious that the escalation of U.S. intervention in Chad represents an integral part of its active efforts in recent years to, as the TASS statement of 3 August 1983 pointed out, "reinstate its domination of the African people, restrict their sovereignty and deprive them of the right to make independent decisions."

For this purpose, U.S. policy in the English-speaking countries of West Africa--Liberia, Nigeria and Ghana--became more active at the end of the 1970's. Steps were also taken to expand U.S. ties with the French-speaking countries of the region--Senegal, the Ivory Coast, Gabon and Guinea. Apparently, there was some basis for the allegations of U.S. involvement in the 1981 coup in the Central African Republic. The United States, as pointed out above, launched a genuine "cold war" against Libya. One of the aims of American intervention in Chad was the encirclement of Libya on land and on sea, the isolation of this country from other progressive forces on the continent and the creation of a direct military threat to its independence and sovereignty.

The United States has launched broad-scale military preparations in direct proximity to this region. On the one hand, the conflict in the West Sahara has been used as a pretext for the dramatic augmentation of U.S. military aid to Morocco, which has been forced to sign an agreement on American military bases "in exchange." On the other, the United States has persisted in its military penetration of the countries of the Horn of Africa, Egypt and the Sudan, which have become the main location of "rapid deployment force" sub-units. While it was exacerbating the situation in Chad, the United States conducted the massive "Eastern Wind-83" combat maneuvers in Somalia and the latest "Bright Star-83" maneuvers in Egypt, Sudan and Oman in August, with around 7,000 American servicemen participating in these exercises.

In this dangerous strategic game, Washington has assigned Chad the role of a U.S. bridgehead in the center of Africa, from which the Pentagon could control most of the continent. Although Chad is one of the poorest African countries, it is located in the very center of the continent and the N'Djamene Airport is one of the best and largest in Africa, serving the airlines connecting Africa with the outside world.

In the last 3 years--that is, ever since the Reagan Administration "discovered" Chad--Washington has invested over a hundred million dollars in operations to put this country under U.S. control (this figure includes the direct aid to Zairian troops and the funds spent on Sudanese operations connected with the situation in Chad).

Washington's intervention in Chad is directly related to neocolonial ambitions and represents a growing threat to the independence of the African countries.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka", "SShA--ekonomika, politika, ideologiya", 1983

CONGRESSIONAL DEMOCRATS' FOREIGN-POLICY PROPOSALS CRITIQUED

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 83 (signed to press 21 Oct 83) pp 70-75

[Article by N. N. Sokov: "On the Road to the Elections: The Search for an Alternative Foreign Policy"]

[Text] Presidential elections will be held in the United States in exactly a year and there are many signs of campaign activity, particularly among Democrats. After the 1980 elections made the Democratic Party the opposition, it was faced with the need to work out a policy line contrary to the line of the current administration, including an alternative foreign policy, particularly with regard to such important issues as Soviet-American relations and the need to prevent nuclear war. The planning of an alternative Democratic program is being influenced not only by the criticism of the current White House leadership by some segments of the political and academic establishment, but also the growth of the mass antiwar, antinuclear movement.

Back in September 1982 a document compiled by the Democratic party faction in Congress and entitled "Rebuilding the Road to Opportunity," was published in the official organ of the U.S. Congress, the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.* The provisions of this document were later clarified in a number of statements by prominent Democrats, and some points were implemented in Democratic actions in the Congress: in the adoption of an alternative draft budget for fiscal year 1984, envisaging the much slower growth of the military budget, by the House of Representatives and Senate in spring 1983 and then by a conference committee of both houses in June 1983, as well as the House's approval of the Soviet-U.S. nuclear freeze resolution in May 1983. The premises of "Rebuilding the Road to Opportunity" are also in accord with statements by contenders for the Democratic Party presidential nomination.

This is a policy-planning document, consisting of several parts pertaining to basic questions of economic and social policy and national security. The last part is entitled "Building a Strong Defense: Assuring America's Security in the 1980's."

* "Rebuilding the Road to Opportunity. Building a Strong Defense: Assuring America's Security in the 1980's. Studies Produced by the Democratic Caucus of the House of Representatives," CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, 23 September 1982, pp S12098-12102.

Soviet-American relations occupy the central place in the system of future foreign policy priorities worked out by the authors of the document, and they view the international situation through the prism of these relations. There are two focal issues: methods of reducing the danger of nuclear war, including a group of measures in the sphere of U.S. military policy and nuclear arms reduction and limitation talks with the USSR and, secondly, a full-scale revival of the "human rights" policy as a means of pressuring the USSR and of countering the Soviet Union's influence in the "Third World." "We feel," the document says, "that our national security could be strengthened considerably by a firm and consistent foreign policy aimed at the reduction of world tension."

Policy on "human rights" is a prominent element of the Democrats' alternative program. It is substantiated by references to the United States' "moral superiority" to other countries and statements about the "exceptional" nature of the American political system, which allegedly makes U.S. foreign policy "highly moral."

In their attempt to revive Carter's policy on "human rights," the authors of the document allege that this kind of consistent line will also give the American side broader opportunities in the sphere of Soviet-American relations. In other words, it can be used to pressure the USSR, although it is already a fairly well-known fact that U.S. attempts to interfere in the affairs of others have not helped at all to reduce international tension and have always been repulsed by the Soviet Union and the majority of other countries.

Although the Reagan Administration's support of terrorist dictatorships in the developing countries is criticized in the document ("in an attempt to stop the spread of communism we are supporting the very regimes whose tyranny and mercenary character are the precise causes of revolution"), the authors nevertheless view U.S. relations with the Asian, African and Latin American countries through the prism of Soviet-American confrontation.

According to the Democratic leadership, the deciding factor of U.S. policy in the central sphere of Soviet-American relations--the politico-military sphere--should be consideration for the approximate balance between the two countries' strategic capabilities that took shape in the 1970's. "We must remember," they note, "that 1982 is the 20th anniversary of the Caribbean missile crisis, when mankind was on the verge of nuclear war. We no longer have the invulnerable nuclear strength we had in 1962, and the Soviet Union does not need forward bases in the Western Hemisphere to threaten American territory. The days when we could attack the USSR without fear of a retaliatory strike are over. This fact alone dictates the need for a policy of strength and restraint in our relations with the Soviet Union."

The authors of the document essentially suggest that all attempts to disrupt the balance and to attain nuclear superiority be abandoned. They propose instead an emphasis on nuclear arms reduction and limitation agreements with the Soviet Union because U.S. policy, according to this document, should be aimed at the prevention of nuclear war.

The group of national security measures outlined in the alternative program extends to military organization in the United States and to Soviet-American interaction to reduce the danger of nuclear war. These measures include the reinforcement of conventional armed forces, so that "nuclear weapons will remain the last deterrent," and the reduction of the vulnerability of nuclear forces.

The last point in the document is an extremely detailed one and includes a freeze on the testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery; the elimination of "counterforce weapons" as the most destabilizing type of armaments; the strict observance of all arms control treaties and agreements signed in the 1970's; the expansion of the machinery to prevent the accidental start of a nuclear war, including the establishment of "hot lines" between all nuclear states without exception; the reinforcement of nuclear nonproliferation regulations; the conclusion of a verifiable total and universal nuclear test ban treaty; the reduction of nuclear arsenals, conventional arms and armed forces in Europe and the planning of broader confidence-building measures; the inclusion of all other nuclear states in nuclear arms limitation talks.

Not all of these measures are of equal importance, and some presuppose attempts to gain unilateral advantages for the United States (for example, the efforts to heighten the invulnerability of American nuclear forces and the elimination of "counterforce weapons," which generally presupposes the dismantling of some Soviet strategic systems on a larger scale than in the case of U.S. systems), but the overall purpose of these proposals differs noticeably from the current administration's approach to arms limitation.

One striking element is the support for the now popular demand for a freeze on Soviet and U.S. nuclear arsenals, a demand made by the American antinuclear movement. "We welcome and support the national movement for nuclear arms control and for a ban on nuclear weapons, including the national campaign for a nuclear freeze, which is a clear expression of the American people's wish to prevent war and reverse the nuclear arms race. We believe that the United States should immediately seek serious talks on strategic arms control while maintaining the overall balance with the Soviet Union."

The freeze has now been supported by all Democratic Party contenders for the presidential nomination--W. Mondale, G. Hart, J. Glenn, A. Cranston and G. McGovern. A resolution calling for the immediate commencement of Soviet-American talks on a mutual, verifiable nuclear freeze was adopted in the House of Representatives through the efforts of Democrats. A similar resolution was to be discussed in the Senate, but the Republican majority in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee blocked the vote on this matter after prolonged procrastination. It is obvious that the Democratic Party is supporting the growing U.S. movement for a nuclear freeze in order to win the votes of members of the movement and to use this issue in their fight against the Republicans.

Democratic recommendations regarding military construction are based on the allegation that the current approach to the safeguarding of U.S. national security and the structure of the American armed forces do not meet the needs

of the present day and require reassessment. The document contains an appeal for a thorough study of the current international situation and the elaboration of military principles meeting today's needs, as was done in the 1960's when R. McNamara was U.S. secretary of defense. "During the two decades since the time when our military needs were last analyzed from top to bottom, the world has changed considerably but the structure of our armed forces has remained the same," the document says. "As a result, we are spending money on a military establishment created for our military needs of 20 years ago. Therefore, we are paying for a more effective and more suitable defense than we are getting."

The authors suggest that some of the programs announced by the Reagan Administration for the "modernization" of U.S. nuclear forces be scrapped. Describing the views of legislators objecting to the current administration's plans to "rearm the United States," Senator C. Levin, Democrat from Michigan and member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, had this to say when he addressed the heads of national agency for the development of ground force preparedness in September 1982: "Above all, we are trying to limit the increase in military spending to a more moderate, reasonable sum." Although he agreed with the talk about the "Soviet threat," he nevertheless stressed that "excessive concern with this threat is diverting our attention from another threat which is also hanging over us, posed by the depressed, deficit-ridden economy, suffering the worst slump since 1929."

Democratic Party leaders regard the 10-13 percent increase in military spending envisaged by the Republican Administration for the next few years as unacceptable and excessive; the Democratic Party's alternative draft budget also acknowledges the need to increase military expenditures, but at a rate of less than half the projected one. The slower growth of this part of the federal budget is to be accomplished through the redistribution of expenditures, primarily by means of the cancellation of several new costly programs, such as the MX and B-1 programs.

Instead of advising the escalation of the nuclear arms race, the Democrats suggest concentration on the modernization of conventional armed forces. In particular, the abovementioned group of measures in the sphere of national security policy specifically stresses that the United States should "improve conventional armed forces so that nuclear weapons will be the last deterrent, and not the first line of defense."

The document places greater emphasis on the combat readiness, fighting capability and mobility of the "rapid deployment force," which is to perform two functions: "countering the 'Soviet threat'" and "securing free access" for the United States to energy resources in the Middle East. It is clear that this policy does not differ in any way from the policy line of the Reagan Administration, which has already turned the Middle East into a powder-keg.

The authors of the document regard relations with America's allies as an important factor in military policymaking. These allies are viewed as a means of solving the United States' own economic problems, primarily as a means of lowering the growth rate of military spending by transferring part

of these expenditures to the allies on the pretext that they should make a greater contribution to "joint defense." "We are now spending around 5.9 percent of our gross national product on military needs, and the figure will exceed 7 percent by 1987. Japan, on the other hand, has the second largest economy in the world and spends less than 1 percent of its GNP on military needs. Each dollar Japan does not spend on defense is used to overtake us in the free market that we are paying such a high price to protect." The authors also note that the excessive development of the defense industry is excluding the best scientists and designers from the production sphere. But instead of concluding that less should be spent on defense, the authors use all of these facts as arguments that America's allies should spend more.

"Rebuilding the Road to Opportunity," which was compiled by the House Democratic Caucus, is essentially a draft Democratic platform for the 1984 election. The foreign policy section of the document is distinguished by two important features. First of all, it presumes the close interaction of foreign and domestic political problems, which can be solved only as a group. To facilitate the United States' emergence from the current crisis, the Democrats propose that the military budget growth rate be reduced by cancelling the deployment of the most costly new types of strategic weapons. The principles of military policy put forth in "Rebuilding the Road to Opportunity" were also reflected in the budget amendment adopted in December 1982 to block allocations for the MX missile. It took President Reagan half a year to unblock them in exchange for a promise of "flexibility" in strategic arms limitation and reduction talks with the Soviet Union. Within just a few days after this decision, however, a group of influential senators sent the President a letter to warn him of a possible change in their position with regard to the MX allocations if the administration should fail to take steps to ensure progress in the talks. Secondly, the document assumes that confrontation will remain the basic concept of Soviet-American relations, and in this sense the Democratic program is similar to the Republican administration platform. The only difference consists in the proposal that the system of foreign policy priorities be reordered considerably, with greater emphasis on the reinforcement of strategic stability, the prevention of nuclear war and the establishment of smoother relations with the Soviet Union.

When a delegation from the U.S. House of Representatives visited the USSR, Majority Whip T. Foley, the head of the delegation, stressed that relations between the two countries should take a turn for the better.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka", "SShA--ekonomika, politika, ideologiya", 1983

8588

CSO: 1803/3

OPERATIONS OF U.S. OIL MONOPOLIES UNDER NEW CONDITIONS

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 83 (signed to press 21 Oct 83) pp 82-91

[Article by A. N. Loginov and Yu. S. Stepanov]

[Text] The 10 U.S. industrial corporations with the largest sales volume include 7 oil giants--Exxon, Mobil, Texaco, Standard Oil of California (SoCal), Standard Oil of Indiana, Gulf Oil and Atlantic Richfield (ARCO). Since 1979 the list of the 50 largest industrial companies in the world has been headed by Exxon, a leading corporation in which the Rockefeller family is the dominant power. At the end of the 1970's the five American monopolies in the International Oil Cartel (IOC) accounted for around 10.5 percent of the production, 25 percent of the refining and 15 percent of the transport of oil in the capitalist world.¹ The position of oil monopolies among the largest U.S. industrial corporations was even stronger at the beginning of the 1980's (see Table 1). All of this attests to the significant role played by American oil monopolies in the U.S. economy and in the entire world capitalist economy.

In the past 10 years no Soviet or foreign economic work dealing with power engineering has failed to discuss the role and place of the largest oil monopolies, members of the IOC, in the power industry of various countries and in the capitalist world as a whole.² At the turn of the decade new tendencies and features appeared in the strategy of the oil business in response to serious changes in the world market for energy resources, primarily oil. This was reflected in the changing scales and nature of the diversified activity of U.S. oil monopolies, which is analyzed in this article.

Diversification as an Instrument of Competition

The slight drop in world oil prices in 1981-1982 as a result of the economic crisis and the energy conservation policy of the industrially developed capitalist countries slowed down the growth of the profits of American oil monopolies. Nevertheless, absolute profits have remained colossal. According to the American Petroleum Institute, the net profits of the largest oil monopolies in 1982 exceeded 20 billion dollars.³

This substantial increase in revenues was the reason for the rapid advancement of oil capital in non-customary sectors of the economy in the United States and

other capitalist countries. The real possibility of the depletion of reserves of traditional hydrocarbon types of fuel (oil and natural gas) and the nationalization of these resources in the majority of oil-producing countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America also motivated American oil monopolies to enter other industries. On the level of general theory, diversification means that large companies transcend the bounds of their traditional activity by entering industries with no productive or functional relationship to the sphere of their basic operations. This kind of diversification has become the main form of expansion by large U.S. oil companies in today's world. According to the former chairman of the board of the American Conoco oil company, G. Blauvelt, the prosperity of a corporation depends largely on "the extent of the diversification of its operations at the beginning of the new era in power engineering."⁴

Table 1

Basic Economic Indicators of Top 500 U.S. Industrial Corporations

Indicators	1970		1980		1981		1982	
	\$ bil.	%						
Total sales	463.9	100	1,650.2	100	1,773.4	100	1,672.2	100
10 oil companies	54.7	11.8	381.8	23.1	413.4	23.3	375.3	22.4
Assets	432.1	100	1,175.5	100	1,282.8	100	1,308.0	100
10 oil companies	74.1	17.1	231.4	19.6	260.1	20.3	265.1	20.2
Net profits	21.6	100	81.2	100	84.2	100	61.4	100
10 oil companies	4.6	21.2	22.2	27.3	20.9	24.8	15.0	24.5

The 10 top U.S. oil companies are Exxon, Mobil Oil, Texaco, Gulf Oil, SoCal, Standard Oil of Indiana, Atlantic Richfield, Tenneco, Phillips Petroleum and Conoco.

Calculated according to FORTUNE, May 1971, 1981-83.

Although the oil companies have tried to operate in virtually every sector of the economy, they originally chose related industries, connected with the extraction and refining of energy resources, as the main spheres for the investment of their capital. Striving to conceal their intention to monopolize all of the main energy resources, oil company spokesmen assert that they are spending only a small part of their financial resources on the expansion of operations not connected with oil and natural gas. According to the Chase Manhattan Bank, which is the head institution of the Rockefeller financial group and which has close ties with the world's largest oil monopolies and the U.S. Treasury, the oil giants supposedly spent 4-6 percent of their investment capital to establish or acquire companies not connected with their main sphere of operations between 1968 and 1977.⁵ These relatively low figures, however, conceal huge absolute investment totals.

The oil companies have traditionally concentrated on the U.S. coal industry, where they were already the leaders in the early 1970's. Their special

interest in this industry stems not only from the fact that coal can already be regarded as a substitute for oil and natural gas, but also from the status of the American coal industry in the world. The United States accounts for 47 percent of all coal deposits and 57 percent of the anthracite deposits in the capitalist world. Its share of the coal mined in the developed capitalist and developing countries increased from 42.1 percent in 1973 to 48.2 percent in 1981.⁶

The oil monopolies began their expansion in the coal industry in the 1960's, and 9 of the 25 largest mining companies were under the control of the oil giants by 1975. They are now among the 20 top suppliers of coal in the United States (see Table 2). The oil companies' share of the total quantity of coal mined increased from 25 percent in 1975 to 30 percent in 1980. According to the estimates of the U.S. National Coal Association, the indicator will be 40-50 percent by the mid-1980's.⁷

Table 2

Largest U.S. Coal Companies (1980)

Coal companies (controlling oil companies in parentheses)	Output Millions of tons	% of total output
Peabody Coal	59.1	7.9
Consolidation Coal (Conoco)	49.0	6.6
Amax Coal (20% SoCal stock)	40.5	5.4
Texas Utilities	27.6	3.7
Island Creek Coal (Occidental)	20.0	2.8
Pittson Company	17.8	2.4
Nerco	16.9	2.3
Arch Mineral (Ashland Oil, Hunt Oil)	15.8	2.1
U.S. Steel	14.2	1.9
Central Ohio Company	14.1	1.9
Peter Kiewit & Sons	13.5	1.8
Westmoreland Coal	12.7	1.7
North American Coal	12.7	1.7
Bethlehem Mines	11.7	1.6
Exxon Coal U.S. (Exxon)	11.4	1.5
Old Ben Coal (Sohio)	11.2	1.5
ARCO Coal (ARCO)	11.1	1.5
Kerr-McGee Coal (Kerr-McGee)	10.7	1.4
Western Energy	10.4	1.4
Utah International	10.2	1.3
U.S. Total	747.2	100.0

"Conditions in the Capitalist Economy and the Main Commodity Markets in 1981," BIKI, Appendix 3, Moscow, 1982, p 196.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, 23 March 1981, D-5.

By the end of the 1970's it became apparent that the expansion of American oil monopolies in the coal industry was no longer confined to the United States. They began to enter this industry in other countries--producers and suppliers of coal in the world market. The Mobil company acquired concessions and began to work Indonesian coal mines abandoned at the end of the 1960's. An Exxon subsidiary began to exploit new coal mines in Colombia in conjunction with the Colombian national coal company, Carbocol. In 1977 another affiliate of this oil giant acquired 25 percent of the stock in a joint corporation (with two Australian companies) working the Hail Creek Mine in Australia. The industrial mining of coal for the Japanese metallurgical industry began in 1980 and will reach 5 million tons, or around 4 percent of all the coal mined in that country, by the middle of the decade. P. T. Caltex Pacific, a subsidiary of the American Socal and Texaco oil monopolies, also has an interest in Australian coal mining. Exxon is mining coal in South Africa with Mobil.

By manipulating transfer prices for mineral and energy resources, the trans-national corporations are shamelessly robbing the producing countries. Australia alone lost over 4 billion Australian dollars as a result of the manipulation of the prices of exported resources.⁸ A large share of this sum was pocketed by American oil monopolies.

The American companies may be trying to conceal their desire for leadership in the coal industry of other countries, but their West European rivals and colleagues have behaved more openly. In particular, the Anglo-Dutch Royal Dutch-Shell oil company plans to increase its annual capital investments in the coal industry to 100-200 million pounds sterling between 1980 and 1985. This should increase its trade volume from 6 million tons to 28 million in 1985, representing 10-15 percent of the international trade in this raw material.⁹ British Petroleum, an English corporation, plans a similar increase in trade volume from 7.9 million tons to 20 million by the middle of the 1980's (excluding the sales of its American affiliate, Sohio).¹⁰

Therefore, just two West European oil companies will account for 17-26 percent of the trade volume in the capitalist coal market by 1985. With the addition of the five largest American oil monopolies, the IOC could control 60-80 percent of the international capitalist trade in coal by the middle of the 1980's. Even if these forecasts are slightly exaggerated, there is an obvious tendency toward the further intensification of monopolization in world capitalist power engineering.

The Seizure of Promising Crude Energy Resources

When nuclear power began to be used more widely in the majority of industrially developed capitalist countries, the oil monopolies started to strengthen their position in this industry as well. Their expansion primarily affected the U.S. market, where they took the principal role. Whereas in 1975 the oil companies accounted for 25 percent of all uranium mined, by 1980 only three companies--Exxon, Atlantic Richfield and Kerr-McGee--already controlled 38 percent of the uranium mined in the country.¹¹ Some oil monopolies, such as Exxon and Socal, are conducting uranium prospecting in other countries--Australia, Canada and South Africa. Besides this, the Gulf Oil and Kerr-McGee companies

now have large production capacities in the uranium ore concentration industry and are participating in the construction of nuclear power plants in the United States and other parts of the world.

Despite the fact that the oil derived from bituminous (oil-bearing) shale is a potentially important source of artificial liquid fuel, the technology for the industrial use of these resources has not been perfected as yet. Nevertheless, in the second half of the 1970's Gulf Oil and Amoco joined the consortium of oil monopolies, including Shell Oil, ARCO, Ashland Oil and others, working shale deposits in the United States. Besides this, these two companies formed their own enterprise for the prospecting of bituminous shale in the Rio Blanco belt in Colorado in 1978. The construction of a plant for the derivation of oil from shale began in 1982, and industrial mining will begin in the second half of the 1980's. At the present time, the large oil monopolies account for 8 of the 11 shale projects in the United States.¹²

Oil-bearing sandstone is also a promising source of liquid fuel. The largest deposits are located in the Canadian province of Alberta, where the construction of a plant for the derivation of 70 million tons of synthetic oil a year should be completed by 1989. A consortium was formed to manage this economic project, which is of great importance to Canada and has been called "Alsands." In addition to Petro-Canada, a Canadian state company, seven major oil concerns have joined the consortium. The Canadian Government associates this project, with an estimated cost of 14.5 billion dollars, with the resolution of energy problems in the 1990's (to preserve Canada's self-sufficiency with regard to oil) and with the growth of national employment. The project is expected to create at least 30,000 new jobs. In 1982, however, all private oil monopolies refused to continue financing this project, citing the declining price of oil in the world market as their reason. The Canadian press, however, has correctly linked this move by transnational oil companies primarily with their attempts to disrupt the new energy program announced by the Trudeau government in 1980, which is now being implemented and which envisages the transfer of 50 percent of the oil and gas industry to Canadian owners by 1990.¹³

Despite the fact that the broad-scale industrial use of alternative energy sources (geothermal, solar and others) is now regarded only as a prospect for the early 21st century, oil monopolies were among the first to develop these resources. They were actually the only contenders for the acquisition of geothermal resource exploitation rights when these parcels of public land were auctioned off in the United States. By the end of the 1970's SoCal was already investigating the possibility of using geothermal energy in eight states and began building a 50-megawatt geothermal power station in California in conjunction with the Edison Company.¹⁴ Oil companies are also conducting extensive research in the sphere of solar energy. In particular, Exxon, ARCO, Amoco and some other monopolies are already selling solar batteries. Exxon, for example, is trading in this kind of equipment in 35 countries. In the United States the oil monopolies account for 50 percent of the sales of various types of solar energy conversion equipment.¹⁵ Despite the fact that the development of these alternative energy resources is under government control in many countries, the main role in this industry will most probably be played by the private sector, primarily the oil monopolies as the main suppliers of technology.

Penetration of Processing Industry

By diversifying their operations, the oil monopolies are striving not only to control the sources and extraction of primary energy resources, but also to secure the leading positions in the processing industry.

Up to the present time the production of synthetic liquid or gaseous fuel from coal has been economically inexpedient. This is the main reason why the work in this industry is presently at the stage of the construction of experimental facilities and why the industrial use of the coal liquefaction and hydrogenation processes probably will not take place until the 1990's. Nevertheless, American oil companies are taking an active part in the mastery and improvement of these processes, preparing the soil for future investments. Oil monopolies are participating in four of the ten coal liquefaction projects planned for the 1980's in the United States and they are managing five of the twelve hydrogenation projects.¹⁶ Technological processes developed by the Mobil and Texaco companies are being used in seven projects for the derivation of synthetic liquid fuel for subsequent conversion to gas and chemical products.

American oil companies are building experimental facilities for the derivation of synthetic fuel from coal in the United States and in other countries. For example, Exxon announced its plans to build a coal liquefaction plant in the Netherlands at a cost of 500 million dollars and to spend another 3-4 billion dollars to turn it into an industrial complex by the beginning of the 1990's.¹⁷

The decline of world oil prices, which began last year, and the somewhat limited sphere for the use of synthetic fuel have posed a threat to the majority of projects for the derivation of oil from shale, sand and coal. American oil monopolies immediately announced a freeze on their capital investments in this industry in the United States, which will have an adverse effect primarily on the employment level in the project zones. For example, Exxon's decision not to work deposits of oil-bearing shale in Colorado means the loss of 10,000 jobs.¹⁸ But the oil monopolies have no intention of completely abandoning all future projects involving these energy resources. They hope to gain government-secured orders and price controls for synthetic liquid fuel and certain other financial benefits totaling 17.5 billion dollars.¹⁹ This will allow U.S. oil monopolies to transfer most of the risk of financing these projects to the government while retaining their dominant position in this field.

In this way, by the end of the 1970's the oil monopolies has intensified their efforts to enter the mining and processing of the main energy resources which could be used as substitutes for oil and natural gas soon or in the more distant future. The scales and rates of this expansion have increased and its geographic dimensions have widened. This is a long-term strategy for the oil monopolies, a hedge against the possibility that other important energy resources will compete with oil and natural gas. The result is the further reinforcement of the position of oil monopolies, primarily the largest American companies, in the power engineering sector of the world capitalist economy.

American oil monopolies are also trying to establish a place for themselves in several branches of the processing industry which are not connected with their basic operations--the extraction and refining of energy resources and other minerals. But this has not turned them into conglomerates.

The chemical industry was one of the first processing branches to experience expansion by American oil monopolies. By the beginning of the 1970's they accounted for around 40 percent of all the capital invested in petrochemical enterprises in the capitalist world. In spite of strong competition from established chemical companies (four chemical concerns were among the fifty largest industrial corporations in the world in 1980), the oil monopolies augmented production capacities in this industry more quickly. Between 1971 and 1979 the top five oil companies (in terms of chemical sales volume) increased their sales 4.5-fold, while the five chemical giants increased theirs 3.6-fold.²⁰ An Exxon subsidiary with a chemical sales volume of 7.3 billion dollars in 1982 is among the 10 largest chemical companies in the world.²¹

American oil monopolies are also interested in other advanced branches of the processing industry. They include electronics, data systems, robot engineering and others. The "invisible" assets of acquired firms--accumulated scientific potential, production experience and sales networks--are among the main incentives for this kind of expansion.

The Exxon Information Company, an Exxon subsidiary, can serve as an example of the operational diversification of American oil monopolies. In terms of sales volume, it is already among the top 25 firms in the U.S. electronics industry, and by the end of the 1980's the company's turnover is expected to rise to 10-15 billion dollars, which will allow it to control around 10 percent of this market in the nation.²² Other American oil companies, such as Mobil, Texaco, SoCal and Gulf Oil, are also investing capital in the processing industry. These monopolies are also striving to diversify their activities abroad. For example, Texaco is acquiring stock in Central American rubber enterprises and Gulf Oil has invested in Southeast Asian metallurgical companies.

One absolutely new development in the activities of American oil companies is their participation in the banking, currency and credit sphere in developing countries. In addition to maintaining their own credit system, Exxon, Texaco and SoCal use the assets of many Latin American banks on a partnership basis, including such large institutions as Banco do Brasil. According to expert estimates and the statements of U.S. oil company spokesmen, however, this activity in absolutely unfamiliar sectors of the economy is now more likely to result in losses than in profits. According to these statements, oil monopolies regard these capital investments as a temporary or auxiliary measure in response to various transitional considerations, and they are therefore unlikely to become a principal sphere of their operational diversification.

By the beginning of the 1980's, according to U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, the desire of large U.S. industrial corporations for acquisitions and mergers turned into an unhealthy mania. Once again, the oil monopolies displayed the

greatest enthusiasm in this field. But they ceased to act exclusively as "hunters." Some of them, even some among the top 20, became the "hunted." For example, Conoco was acquired by the largest chemical concern, du Pont de Nemours; Marathon Oil was acquired by the giant U.S. Steel firm; and Cities Service was acquired by Occidental Petroleum. The number of mergers and acquisitions in U.S. industry totaled 2,500 in 1981 (around 1,000 in 1975), and the funds spent by companies for this purpose increased to 82.6 billion dollars (11.8 billion in 1975).²³ This process is still going on.

From Oil Production to Crude Mineral Production

Another important area of the operational diversification of American oil monopolies is their penetration of the extraction and primary processing of rare-earth and nonferrous metals. This relatively new investment sphere has acquired increasing importance since the mid-1970's in the long-range policy of the oil monopolies for several reasons.

The raw material crisis in the capitalist world has been increasing in severity since the beginning of the past decade. Although it has been far from uniform, it has become a fairly steady trend. As a result, the value of scarce minerals has constantly risen in the industrially developed capitalist countries. The wave of natural resource nationalization which swept through most of the developing countries in the 1960's and 1970's had a direct effect on the interests of transnational mining companies. The rise of mineral prices was not as quick or as dramatic as the rise of energy prices, and this kept these companies from quickly accumulating the substantial financial resources needed for investments in the prospecting and exploitation of new mineral deposits. Besides this, the crises with which the capitalist countries were stricken in the 1970's also had a negative effect on the status of mining companies, many of which were on the verge of bankruptcy. This devaluated their stocks and allowed oil monopolies to buy up blocks of controlling stock at a low price.

The expansion of this kind of operational diversification by oil monopolies was promoted to some degree by U.S. antitrust legislation, according to which the merger of companies of virtually any size is permissible if they are in different industries. This is why these mergers did not entail any great legal difficulties. In addition, it is significant that Washington's current foreign policy is intensifying the militarization of the national economy. The Reagan Administration's increased expenditures on the arms race will unavoidably increase the demand for strategic minerals. In 1982 the U.S. Congress approved a bill to increase allocations for the purchase of strategic minerals to 1 billion dollars a year, and oil monopolies are becoming the main suppliers of these minerals.

Sometimes they operate independently in this sector--as Exxon does through its subsidiary Exxon Minerals. Throughout the 1970's this subsidiary engaged in the extraction of minerals throughout the world and almost quintupled its sales of nonferrous metals, including copper, zinc, bauxite, tin and others. This alone secured Exxon Minerals a place among the top 500 industrial corporations in the world.

The oil monopolies have recently been more likely to acquire mining companies which are large but are experiencing temporary financial difficulties; these companies are already transnational in character and conduct operations in many capitalist countries. In 1977 ARCO acquired the controlling stock in a well-known American copper company, Anaconda, which lost 67 percent of its production capacities as a result of nationalization in Chile. The same fate was suffered by other large U.S. mining companies, such as Cypress Mining and Duvall Mining. They are now controlled by Standard Oil of Indiana and Pennzoil. In recent years Socal has made several offers to buy 80 percent of the stock in Amax, which controls large deposits of molybdenum and uranium in the United States and abroad. Besides this, Socal began prospecting for silver in Colorado in 1978. For 107 million dollars, Exxon acquired 86.6 percent of the stock in a Chilean company, Disputada Copper, which mines copper and then exports copper concentrate from refineries to many capitalist countries.²⁴

At the beginning of 1981 Sohio paid 1.8 billion dollars to buy the largest U.S. copper refining company, Kennecott, which urgently needed 880 million dollars for remodeling. In all, the oil giant will pay the Kennecott administration 7 billion dollars over the next decade, 80 percent of which will be spent on the modernization of copper mines, and 20 percent on the prospecting and extraction of other nonferrous metals--molybdenum, silver and gold. "Our aim," G. Joklik, Kennecott's new president, said, "is to use the new investment capital to achieve the lowest mining costs of any American company."²⁵

Making use of the experience of its specialists in mineral prospecting and mining, the oil monopolies have begun to exploit the resources of the world ocean. The international consortium made up of Exxon, Mobil, ARCO, British Petroleum and other major oil companies is already prospecting for nonferrous metals on the shelf and seabed of the Pacific and Atlantic basins. In the hope of future revenue, they have not been discouraged even by today's high production costs, which can run to 2 billion dollars per line hole. Most of the oil companies have even changed their administrative structure by establishing special mineral departments in charge of investigating the possibility of broader activity in the extraction of rare-earth and nonferrous metals.

The results of this expansion were soon apparent. By the beginning of the 1980's the oil monopolies accounted for more than 50 percent of all the copper mined in the United States.²⁶ With the inclusion of the production capacities of overseas subsidiaries of these companies in such countries as South Africa, Australia, Chile and others, American oil capital accounts for more than 20 percent of all the copper mined in the capitalist world. Since the middle of the 1970's the oil monopolies have actively penetrated mining industries having no connection with energy resources, and this testifies that these companies are turning into "raw material" corporations and are hoping to control the market for precious and scarce minerals.

Government-Supported Expansion

The higher concentration of production and capital in American industry and the rapidly increasing economic power of leading oil monopolies have attracted

the government's attention. In the past 2 years three special reports on these matters have been prepared for the House Committee on Energy and Commerce. The latest is a detailed examination of the operational diversification of the leading 20 oil companies. According to this report, oil monopolies spent 38 percent of their cash receipts on the acquisition of other corporations in 1973-1981.²⁷ At the same time, the report says little about the intentions of oil companies to monopolize other scarce minerals, although it was precisely at that time that the two largest mining companies--Kennecott and Cypress Mining--lost their independence. The report also says nothing about the fact that such giants as Exxon, Mobil, Gulf Oil, ARCO, SoCal and Standard Oil of Indiana were among the most active in acquisitions among the top 20 oil companies. The authors of the report could not, however, conceal the fact that the expansion of oil monopolies in other industries (other than the sphere of energy resources) had been intensified perceptibly and that concentration within the industry had reached a level suggesting the return of the U.S. oil cartel headed by the Rockefeller family.

Bourgeois economists have completely ignored the important role played by the largest American banks--Citicorp, Bank of America, Morgan Guaranty Trust and Chase Manhattan--in the acceleration of concentration processes in the American economy. For example, whereas industrial corporations used primarily their own funds for acquisitions at the beginning of the 1970's, their share decreased to 50 percent by the beginning of the 1980's. In 1981 the banks extended the industrial companies 38 billion dollars for transactions of this kind, and their main borrowers were the selfsame oil monopolies. Mobil received 6 billion dollars, Texaco received 5.5 billion, Gulf Oil received 5 billion, Pennzoil received 2.5 billion and Phillips Petroleum received 1 billion.²⁸ This attests to the continuous intermeshing and merging of banking and oil monopoly interests. These are favorable conditions for various types of agreements between large companies and between financial groups on a coordinated economic policy designed to secure constant enrichment.

The oil magnates realize that it is becoming increasingly difficult to carry out their expansionist plans successfully without the support of the bourgeois government. And they have not been stingy. The oil monopolies play a prominent part in financing the campaigns of U.S. presidents and congressmen. Their contributions to both parties, Republican and Democratic, exceed the combined contributions of aerospace, steel and agricultural corporations. In 1978 the oil monopolies paid 3.3 million dollars to candidates in the midterm congressional elections, and by 1982 the figure had risen to 7.1 million, with 76 percent going to Republican candidates.²⁹ These data record only the official contributions of private individuals and corporations to political party campaign funds and cannot be compared to the sums actually paid by oil companies to bribe government officials. For example, the oil lobby in the U.S. Congress spends 10 times as much (around 75 million dollars in 1979) on the maintenance of a special office for the "persuasion" of congressmen. The generously paid officials make a conscientious effort to earn their fees.

The Reagan Administration announced from the very beginning that it would take a "new" approach to problems in state-monopoly economic regulation. The new

approach consisted in verbal promises to offer "private initiative" a broader field of activity, but it was actually the giant monopolies that were given preference. In power engineering this primarily took the form of the cancellation of price controls on petroleum and petroleum products in the domestic market. A bill on the cancellation of federal natural gas price controls, which should, according to the conservative estimates of the Department of Energy, result in 7.3 billion dollars in profit for mining companies, and a bill to repeal the payment of windfall taxes by oil companies, presupposing a significant decrease in their taxes (in 1981 the 10 largest oil monopolies paid out more than 10 billion dollars in this tax alone), are awaiting discussion and approval in the Congress.³⁰

Ronald Reagan was the first U.S. President in the last 10 years to decline to draw up a special federal energy program. On the contrary, his administration made substantial cuts in budget allocations for existing programs for energy conservation, the production of synthetic liquid fuel, the development of alternative energy sources and several others. All of this has slowed down the modification of energy consumption patterns in the American economy and is thereby perpetuating the country's dependence on imported oil. There is no question that the notorious "five sisters" will derive the greatest benefit from this policy because they control most of the import shipments of energy resources.

By labeling the Persian Gulf a zone of "vitally important" interests, the Reagan Administration is placing the interests of oil monopolies above the national interest and the public interest. The interests of oil monopolies in large sales markets are not being ignored by the U.S. Government either. According to American experts, close economic ties between Western Europe and the Soviet Union, particularly in the trade in natural gas, pose a serious threat to these monopolies in Western Europe. The U.S. administration decided to use the policy of "economic sanctions" to disrupt the construction of the Urengoy gasline and deprive Western Europe of an important source of energy, thereby establishing favorable conditions for the retention of the "dispatcher" role by the American oil monopolies in the transport and distribution of major energy resources in this region. Subsequent events indicated, however, that these plans will fail.

FOOTNOTES

1. The International Oil Cartel consists of five American companies--Exxon, Mobil, Texaco, SoCal and Gulf Oil--England's British Petroleum and the Anglo-Dutch Royal Dutch/Shell.
2. The works by Soviet authors include, in particular, "Energeticheskiy krizis v kapitalisticheskem mire" [The Energy Crisis in the Capitalist World], Moscow, 1975; R. Andreasyan and A. Kazyukov, "OPEK v mire nefti" [OPEC in the Oil World], Moscow, 1978; Ye. V. Bugrov, "SShA: neftyanyye kontserny i gosudarstvo" [United States: Oil Concerns and the Government], Moscow, 1978; S. S. Mishin and Yu. S. Stepanov, "Inostrannyye monopolii v Latinskoy Amerike" [Foreign Monopolies in Latin America], Moscow, 1983;

A. Ye. Primakov, "Transnational Oil Corporations and the Oil-Producing Countries: The Evolution of Relations," SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1981, No 11, pp 17-28; R. Andreasyan, "Oil Monopolies as an Instrument of Neocolonialism," MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN', 1982, No 10, pp 50-58.

3. U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 14 March 1983, p 20.
4. Ibid., 5 November 1979, p 26.
5. Ibid.
6. "1979. International Energy Annual," 1980, No 8, pp 22, 32; "Conditions in the Capitalist Economy and the Main Commodity Markets in 1981," BIKI, Appendix 3, 1983, p 196.
7. U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 5 November 1979, p 26.
8. NATIONAL TIMES, 19 January 1983, p 3.
9. FINANCIAL TIMES, 22 April 1980, p 60.
10. Ibid.
11. MAINICHI DAILY NEWS, 28 June 1980, p 7.
12. OIL AND GAS JOURNAL, 29 June 1981, p 72.
13. At the present time, 70 percent of this major sector of the Canadian economy is controlled by foreign monopolies, mainly American ones.
14. "Socal Annual Report, 1978," p 22.
15. U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 5 November 1979, p 26.
16. OIL AND GAS JOURNAL, 29 June 1981, p 72.
17. BUSINESS WEEK, 23 March 1981, p 45.
18. MAINICHI DAILY NEWS, 4 May 1982, p 6.
19. CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Extensions of Remarks, 18 August 1982, p E3948.
20. "MOODY's Industrial Manual, 1980."
21. THE ECONOMIST, 11 June 1983, p 76.
22. BUSINESS WEEK, 28 April 1980, pp 92-103.
23. MAINICHI DAILY NEWS, 27 April 1982, p 6; BUSINESS WEEK, 18 October 1982, p 76.

24. "MOODY's Industrial Manual, 1978," p 621.
25. BUSINESS WEEK, 26 April 1982, p 48.
26. Ibid., 3 May 1982, p 90.
27. "Mergers and Acquisitions of the Top 20 Oil Companies, 1978-1981. House of Representatives, 97th Congress, 2nd Session," Wash., 1982, p 6.
28. MAINICHI DAILY NEWS, 27 April 1982, p 6.
29. INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 7 April 1980, p 3; THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, 27 September 1982, p 14.
30. WORLD OIL, 1 August 1982, p 11; OIL AND GAS JOURNAL, 23 November 1981, p 63.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka", "SShA--ekonomika, politika, ideologiya", 1983

8588
CSO: 1803/3

BOOK ABOUT CURRENT POLITICAL, SOCIAL TENSIONS REVIEWED

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 83 (signed to press 21 Oct 83) pp 112-115

[Review by A. Yu. Mel'vil' of book "Post-Conservative America. People, Politics and Ideology in a Time of Crisis" by Kevin P. Phillips, New York, Random House, 1982, 261 pages]

[Text] Has American society really undergone the rightward shift now being discussed at such great length by political correspondents? If so, then which political groups lie behind the recent changes? What are the extent and limits of this shift and what forces are opposing it? What will happen in the "post-Reagan" era? In short, where is America going?

Today, now that rightwing conservative politicians have grown so much more active and have made vigorous attempts to push the country far to the right, these questions have acquired particular importance and dramatic impact. Without answering them, it would be pointless to discuss today's United States, its present and future. It is precisely these questions that are the central topics of political debates and ideological discussions by American politicians, public spokesmen, scientists and journalists who support different, sometimes opposing, political views and convictions.

Kevin Phillips attempts to answer these questions in his book "Post-Conservative America." The author's ideas were simultaneously put forth in a series of magazine articles. Phillips, a correspondent and commentator who is well known in the United States, is the author of such books as "The Emerging Republican Majority" (1969) and "Mediocracy" (1975). In his new book, Phillips had an ambitious plan to explain the socioeconomic, political, ideological and other shifts and changes occurring in American society and to predict its further development.

Phillips has long been known as a supporter and ideologist of rightwing populism, which has old traditions in the United States and represents a specific form of social protest by the "middle strata," including some segments of the working class. In contrast to the traditional conservatives, rightwing populists object to the preservation of the social status quo and try to mobilize mass political movements to seize power and carry out radical social changes, usually of an ultra-reactionary nature. Contemporary forms of

rightwing populism in the United States date back to the 1960's (for example, the movement in support of G. Wallace). Segments of the so-called "New Right" have been in the mainstream of rightwing populism in recent years. Furthermore, an important role was played in the formation of the Reagan coalition by rightwing populist elements, which were mobilized by Reagan during his struggle for power but retained extremely ambiguous, sometimes even harshly critical, opinions of the administration's economic and social undertakings and its general policy line.

It is these tensions and conflicts that are reflected in K. Phillips' book.

The author's basic premise is that America has entered a stage of radical shifts and changes--social, economic, political, ideological and others. But Phillips declines to associate these changes only with the shift toward conservatism and believes that American society has already begun to move beyond conservatism. The author suggests that the United States has entered a new stage in its development, a stage during which the cyclical alternation of "conservatism" with "liberalism," which has become traditional in American politics, will no longer take place because both are now undergoing a severe crisis. The mass disillusionment with liberalism, with its neo-Keynesianism and programs for the constant growth of military spending that escalated--according to conservatives--inflation, was interpreted as a "mandate" to cut social programs and reduce government spending. But actual American feelings are far from this simple: The "taxpayers' revolt" and the criticism of "big government" were combined with a reluctance to give up the programs of the "welfare society" and to blindly support the Reaganists who were instituting reforms to benefit the rich and to enhance their privileges.

Phillips senses this duality and expresses the belief that the policy of the conservative Reaganists will suffer a collapse, as will their political coalition. He is certainly not making a great discovery when he acknowledges the contradictory, internally tense nature of the political alliance which took over the government in 1980. It is unstable because it unites diverse forces and groups with extremely diverse aims. According to the author, a new phenomenon has arisen in the sphere of American political ideology--a symbiosis of conservatism and radicalism, the first traces of which were already apparent during B. Goldwater's race for the presidency in 1964. Various forces proposing radical changes in American society, and certainly not the preservation of the status quo, united under conservative banners throughout the 1960's and 1970's, even if only on shaky and temporary foundations. Ronald Reagan, who won the election with their support, is sometimes compared to C. Coolidge (a portrait of whom the current President hung in the Oval Office of the White House), but K. Phillips feels that this analogy is incorrect; in contrast to Coolidge, Reagan supports the "ante-status quo"--that is, he does not want to maintain the current state of affairs, but to return to the past. In other words, Reaganism is "nostalgic conservatism," geared to the past.

The combination of conservatism and radicalism, in Phillips' opinion, is paradoxical and attests to the exhaustion of traditional conservative ideas. In other words, present-day conservatism is something like a *de classe* element, taken up by new, non-traditional, non-elite populist groups. But the author

does not consider the fact that adherence to the status quo is, strictly speaking, the logical limit of conservatism. In real situations, conservatives have often had to support certain social changes, but these could be called regressive. In an atmosphere of strong opposition to new social trends, the tenacity of the status quo can be secured only by relatively regressive programs. Consequently, conservatives who want to perpetuate the current state of political affairs in society often support an alternative which seems regressive and even presupposes the restoration of past traditions. This is why K. Phillips misses the mark when he tries to disregard traditional American conservatism on the grounds that conservatives will never support social change. This is a banal view of conservatism and conservatives. The fact that traditional conservative forces and various types of rightwing radical elements, including rightwing populists, pressuring conservatives from the right and urging them to make radical political decisions, are quite strong in today's rightwing conservative coalition, is another matter.

Phillips specifically mentions two groups with the greatest influence on the evolution of contemporary American conservatism. The first, the neoconservatives, are distinguished less by their direct participation in politics than by their part in the creation of an ideological and psychological climate permitting a serious approach to conservative ideas and principles, which ultimately secured a conservative political victory. The second, the New Right, opposes "big government" but is also against big business, is suspicious of the "free market" and of unlimited corporate power and does not want to give up federal programs of social assistance, although it believes that this assistance should be given to members of the "middle class" rather than to ethnic minorities and the unemployed.

This is the reason for the unavoidable conflict between the sizeable rightwing populist elements of the Reagan coalition and the administration's line of economic reforms to benefit the more privileged population strata. This naturally gives rise to a question: Is the Reagan brand of conservatism only a means of making a complete break with the prevailing liberal trend and a short-term reaction to its collapse, or is it really a long-term alternative? The author is inclined to believe that this is only a kind of springboard or stage of transition to a post-conservative era. He formulates his ideas about America's future development in line with this belief.

If the state of the economy does not improve dramatically and "Reaganomics" is completely discredited, the prestige of private enterprise will decline and the "emancipation" of business will no longer be seen as a panacea. Disillusionment with "Reaganomics" will lead to the mass spread of ideas in support of the redistribution of income by the middle of the 1980's. Futile attempts to revive the "free market" will justify active government intervention in economic affairs and a partnership between government and business on the basis of the European model of "corporate statism."

Phillips predicts the rise of the kind of alliance between business and government which will combine federal efforts in the sphere of capital investments, reindustrialization, the improvement of the balance of trade, the development of heavy industry for defensive purposes and a display of "concern" for the

broad strata of "middle America" which will eventually lead to the establishment of a "society of economic stability." In his opinion, this will promote the rise of specifically American varieties of rightwing radical corporate authoritarianism, resembling German and Italian fascism. Furthermore, the author is certain that substantial elements of the present Reagan coalition will support this turn of events.

One of the key points of Phillips' theory is the analogy (even if only hypothetical) between present-day America and European politics of the 1920's and 1930's, particularly at the time of the Weimar Republic in Germany, when preparations were being made for the fascist takeover. There are three main parallels. The first is severe inflation and the resulting decrease in real wages and income, the declining standard of living and the rise in taxes, from which the "middle strata" suffer the most and which evokes their pronounced discontent. The second is the crisis of faith in the main social and political institutions (what R. Nisbet calls the "twilight of authority" and D. Bell calls a "loss of civic responsibility"), a growing dissatisfaction with the functioning of the political system and a desire for change. The third is the state of "cultural anomalous"---that is, the crisis of traditional cultural and moral values and beliefs and the mass spread of the skepticism, cynicism and hedonism which are so abhorrent to the "middle class." The reaction to the moral crisis in the United States has turned into something like a "neo-Puritan counter-reformation," a rightwing fundamentalist religious "revival." Finally, the fourth parallel is the spread of disillusioned nationalist feelings after a military defeat (World War I for Germany and the Vietnam War for the United States) and the growth of chauvinism. Furthermore, in the United States these tendencies are heightening the sense of the "end of American exclusivity."

Phillips believes that these tendencies and feelings naturally give rise to rightwing populism, and not traditional conservatism. This is why the "rightward shift" in the United States is a shift to rightwing populist radicalism, and not to conservatism. To substantiate his views, the author cites S. Lipset's theory of centrist radicalism, according to which some of the most severe crises will result in the radicalization of the political center. In other words, without shifting to the right or the left, the centrist electorate will seek radical changes and will be prepared to support a "strong government," which is exactly what happened in Hitler's Germany, Mussolini's Italy and Peron's Argentina. According to Phillips, something similar to this can be expected in the United States, and evidence of this can be found in the preoccupation with "law and order" and the desire to return to the pre-inflation, pre-Vietnam era.

The author uses precisely this phenomenon of centrist radicalism to explain the increased activity of various rightwing radical, extremist and neo-Nazi groups in America, the intensification of authoritarian tendencies, the desire for a "strong government" and so forth. Essentially refuting the ideas he expressed in his first book about the "emerging Republican majority," Phillips no longer believes in its rise from the ruins of the "New Deal" coalition. He associates the future of America with rightwing populism, whose current citadel is the "Sun Belt" of the United States. He is actually predicting a rightwing dictatorship, camouflaged, as is often the case, by pseudo-populist slogans and rhetoric.

This puts everything in perspective. We are dealing here with one rightwing radical alternative to Reaganism, essentially a scenario for an ultra-rightist takeover in America and the establishment of an authoritarian regime of the fascist type. And it makes no difference that K. Phillips stipulates that fascism in the United States will differ from the European variety because it will be an "Americanized" variety (which he himself calls "apple-pie authoritarianism"). The main thing is that Phillips not only "slurs over" the diverse and largely contradictory political currents in the mainstream of American populism and says nothing about the ever-present leftist democratic tendencies, but also misrepresents fascism, including the role of the most aggressive segments of monopoly capital in the establishment of a rightwing extremist dictatorship.

Of course, the tendencies described by Phillips do exist in America. It is significant that renowned researcher and journalist Bertram Gross arrives at the same conclusions, although he approaches them from a totally different ideological standpoint, in his book "Friendly Fascism. The New Face of Power in America."* It is a fact that rightwing radical and extremist forces, including neo-Nazis and the Ku Klux Klan, are more active in America today.

We are concerned with something else: How does Phillips himself feel about all of this? Despite his academic tone and pretense of objectivity, his forecast is a rightwing radical solution to American society's present state of crisis.

Absorbed in his apology for a rightwing populist alternative for America, Phillips does not see (and does not want to see) other powerful forces and tendencies which are opposing the rightward shift and which will indisputably continue to influence certain aspects of American social development. For this reason, the author's onesided theory cannot provide any kind of unbiased answer to questions about America's future. But although it does not elucidate the future of America in the slightest, there is no question that it sheds additional light on its present. It points up some facets of the fierce ideological and political struggle between various American conservative and ultra-rightwing factions and testifies that conservatism is not the last conceivable limit of the rightward shift, that there is a more serious danger on the right.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka", "SShA--ekonomika, politika, ideologiya", 1983

8588
CSO: 1803/3

* See SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1982, Nos 1, 2, 3.

BOOK ABOUT U.S.-FRENCH RELATIONS REVIEWED

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 83 (signed to press 21 Oct 83) pp 117-121

[Review by G. A. Trofimenko of book "SShA i Frantsiya: sopernichestvo i partnerstvo" [United States and France: Competition and Partnership] by S. B. Vorontsova, Moscow, Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya, 1983, 127 pages]

[Text] Relations between the United States and France occupy an important place in the structure of American-West European ties. They can have--and have had--a decisive effect on the development of these ties.

France's importance in Washington's European policy stems not only from its economic, military and political potential, and not only from the prominent role Paris plays in European affairs, particularly in East-West relations, but also from the fact that France pursues a separate and independent policy, despite its membership in the North Atlantic pact. During the postwar period France has heralded and promoted several new trends and reversals in Western Europe's approach to the United States, all of the developments whose common denominator has been the establishment of greater equality for the West European states in relations with the overseas giant.

The partnership and rivalry between the United States and France are like a paradigm of all the contradictions of world capitalism and clearly reflect the two general trends pointed out by V. I. Lenin: the one making the alliance of all imperialists inevitable and the other setting some imperialists in opposition to the rest.* It is surprising that so little has been written in our country about American-French relations after World War II.

In essence, only two works have dealt specifically with this topic--L. A. Salycheva's book, which was published in 1970 and describes American-French relations in the 1940's and 1950's, and the chapter by A. I. Utkin in the book "SShA i zapadnoevropeyskiye 'tsentry sily'" [The United States and the West European "Power Centers"] (Moscow, 1978). For this reason, the appearance of this book by S. B. Vorontsova should be welcomed. It is concerned with U.S.-French relations in the 1960's and 1970's, a particularly stormy period in their bilateral diplomacy.

* V. I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 36, p 332.

The short book contains a great deal of factual information about the complex and multifaceted evolution of the relations between the two countries during this period and, what is most important, presents a thoroughly substantiated, well-organized Marxist analysis of these relations during each stage of their development. Furthermore, the author does not simply take a position of academic objectivity in analyzing the policy of the two bourgeois states, but constantly assesses American and French diplomatic moves from the standpoint of their effect on Europe--the continent where our country has the most direct interest in regional peace and tranquility. This approach makes S. B. Vorontsova's book politically pertinent and interesting to the broadest range of readers rather than only to historians of international relations or diplomats.

The author has been able to avoid excessive dependence on chronology in the presentation of her material and has successfully accomplished a double task: She has traced the development of American-French relations from the time France began pursuing an independent policy line to our day and has simultaneously analyzed all of the bilateral problems that have affected the present system of international relations.

It is no secret that France and the United States have held and still hold widely differing views on some economic, political and financial issues and matters of military policy. Whereas France has repeatedly proved to be the most outspoken supporter of the so-called Europeanist tendency, the United States is a confirmed supporter and promoter of Atlanticism, of the political solidarity of states on both sides of the Atlantic under American auspices.

S. B. Vorontsova carefully traces all of the reversals brought about in the evolution of American-French relations by positive processes in Europe. Now that the international situation has been exacerbated to such a degree by the U.S. administration and its NATO allies, it is particularly evident how much positive influence France's status as the pioneer of detente in the West had on the foreign policy of the Fifth Republic and on France's position in the world and how fruitful and significant the friendly and constructive relations between the Soviet Union and France were.

The development of American-French relations at the time when the United States took up the policy of detente in the 1970's and began to improve relations with the USSR is also discussed at length in the book. The author correctly points out the positive U.S. interaction with Western Europe in the improvement of East-West relations as an important feature of this period. The idea that all sides eventually benefit from the relaxation of international tension is stressed repeatedly in the book. This process is not directed against anyone in the world, it produces positive results for all members of the world community and it helps to improve the political climate throughout the world.

On the basis of her analysis, the author rightfully concludes that basic trends in U.S. relations with France were the forerunners of many of the profound changes that took place a short time later in inter-imperialist relations in general. They took the form of weaker American leadership and more intense competition in all fields.

These are some of the important matters analyzed in the book, but it also contains several particularly interesting statements which deserve more detailed discussion.

One is connected with France's withdrawal from the NATO military organization in 1967 and the effect of this action on subsequent NATO policy. The author correctly stresses that this move by the government of the Fifth Republic was dictated largely by the objective need for an independent policy and the desire to "de-Americanize" French foreign and military policy.

The first president of the Fifth Republic, General de Gaulle, must be given most of the credit for this move. He "saw through" the system of U.S. domination over Western Europe, took a penetrating look at Europe's future and planned the kind of strategy for France which would be in Europe's, and not America's, interest.

De Gaulle believed that the system of American domination was based on the NATO military machinery and on the U.S. "nuclear guarantee" ("nuclear umbrella") against the so-called "Soviet military threat."

De Gaulle rejected this American myth, as his subsequent actions demonstrated. In any case, he was fully aware that even if Washington was right about the existence of a "Soviet threat," the U.S. "nuclear guarantee" would become a fiction under the conditions of a Soviet-American balance in strategic arms: The United States would not risk Washington or New York for the sake of Paris or Marseilles. The American leadership needed the notorious "guarantee" only for the perpetuation of the U.S. patronage of Western Europe. As long as this patronage should continue to exist, however, any kind of equal relations between the United States and the West European states would be impossible: The United States would always be able to dictate its own wishes by gambling on the "nuclear guarantee" (including the threat to "take it back," with which Nixon tried to blackmail Western Europe during the American-West European crisis of 1973). De Gaulle understood the machinery of American domination and decided to decline the offer of American "nuclear protection." He did this by taking France out of the NATO military mechanism and by renationalizing, so to speak, French defense.

De Gaulle realized, however, that this move would not be enough and that it would only isolate France in the Atlantic community and not give it the free hand it needed unless the move could be followed by others. For this reason, he tried to shatter the myth of the "Soviet threat" and began the radical normalization of relations with the USSR by means of detente. In this way, France was the first of the Western states to respond effectively to the Soviet Union's peaceful initiatives aimed at safeguarding European and world security, establishing stronger trust between states and expanding the framework of mutually beneficial economic cooperation, and it expressed its willingness to take joint action with the USSR and the countries of the socialist community in the field of disarmament.

De Gaulle did not only agree to active political, economic, scientific and technical cooperation with the Soviet Union. He also substantiated this

cooperation with his ideas about Europe "from the Atlantic to the Urals." Whether these ideas are accepted or not, it is obvious that they represented an alternative to the American approach to European security. Whereas U.S. ruling circles viewed the "security of Europe" primarily as a matter of splitting it up and then gambling on the balance of European power while reinforcing their own domination of Western Europe through the NATO mechanism, for de Gaulle the security of Europe meant that eventually it would cease to be split into opposing military blocs and that all European states would cooperate to keep the peace on the continent and consolidate this peace. This approach to European security coincided with the views of the Soviet Union and the countries of the socialist community, which had long been advocating an all-Europe conference on security and cooperation in Europe.

As we know, detente began in the relations between the USSR and France in the mid-1960's, eventually encompassed all of Europe, was evident in USSR-U.S. relations and ultimately resulted in the Helsinki Final Act, which considerably improved the European climate. It is no coincidence that the English-speaking countries used the French word "detente" to define this process. American political terminology, permeated with the cold war spirit, contained no suitable term to denote the process!

The states party to the all-Europe conference met twice to develop the process that had begun in Helsinki: in Belgrade in 1977-1978 and in Madrid in 1980-1983. The main topic discussed in Madrid was a future conference on measures to strengthen trust and security and on disarmament in Europe. Striving to broaden and deepen the reinforcement of European security, the Soviet Union proposed at the Madrid conference that confidence-building measures encompass all of the territory between the Atlantic and the Urals and expressed its willingness to extend these measures to the entire European half of the USSR.

As for the American "nuclear umbrella," everything that was obvious to de Gaulle in the mid-1960's is now understandable even to any West European schoolchild: The American "nuclear guarantee" is a fiction, with the aid of which the United States is trying to perpetuate its military presence in Europe and its domination of West European policy. The ephemeral nature of this "guarantee" is now obvious even to the Washington leadership. This is why it is working out a strategy of "limited nuclear war" in Europe and is imposing around 600 American medium-range nuclear missiles on the West European states for this purpose. Much has been said and written about how dangerous this move could be for Europe; many have also heard the Soviet Government warning that this move will have repercussions and that the Soviet Union will not allow anyone to disrupt the existing balance between the Warsaw Pact and NATO in the sphere of nuclear weapons.

One thing is not clear: Why is France energetically supporting the deployment of American Pershing-2 missiles in the FRG after taking action to frustrate two previous plans for the emplacement of nuclear weapons in the FRG (the plan for the European Defense Community and the plan for the creation of NATO "multilateral nuclear forces")? One reason is that the current socialist government in France is more pro-NATO than previous governments. Besides this, considering France's historically determined divergent view on the rearming of

its neighbor to the east, we could make another assumption: French ruling circles might believe that the deployment of American nuclear missiles in the FRG will create so many foreign policy difficulties for this country, including difficulties in its relations with the USSR, with other West European countries and even with the United States (which will indisputably demand various types of concessions and services from Bonn in exchange for the "gift" of the nuclear missiles), that they will take the FRG out of the running for the leading position in Western Europe and the EEC for a long time. But would this not be too dangerous and too high a price for France to pay just for the devaluation of the FRG's role in European politics?

In addition to the European dimension, there is another aspect of U.S.-French relations discussed in detail in S. B. Vorontsova's book. This aspect concerns policy toward the developing countries. Postwar relations between the two countries in this area began with Washington's energetic efforts to save the French colonial empire. By supporting Paris' colonialist claims in the 1940's and 1950's, Washington repaid it for its support of the cold war in Europe. The Eisenhower Administration was even prepared to use nuclear weapons to maintain France's proprietorship in Indochina.

But the dialectics of the inter-imperialist struggle eventually made the United States start trying to establish its own spheres of influence in France's former possessions, either with the aid of weapons, as in Indochina, or with "dollar diplomacy," as in Africa and the Middle East. This was certainly not a policy the French bourgeoisie could accept. S. B. Vorontsova presents an extremely accurate and astute description of France's current efforts in the increasingly active pursuit of its own line in the Middle East and other parts of the developing world. Its line contains elements of capitalist class solidarity but is also distinguished by a clearly anti-American aim: to regain the positions in the developing world from which it was displaced by the United States during the continuous political crises of the Fourth Republic (1946-1958). "French views," the author remarks, "are clearly apparent in the EEC's approach to its affiliated states and to the conflicts between the West European 'center' and the United States in vast regions of the developing world. As one of the leaders of the Common Market, France has made a vigorous effort to involve the developing countries in European Community affairs, to consolidate the preferential trade zone and to attach the economics and policy of EEC associate members to the European 'center' rather than to the United States" (p. 88).

It is true that Paris has recently displayed greater solidarity with the United States and even did much to save Washington's prestige by agreeing to participate in the patrol forces in Sinai and Lebanon. But it would certainly be wrong to think that these moves, just as France's actions in Chad, were dictated only by Atlantic solidarity. It is more likely that they were supposed to restore France's influence in the Arab and African countries.

These are just some of the topics discussed in S. B. Vorontsova's interesting and informative book. We can only hope that the author will continue studying this topic because, as the conclusion states, the evolution of U.S.-French relations clearly illustrates a movement "from American domination (in Europe--G. T.) to a partnership, from unilateral dependence to more equal relations between two 'centers' of imperialist rivalry" (pp. 115-116). This is the prevailing tendency today, despite all of the policy reversals and zigzags in the Atlantic community.

RUSSIAN-LANGUAGE EDITION OF U.S. SCIENTIFIC JOURNAL REVIEWED

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 83 (signed to press 21 Oct 83) pp 121-124

[Review by I. Ye. Malashenko of journal V MIRE NAUKI (Russian-language edition of SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN), Moscow, Mir, 1983, Nos 1-6]

[Text] The journal V MIRE NAUKI (S. P. Kapitsa--editor-in-chief), a Russian-language edition of SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, which was founded in the United States in 1845 and is known as one of the best and most prestigious publications popularizing the achievements of contemporary science, began to be published in the Soviet Union in 1983. In essence, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN has been publicizing the successes of not only American science, but also world science in general, for a long time. Its authors are prominent scientists from many countries, including the Soviet Union. Until recently the journal had a circulation of over 1 million in seven countries--the United States, France, the FRG, Italy, Spain, Japan and the PRC. Now there is also a Russian-language edition in the Soviet Union.

The publication of the first issues of the Russian-language edition of SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN was particularly significant under the conditions of the current deterioration of the international political climate and the exacerbation of Soviet-American relations as a result of the behavior of the American leadership. Washington has made several attempts to do away with detente, to curtail scientific and technical cooperation between the Soviet Union and the United States and to "freeze" contacts between scientists in the two countries. This is why the publication of the Russian-language edition of SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN can be regarded as a symbol of the desire of scientists in the two countries for constructive dialogue and for the resolution of the problems facing mankind through international cooperation.

For the past 30 years the publisher of SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN has been Gerard Piel, a talented popularizer of science, under whose guidance the journal acquired its present appearance and won widespread international acclaim. Gerard Piel is a member of the Pugwash Movement, and the publication he heads has consistently advocated the cessation of the arms race and the prevention of nuclear war and has taken an antimilitarist approach to problems in the use of scientific achievements.

The journal V MIRE NAUKI is being published by the Mir Publishing House, which had to solve several difficult problems when the translation for the Soviet reader was being prepared. This is a popular science magazine and it presents material in an accessible style. It contains information about the latest achievements in various fields of knowledge, especially the natural sciences. This means that translators have to have a thorough understanding of the scientific theories and hypotheses put forth on the pages of the magazine by leading specialists.

Besides this, the terminology and the very presentation of material in SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN are geared to a specific segment of the reading public and require not only translation, but also the creative reinterpretation of the entire system of metaphors and images used by the authors and editors of the American edition. In addition, there were sizeable printing problems connected with all of the illustrations which had to be made an organic part of the Russian text and with all of the advertisements addressed to the American reader, which are a common feature of U.S. periodicals.

The Mir Publishing House was able to resolve all of these difficulties and to publish an interesting Soviet edition of high quality which will allow Soviet readers to keep up with the latest scientific achievements. Most of the credit for this must be given to Professor S. P. Kapitsa, editor-in-chief, who has done much to develop and reinforce the network for the popularization of scientific knowledge in the Soviet Union. The journal editors have enlisted the services of highly qualified specialists to work on the translations, and they have been able to accurately convey not only the basic content but also the more subtle nuances of the original English articles. The science editors have skillfully combined fidelity to the original with precise terminology familiar and understandable to the Soviet reading public. The printing format also meets high standards.

Overseas editions of SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN are autonomous to some degree because their editors have the right to leave out some articles and replace them with others that are of greater interest to the readers in a particular country. The Mir Publishing House also intends to exercise this right and to devote some pages of the magazine to Soviet scientific and technical achievements.

The first six issues familiarized the reader with the situation on the advance frontiers of contemporary science and technology. Accessible accounts of the latest theories in fundamental research in physics, reflecting the increasing thoroughness of scientific beliefs about the composition of matter, the nature of elementary particles and the characteristics of processes in the microsphere, have been prominent. Just as many other popular science publications, this journal has contained detailed accounts of the latest achievements in astronomy. These are always of great interest to the general reading public, which has been eager to learn more about the universe.

In addition to publicizing fundamental research, the journal does much to popularize scientific and technical achievements of great practical value in various fields of industry, medicine, computer technology and agriculture. Under the heading "Science and Society" the journal discusses the socioeconomic

significance of scientific discoveries and the social responsibility of the scientist. It regularly publishes bibliographic surveys which are distinguished by their broad range and which allow the reader to keep up with major new works of scientific literature.

It is understandable and natural that many articles deal with the development of contemporary computer technology, on which the directions and rates of contemporary scientific and technical progress largely depend. This is the subject, for example, of "Supercomputers" (No 1, pp 16-29), an article by Technology Development of California researcher R. Levine, in which he discusses supercomputers capable of performing more than 100 million operations per second. There are now two such computer models--the Cray-1 (Cray Research) and the CYBER-205 (Control Data), a few dozen of which have been purchased for 10-15 million dollars by several science laboratories, oil companies, etc. The author says that these computers could be used for the resolution of the most complex problems in hydrodynamics, seismology, meteorology and many fields of physics.

The operational speed of the computers discussed in this article is far from the maximum. Researchers from Edinburgh, A. Abraham, C. Seton and S. D. Smith, state in their article "Optical Computers" (No 4, pp 15-25) that it would be possible to develop computers capable of performing a trillion operations in a second. The authors investigate a hypothesis of the mid-1970's--that laser beams might be substituted for electrical current in computers. They were able to build the basic element of this computer, an optical analogue transistor, which theoretically could considerably heighten the operational speed of a computer. The authors admit that the development of an optical computer would entail the resolution of complex technological problems, but past results indicate the promise of realizing this idea.

American and Japanese companies are waging a fierce competitive struggle in the world computer market. Furthermore, the American magazine admits that the Japanese have taken the lead in several fields. In particular, the Japanese electronics industry has made a breakthrough in the design and production of microcircuits which can perform the functions of larger memory banks. On the strength of this, Japan now controls 50-70 percent of the market for these microcircuits. "The highly organized and rapidly developing semiconductor industry in Japan," the journal reported, "appears to have reached the point at which it can control the market for electronic memory equipment of the last generation" (No 1, p 46).

The intensification of competition and the higher demands made on the products of the semiconductor industry are promoting new forms of production organization. For example, K. Mead, a researcher from the California Institute of Technology, suggests that a new type of industrial enterprise will soon be developed--the so-called silicon workshop, which will produce "semimanufactured" microcircuits, which will then be converted by the client to fit his own needs (No 4, p 14).

In general, the journal V MIRE NAUKI presents a multidimensional picture of the development of contemporary electronics, giving the reader an opportunity

to learn about the foremost projects of the technological revolution and about problems in the organization of research, the improvement of production and the competitive struggle between major firms specializing in computer production.

Laser equipment is being used more and more widely in contemporary production and is heightening the effectiveness and reducing the cost of many technological processes. In his article "Lasers in Industry" (No 1, pp 36-43), Italian expert on the industrial use of lasers A. LaRocca discusses their value in drilling, welding, hardening and alloying processes. The author notes that industrial lasers are superior in many ways to some traditional processing methods. Their use can enhance product quality, reduce material-intensiveness and augment labor productivity.

The present organization of production, however, is frequently unsuitable for the use of highly productive laser equipment and does not take advantage of its full potential. For this reason, many current ideas about the organization of technological processes in metallurgy and some other industries require revision. LaRocca's article directs the reader's attention to the fact that the use of the latest scientific achievements in production requires fundamentally new architectural and engineering designs and a comprehensive approach to the industrial incorporation of the results of the technological revolution.

One of the most impressive achievements of contemporary engineering has been the development and operation of offshore drilling platforms, which now account for around 22 percent of the world output of petroleum. Problems in the development of these gigantic structures are discussed in an article by F. Ellers, director of special projects in a branch of the Bechtel firm (No 2, pp 5-16). The author points out the fact that whereas the construction of the first drilling platforms in shallow sections of the Gulf of Mexico did not present any serious problems, the discovery of rich oil deposits in the North Sea meant that platforms had to be installed at depths reaching 150 meters. In 1981 the Statfjord-B platform was installed 160 kilometers from the coast of Norway in water 145 meters deep. It was expected to drill 32 wells with a daily output of 24,000 cubic meters of oil. The final cost of the platform was around 1.8 billion dollars.

The author also cites the technical features of other types of platforms (the English Magnus and Hatton models and the American Block-280). His analysis of the methods of constructing various types of drilling platforms--concrete gravitation platforms, steel platforms on pilings, tension-support platforms and crane platforms with anchor cables (the latter are designed to drill for oil at depths of over 300 meters and are, according to the author, the most promising type)--is particularly interesting. Underwater drilling equipment is also being developed. The author concludes, however, that drilling platforms will play the leading role in the foreseeable future. It must be said that at a time when problems with energy resources, especially oil, are still pressing matters for the industrially developed Western states, the development of powerful drilling platforms concerns the economic, and sometimes even the political, interests of the countries which are the largest producers and consumers of this major energy resource.

The developmental prospects of U.S. agriculture are the subject of an article by American economists S. Beatty and R. Healy (No 4, pp 49-59), in which they use the data of a comprehensive study initiated by a federal agency in charge of crisis management and environmental protection, the complete results of which were presented in a book published in the United States--"The Future of American Agriculture as a Strategic Resource." The authors note that U.S. agriculture no longer has its previous reserves of the main resources--land, water and energy--and this puts its ability to maintain its current level of production in question. Difficulties with supplies of these resources stem less from a physical shortage than from rising prices. The serious problems faced by American agriculture are erosion, excessive salinization, climatic changes due to environmental pollution, etc.

The authors do not confine themselves to an examination of the "traditional" factors influencing agricultural production and conclude that the future of American agriculture will depend largely on export demand. The authors stress that U.S. agricultural exports exceeded 40 billion dollars a year in the last 3 years; since 1973 more than 62 percent of national expenditures on imported oil have been covered by sales of agricultural products. The authors' conclusions effectively reaffirm the negative impact on nearsighted attempts to restrict agricultural exports for political reasons and to use them to exert pressure on the Soviet Union and other countries.

The authors of articles about progress in medicine approach their subject from various vantage points. The topics discussed include the use of nuclear magnetic resonance (NMR), a method of examining the internal structure of the human organisms without the use of x-rays (the article by American physicist J. Pickett, "NMR--Introscopy in Medicine," No 2, pp 18-29) and of studying metabolical reactions directly in organs and tissues (the article by Yale University Professor R. Shulman, "The NMR-Aided Examination of Living Organisms," No 3, pp 50-58); the study of oncogenes--genes causing cancer, which were first found in viruses but which apparently exist in normal cells as well (the article by University of California Professor J. M. Bishop, "Oncogenes," No 1, pp 64-74).

Problems in the organization of public health care in the United States are also elucidated in the magazine. The production of unprofitable medicines has turned into a serious problem in the country. The magazine reports that "the owners of American pharmaceutical enterprises cynically believe that until at least 100,000 people die of a certain disease, the production of the necessary medicine will not produce a profit" (No 3, p 13). But there are around 2,000 diseases which have killed less than 100,000 people in the United States, and the medicines for many of them exist in principle but their production has not been organized because they are "unprofitable." According to J. Brewer, a researcher from the University of Michigan School of Medicine, this is due to the indifference of pharmaceutical firms and to the inadequacy of applied biological research in medicine.

Professor of clinical pathology S. Geller discusses the causes of the sharp decline in the number of autopsies in the United States, which are now performed only in 15 percent of all deaths, although the indicator was close to 50 percent

after World War II (No 5, pp 82-90). The author feels that one of the main reasons for this is the widespread belief among physicians that a correct diagnosis can almost always be made while the patient is still alive. But this opinion is not only mistaken but can even conceal an attempt to avoid the discovery of incorrect diagnoses. The author stresses that the results of autopsies can be of great value.

Therefore, the reader of V MIRE NAUKI will encounter a sweeping panorama of the state of affairs in medicine today--from accessible accounts of the latest achievements of medico-biological science to discussions of their use in medical practice and the socioeconomic aspects of public health care.

In general, the journal contains engrossing professional discussions of fundamental and applied projects in contemporary science, interesting designs, bold hypotheses, research findings and various aspects of the technological revolution in the United States, which are elucidated in the journal in close conjunction with the progress of all world science and technology.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka", "SShA--ekonomika, politika, ideologiya", 1983

8588

CSO: 1803/3

- END -